

Since 1967, Israel has built an extensive network of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). Does this network prevent the possibility of solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by endorsing the principle of two states for two peoples? This in-depth study – Deceptive Appearances – tells the story of the Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria and examines their impact on the two-state solution. It adopts a thorough and detailed approach in order to present an accurate picture free of assumptions and emotions. The study includes numerous unique maps, tables, and figures that provide a visual depiction of the data discussed.

Through an analysis of numerous aspects of the Jewish settlements in the area, including long-term trends, the study unequivocally disproves the claim that the settlements prevent a two-state solution. However, it adds a clear warning concerning current trends. The concise and precise style of the study answers the question as to whether the settlers have achieved their political objectives, and whether they are likely to do so in the future.



*Dr. Shaul Arieli* is probably the leading expert in Israel today on the Jewish-Arab conflict, and especially on the demarcation of the future Israeli-Palestinian border and the route of the Separation Barrier.

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Shaul Arieli

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**Do the Jewish Settlements in the West Bank  
Negate the Feasibility of the Two-State Solution?**



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Translated by Shaul Vardi



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*Sharon's plan was to deploy so many settlements at so many points in Judea and Samaria that a Palestinian state could never be established. But this plan was foolish. Sharon's isolated settlements weakened rather than strengthened the settlement blocs. Sharon's isolated settlements were a classic case of aiming too high and ending up in a worse position than before.*

Ehud Barak, 2005





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## Executive Summary

Since 1967, Israeli governments have adopted various diplomatic plans for the future of the territories occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War. As part of these plans, and to encourage their implementation, governments established Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The settlements were established in order to create physical, spatial, and psychological conditions enabling the securing of *three political goals*, according to the following rising order of priority:

1. To encircle any Arab political entity with Israeli territories, delineating a border reflecting Israeli priorities.
2. To prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with territorial contiguity by ensuring a substantial Israeli presence, particularly along the central mountain ridge (Route 60).
3. To annex all or significant parts of the occupied territories to the State of Israel without impairing the Zionist vision of a democratic state with a Jewish majority.

*Three key strategies*<sup>1</sup> can be used to secure the three above-mentioned political goals:

1. Control by the new residents of all or parts of the territories through the creation of a settlement network with independent economic capacity, a demographic majority, and spatial dominance in terms of land ownership, built-up areas, and infrastructures.
2. Establishing a complementary settlement network integrating with the existing deployment of the Palestinian population, so that any attempt to separate the two will violate substantive principles of ensuring a stable border between two new political entities.
3. Establishing a wedge-like settlement network impairing the local settlement network in terms of territorial contiguity (urban and agricultural) and transportation contiguity, thereby denying this latter network the capacity to maintain a viable political entity.

Israeli governments sought to secure the first and third goals mainly through the first strategy, and the second goal through the third strategy. The second strategy was never adopted.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> An addition strategy—the transfer of the indigenous population—will not be discussed in this study.

<sup>2</sup> With the exception of the sphere of infrastructures. Following the signing of the Oslo Accord, Israel began a process of separation of infrastructures.

As of the end of 2020, the *Jewish settlement system* included 451,257 Israeli citizens living in four cities (home to 43.5 percent of the Israeli residents), 13 local councils (20.7 percent), and six regional councils (35.8 percent), with a total of 110 settlements. The following are the chief characteristics of the Israeli settlement:

- 75 percent of the settlements have a community and urban character; these are home to 95.3 percent of Jewish residents.
- Over one-third of the Israelis in the territories are Haredim, over one-third are national-religious, and the remainder are secular.
- Two-thirds of the Israeli settlers moved to Judea and Samaria mainly in order to improve their quality of life; one-third moved mainly for faith-based / religious reasons.
- 91 percent of settler votes voted for right-wing parties in the 2021 elections; the remainder voted for parties from the center-left bloc.

Since the signing of the Oslo Accords (the “Declaration of Principles”) in 1993 between the PLO and the Israeli government, which sought to resolve the conflict on the basis of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, the level of support for the two-state solution among the Israeli public has ranged from 45 to 65 percent. However, for over a decade a majority of the public does not believe that the two-state solution is feasible due to *two main perceived obstacles*:

1. The assumption that there is no Palestinian “partner” (an aspect we did not address in this study).
2. The assumption that the growing settlements, together with illegal outposts and farms, have irreversibly changed the demographic situation in the West Bank, preventing any possibility of a two-state solution based on the formula of “the 1967 borders with small land swaps on a 1:1 ratio.”

Is this second assumption based on fact? We will examine this question by gauging the extent to which the Jewish settlement network has secured the three political goals outlined above. This evaluation will in turn be based on *five key criteria and 20 secondary indices*.

CRITERION #1: *Has the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank reached a critical demographic mass?* An examination of the settlement network from this angle reveals the following findings:

1. The proportion of Jews out of the total population of Judea and Samaria rose gradually over the years, and in recent years has stabilized at 14 percent—a level

that does not threaten the firm and decisive Palestinian majority in the area.

2. The demographic balance between Jews and Palestinians in the various settlement areas, according to the different plans, shows that the three political goals have not been secured. It should be noted, however, that in the Jerusalem area, which is home to most of the Israelis who live beyond the Green Line, a Jewish critical mass (primarily Haredi) is currently being consolidated.
3. Regarding *long-term trends*, it emerged that:
  - The nominal growth of the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria over recent years has stabilized at an average of 13,000. The annual growth rate, which reached a peak of 16 percent in 1991, *has shown an ongoing and gradual decline, reaching 2.24 percent in 2020*. This growth rate is still higher than that inside the State of Israel (1.8 percent).
  - Regarding the sources of annual growth—the total migration balance and domestic migration balance have both *been falling constantly since 2000, and in 2020 a negative balance was recorded*. The decline is concentrated mainly in the four cities and some of the local councils that are home to most of the Jewish population in the area. By contrast, the *international migration balance is positive*, and is constituting an increasingly important component in the total migration balance (as high as one-third). *Natural growth is rising gradually, and in recent years has accounted for almost the entire annual growth*. However, *almost half of the natural growth is contributed by the two Haredi cities—Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit*.
  - *The population of Judea and Samaria is particularly young*, even by comparison to the State of Israel, which has a very young population by comparison to the developed countries. This creates potential for future growth, albeit mainly in the Haredi sector.

*According to the current trends, the weight of the Jewish population within the total population of Judea and Samaria can be expected to fall. Growth will rely on natural growth, substantially increasing the proportion of Haredim relative to secular Jews. These processes will not contribute to securing the political goals outlined above, although the dense Haredi population around Jerusalem will strengthen the existing trend toward the emergence of a significant Jewish critical mass in this area. This will require more complex solutions as part of the two-state solution.*

CRITERION#2: *Has a high level of density been created among the Jewish population, potentially enabling contiguous contact and cohesion between its different parts?*



An examination of the settlement network from this aspect reveals the following findings:

1. The general population density in Judea and Samaria is extremely high, even by comparison to the State of Israel, which is considered a highly congested country. The reason for this is the *high level of density of the Palestinian population* (427 persons per sq.km.), *and not the level of density among the Jewish population*, which is 78 per sq.km.—*a level characteristic of peripheral and desert regions. Moreover, the deployment of the Jewish population in parts of Judea and Samaria is linear*, following the main roads and Green Line. This is regarded as a poor quality of deployment, as within Israel itself.
2. The high average distance between settlements, the absence of similar identity-based, cultural, and economic characteristics between all the settlements in the regional councils, and the differences between the population of the large Haredi cities and the surrounding Jewish settlements are all factors that prevent the maintenance of interactions in the social and economic spheres at the level of intensity required for settlement cohesion.

Moreover, *the high average distance between the settlements and the regional council offices*, the need to circumvent Areas A and B (which account for 40 percent of the area of the West Bank), and the need to pass crossings in some instances, together with *the high average distance from service cities* within the Green Line all also prevent settlement cohesion.

All the elements examined here show that there is not a sufficient level of density to create settlement cohesion, with the exception of the Jerusalem area.

CRITERION #3: *Has a hierarchy of settlements been created in terms of size and location?* An examination of the settlement system from this aspect reveals the following findings:

1. Unlike the system inside Israel and the Palestinian system, the hierarchy of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria *does not have a normal urban character and is underdeveloped in urban terms*. The principal problem is that the two relatively large cities—Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit—are poor Haredi cities that do not constitute points of reference for the national-religious or secular population in almost any field. Both are situated on the Green Line, at a great distance from most of the settlements in Judea and Samaria, and both themselves receive the services they require from the main cities inside Israel. The third-largest city, Ma'ale Adumim,

is situated on the edge of the desert and its surrounding settlement system is extremely thin. The fourth city, Ariel, is situated in an excellent location in the center of Samaria, and is home to a university. However, it is relatively small, with some 20,000 residents. The density of the built-up area in all the Jewish cities in Judea and Samaria also reflects an inability to create the potential for extensive urban services (despite the fact that the two Haredi cities are extremely congested, like the Haredi cities inside Israel).

2. From a broad perspective, the *Jewish settlement system* in the entire area, with its high proportion of small settlements (many extremely small), *does not maintain any significant economic and social interactions with the Palestinian urban and rural settlement system*, relying instead on the Israeli cities inside the Green Line, particularly the capital Jerusalem.

*The absence of a settlement hierarchy in terms of location and size in all the areas, and the lack of interaction with the Palestinian settlement system, hamper the ability of the Jewish settlement system in Judea and Samaria to maintain an independent fabric of life, including internal settlement consolidation.*

CRITERION #4: *Does the settlement structure entail a presence on the ground and are the settlements based on local agriculture and industry?* The examination of the settlement system from this aspect, based on numerous parameters, revealed a very limited presence of the Jewish settlements on the ground:

1. The level of private Jewish land ownership is negligible (0.28 percent) and requires the allocation of “state land” for Jewish construction; however, this land is located almost entirely in the Judean Desert and the Jordan Valley.
2. Within the area of the Jewish settlements there is a high proportion of privately-owned Palestinian land.
3. *Israeli agriculture in Judea and Samaria is marginal* and concentrated almost entirely in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area. Only one-fourth of the settlements, four percent of the residents, and 0.6 percent of the Israeli workforce in Judea and Samaria work in agriculture, farming an area of just 143,000 dunams (35,366 acres, mainly in the Jordan Valley). These rates are lower than those inside Israel and in Palestinian agriculture (approx. 1.2-2 million dunams—around 300,000–500,000 acres). Moreover, the regional councils in the area are not agricultural in character, in contrast to the situation inside Israel, with the exception of the two smallest councils—Arvot Hayarden and Megillot Yam Ha-Melakh.

4. The situation regarding Israeli industry is similar: only 5.3 percent of the workforce is employed in industry—*a significantly lower rate than inside Israel*. There are only three significant industrial zones, and 63 percent of the workers in these zones are Palestinians.
5. The *workforce participation rate is particularly high in Judea and Samaria*, and is particularly remarkable given the high proportion of Haredi residents. However, the *proportion of part-time jobs is higher than inside Israel*, and more importantly—the *proportion of those employed in state-funded sectors, particularly the education system, is significantly higher than in Israel*.
6. The proportion of Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria in *the lowest socioeconomic rank (cluster 1)* is much higher than the average inside Israel, due to the high proportion of Haredim (3.5 times their weight inside Israel).
7. The proportion of *residents entitled to a matriculation certificate among Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria is higher than the average in Israel*. However, the *proportion of graduates is lower*, particularly among residents who live in the cities. These findings reflect a poor exploitation of educational potential and/or a shift of graduates to Israel. For all the categories, the proportions among the Haredim are negligible, and significantly lower even than the figures for Haredim inside Israel.
8. Lastly, *a significant proportion of the budget of the local authorities relies on government grants* (balancing, special, and earmarked grants), which are provided with unusual generosity to the non-Haredi authorities in this area.

*These economic statistics highlight the fragile nature of the Jewish settlement system in Judea and Samaria. In the absence of massive and ongoing governmental support, the local authorities will find it difficult to maintaining their existing standard of living, and most of them are liable to be left unable to cope.*

CRITERION #5: *Is the deployment of the population and settlements based on exclusive, or at least safe, principal traffic arteries?* An examination of the settlement system from this aspect reveals the following findings:

1. Half the Jewish residents indeed live within 5 km (as the crow flies) of the Green Line, and three-fourths live within 10 km (one-sixth of the width of the West Bank).
2. The traffic arteries to the Jewish settlements very rarely cross Palestinian communities.
3. However, driving distances within Judea and Samaria are relatively large, and journey times to places of work and service cities inside Israel are relatively long.

*The duration of exposure while traveling through the heart of the Palestinian population is long and liable to entail danger. The IDF makes substantial investments in securing the roads to isolated settlements, but experience shows that most of the attacks take place along the roads.*

IN CONCLUSION: Israeli governments over the decades built the Jewish settlements without any overall master plan adapted to the conditions in the area. They adopted disparate and non-complementary patterns of settlement that emerged in Israel's early years according to the availability of land. In the early years, the governments still believed in the first strategy outlined above—the aspiration to create demographic and spatial dominance over the Palestinian settlement system through expansive Jewish settlement. This constituted an attempt to replicate Israel's successful actions within the Green Line after 1948. Later, in the late 1970s, Ariel Sharon adopted the third strategy, and most of the Jewish settlements (including those later evacuated in 2005) were built during this period. The Jewish settlements were built with a wedge-like shape into the Palestinian system, rather than as an integrated and complementary system. Accordingly, removing the Jewish wedge system (comprising some 60 isolated settlements along the mountain ridge) from within the local Palestinian system, as part of a permanent agreement, will only serve to reinforce the existing Palestinian system; it will alleviate rather than impede its fabric of life.

*This study shows that the Jewish settlement system has failed to secure the three strategies intended to achieve its three political goals. It has not integrated with or complemented the existing Palestinian system; it has not created a demographic majority; and it has not secured spatial control of Judea and Samaria or of one of the settlement areas defined in the various plans. It does not threaten Palestinian territorial integrity along the mountain ridge.*

*The Jewish settlement system does not negate the feasibility of the two-state solution in the spatial and physical dimension. Its impact on the demographic balance and on Palestinian spatial dominance—north of Jerusalem and south of Gush Etsyon—is negligible at best. In the Jerusalem area, however, where the majority of the Israeli population beyond the Green Line is concentrated (including in East Jerusalem), a Jewish urban and demographic mass is emerging that is liable to impede the maintenance of Palestinian contiguity along the mountain ridge. This will demand more extensive functional solutions and arrangements in this area. Israel's future plans in this area, including new neighborhoods and roads, are liable to intensify this*

*trend and to exacerbate the negative impact on the feasibility of the two-state solution.*

*This study shows that the Jewish settlement system has suffered for many years from negative trends in such aspects as demographic growth, sources of growth, socioeconomic ranking, and various economic parameters. If these trends continue, the Jewish population of Judea and Samaria will in the future comprise a Haredi majority, a religious-national minority, and a very small secular population. Thus the Jewish population in the area will become a security and economic burden on the back of the State of Israel—a poor population, lacking independent employment sources, and dependent on Israel within the Green Line in all areas—employment, services, governmental support, and so forth.*

The appendices attached to this study include a detailed study presenting the possible format of an agreement for a two-state solution regarding the four core issues: borders, security, Jerusalem, and the refugees. This proposal includes a suggestion for an optimal border between Israel and Palestine based on land swaps on a scale of four percent, while leaving some 80 percent of the Israelis who live beyond the Green Line under Israeli sovereignty.

The appendices also include a study examining the attitudes of Israelis likely to face eviction as part of a permanent agreement. Three surveys conducted during various periods and using different methodologies among representative samples of ideological and quality-of-life settlers *do not* support the conclusion that it is impossible to implement a two-state solution requiring the evacuation of settlements. The surveys, held among the population liable to face eviction in a future agreement (i.e. outside areas liable to be included in the land swaps) show that most settlers are pragmatic. Even if they do not support the evacuation of settlements, they will be willing to accept the decision, provided that the withdrawal is approved in a government decision and/or referendum. Most settlers disapprove of violence and of protests beyond the scope of the law, and prefer to express their protest in a lawful and legitimate manner.

It also emerged that opposition to a withdrawal is motivated not only by ideological factors, but also by more practical considerations, such as the distance from the place of work, the desire to remain in an existing community, and resistance to change at an advanced age. Effective attention to these aspects could reduce the level of opposition to evacuation. The decision to evacuate settlements will ultimately be taken on the basis of various considerations. The current analysis of the attitudes and desires of settlers in Judea and Samaria suggests that they will not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to a diplomatic solution.

*Accordingly, the greatest challenge facing the two sides is not in the spatial and physical dimension—since it is still possible to reach a two-state solution based on the guiding parameters of the negotiations at Annapolis in 2007, but rather in the political dimension. In this respect, the requisite conditions include a willingness on the part of the Israeli government to readopt the two-state solution, and the ability of the Palestinians to present a single legitimate and authoritative body to pursue negotiations and sign a permanent agreement.*

If Israel wishes to maintain the feasibility of the two-state solution, it should:

- 1. Refrain from its planned actions in the Jerusalem area.*
- 2. Act to concentrate the Israeli settlers in blocs and settlements adjacent to the Green Line.*
- 3. To this end, a plan should be prepared facilitating employment, traffic, and services in the new system, including its future connection to Israel.*





# Deceptive Appearances

**Do the Jewish Settlements in the West Bank**

**Negate the Feasibility of the Two-State Solution?**



# Introduction

Since 1967, Israeli governments have adopted various diplomatic plans for the future of the territories occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War. As part of these plans, and to encourage their implementation, governments established Jewish settlements<sup>3</sup> in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The settlements were established in order to create physical, spatial, and psychological conditions enabling the securing of *three political goals*, according to the following rising order of priority:

1. To encircle any Arab political entity with Israeli territories, delineating a border reflecting Israeli priorities.<sup>4</sup>
2. To prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with territorial contiguity by ensuring a substantial Israeli presence, particularly along the central mountain ridge (Route 60).<sup>5</sup>
3. To annex all or significant parts of the occupied territories to the State of Israel without impairing the Zionist vision of a democratic state with a Jewish majority.<sup>6</sup>

*Three key strategies can be used to secure the three above-mentioned political goals:*

1. Control by the new residents of all or parts of the territories through the creation of a settlement network with independent economic capacity, a demographic majority, and spatial dominance in terms of land ownership, built-up areas, and infrastructures.
2. Establishing a complementary settlement network integrating with the deployment of the Palestinian population, so that any attempt to separate the two will violate substantive principles of ensuring a stable border between two new political entities.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> These settlements are referred to as Jewish and not Israeli since the State of Israel has never annexed the West Bank (apart from the area east of Jerusalem).

<sup>4</sup> See Maps 1, 2, 3: Allon Plan 1967, Sharon Plan 1977, Supersystems Plan 1997.

<sup>5</sup> See Map 4, Drobles Plan 1979. For further details about the plans, see my book *Messianism Meets Reality. The Israeli Settlement Project in Judea and Samaria: Vision or Illusion, 1967-2016* (ECF, 2017).

<sup>6</sup> Around 60 proposals for annexation have been raised over recent years. For further details, see: Commanders for Israel's Security, *Ramifications of West Bank Annexation* (September 2018). See also Map 5, "Calming Plan" of the Jewish Home Party, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> The intermixed deployment of the populations will prevent their separation on an ethnic basis; the new political border will create a barrier in the space between the different residents of the area who maintain a mutual dependency (economic or otherwise), without any ability to ensure proper alternatives for this dependency in each of the two new states; moreover, the border will cross settlements and their immediate living area, including their resources, production sources, and sources of livelihood.

3. Establishing a wedge-like settlement network impairing the local settlement network in terms of territorial contiguity (urban and agricultural) and transportation contiguity, thereby denying this latter network the capacity to maintain a viable political entity.

Israeli governments sought to secure the first and third goals mainly through the first strategy, and the second goal through the third strategy. The second strategy was never adopted.

Since the signing of the Oslo Accords (the “Declaration of Principles”) in 1993 between the PLO and the Israeli government, with the goal of resolving the conflict in accordance with UN Resolutions 242 and 338, the level of support for the two-state solution among the Israeli public has ranged from 45 to 65 percent. However, for over a decade a majority of the public does not believe that the two-state solution is feasible due to two main perceived obstacles. The first is the assumed absence of a Palestinian “partner;” I have addressed this aspect extensively in other publications and it will not be discussed here. The second is the assumption that the growing settlements, together with illegal outposts and farms, have irreversibly changed the demographic situation in the West Bank, preventing any possibility of implementing the two-state solution.

In other words, a majority of Israelis believe that the various Israeli strategies (including the second strategy, which was never adopted or implemented) have been successful, so that it is no longer possible at a reasonable national, social, and personal cost to Israel to separate the two populations according to the basic approach of the negotiations toward a permanent settlement between Israel and the PLO, based on the formula of “the 1967 borders with small land swaps on a 1:1 ratio.” It is also believed that due to this success, the Israeli settlement system has completely crushed the Palestinian system so that this system cannot form the basis of a state.

To put it another way: the perception is that even if Israel has failed and is unable to annex the entire West Bank without impairing the Zionist vision of a democratic state with a Jewish identity and majority, the Jewish settlement system—due to the dispersion of settlements across Judea and Samaria, which prevents ethnic separation at a reasonable national cost—has nevertheless secured two goals: impairing Palestinian territorial contiguity in a manner that will prevent the establishment of a viable state, and creating the physical conditions (demographic balance and spatial dominance) for the annexation of extensive parts of Judea and Samaria.

Have these goals really been secured? We may examine this question by gauging the level of success of the Jewish settlement system in the relevant aspects, on the

basis of five key criteria proposed by the geographer Elisha Efrat<sup>8</sup> and applying a large number of indices.

*The examination proposed here is vital in order to allow the Israeli government to consider its policy concerning the political future of the West Bank based on an updated and reliable picture of the situation at the end of 2020. This will ultimately enable the government to reach a decision on this issue. If it emerges that the Jewish settlement system has indeed secured the political goals, the Israeli government—together with the Palestinians—will need to prepare for the implementation of political solutions other than the “two-states for two peoples” model. If, however, it emerges that this system has failed to secure each of the political goals, the Israeli government—and the Israeli public—will need to abandon this assumed obstacle from the constraints in order to implement the two-state solution as part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians based on the international resolutions.*

The examination will relate not only to the Judea and Samaria as a whole, but also to three territorial divisions that are relevant to gauging the success in securing each of the three political goals: The settlement areas defined in the Sharon Plan, as approved by the Begin government in October 1977 (see Map 2); the area of the six Jewish regional councils (see Map 6); and the system of 11 Palestinian districts in the West Bank (see Map 7). The examination will focus mainly on the situation as of the end of 2020, though in certain aspects we will also present and examine the long-term trends, in order to facilitate an understanding of this picture against the background of the full relevant timeframe.

The study will include a comparison between the Jewish settlement system and the Palestinian population and settlement system. This will allow us to gauge the extent to which the Jewish settlement system has damaged and influenced the spatial and demographic viability of the existing Palestinian system to serve as the basis for a viable state with territorial contiguity.

Numerous researchers, myself included, have published a large number of books, articles, and studies describing the history of the construction of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.<sup>9</sup> Readers who wish to explore the historical aspect in greater detail may refer to these works. In the context of the current study, the Molad

<sup>8</sup> Elisha Efrat, *Geography of Occupation*, Carmel, 2002 (Hebrew).

<sup>9</sup> Hagai Huberman, *Against All Chances: The Story of the Jewish Settlement in Judea, Samaria, Binyamin, and the Jordan Valley, 1967-2006*, Sifriyat Netzarim, 2008 (Hebrew); Akiva Eldad and Idit Zertal, *Masters of the Land*, Kinneret-Zemora-Dvir, 2005 (Hebrew); Shaul Arieli, *Aiming Too High*, Carmel, 2006 (Hebrew).



Institute recently (October 2021) published a study entitled “Non-Violent Civilian Evacuation: Rethinking the End of the Settlement Enterprise.” The study examines the thesis of the irreversibility of the Jewish settlement system and offers a new look at the old method for multi-stage civilian evacuation.

The study will begin by presenting the general background to the establishment of the settlements, highlighting their changing characteristics under the different Israeli governments. This will be followed by the presentation of the indices and analyses relating to the five criteria. The study will end with conclusions and recommendations. In addition, two further documents will be attached: the first will present the main features of a permanent agreement between Israel and Palestine following the “two-states for two peoples” approach, relating to the four core issues; the second will present the settlers’ positions.

The main source of the data in the study are the publications of the Israeli and Palestinian Central Bureaus of Statistics (CBS and PCBS, respectively), as well as independent geographical measurements undertaken from the digital database of the Economic Cooperation Fund (ECF). Some of the maps are taken from the *Truman Institute Atlas of the Jewish-Arab Conflict* (2021).

It is important to note several points concerning data that were particularly difficult to obtain from official sources. Data regarding the settlements were not collected for every year since 1967; the CBS occasionally changed some of the criteria for its indices, and in some instances later updated only part of the criteria behind the data, or the data themselves. It is difficult to determine the exact year of establishment of some of the settlements: sometimes there is a gap between the date on which settlement occurred on the ground and the date when it secured recognition; some settlements began as military settlement points of the Nahal brigade; others were abandoned and then reestablished, and so forth. In some cases there may be a small discrepancy between a figure representing the total of a data series for the settlements and a figure from another publication relating to the area as a whole. Such discrepancies, or minor deviations in calculations, do not impair the conclusions of the study.

A word must be added about the way we use some key terms and names in this study. Since the main question we approach here is whether or not the existence of Jewish settlements in the West Bank rules out a potential implementation of the two-state solution, the main term describing this region will be “Judea and Samaria,” which we will use in the same way it is used by the settlers themselves and by the Israeli authorities. Roughly speaking, the first part of this term (Judea) refers to the southern half of the West Bank (as far south as an imaginary line between Ramallah and Jericho), and the second (Samaria) to the northern half



Map 1: Allon Plan, 1967–1968



Map 2: Sharon Plan, 1977





Map 3: Super Zones Plan, 1997



Map 4: Drobles Plan, 1979





Map 5: "Calming Plan" of the Jewish Home Party, 2012







Map 7: Palestinian Authority Districts in the West Bank, 2020

However, it should be remembered that from the Israeli official point of view the term “Judea and Samaria” does not include the area east of Jerusalem annexed to Israel in 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War. Conversely, for the Palestinians, the term “West Bank” does include this area, the annexation of which was rejected by almost all countries. Moreover, in our analysis we shall sometime talk about several sub-divisions of this region, referring at times to areas such as the Jordan Valley, the Judean Desert, the Hebron Hills, and so on, as well as to Israeli and Palestinian administrative divisions. Thus, “Samaria” as a modern geographic term (Shomron, in Hebrew) will comprise only part of the northern part of the West Bank.

Finally, while we use the names Judea and Samaria (and a handful of other names) in their traditional biblical forms in English, most other geographic terms and names of places are transcribed according to their modern-Hebrew form: for example, Karnei Shomron, Metsadot Yehuda, Mate Binyamin, etc. “Hebron” is as ancient as the Bible can remember, but “Har Khevron Regional Council” is a modern-day invention.

This brief introduction reflects the spirit of the study and of this document, which aims to be focused, short, and to the point, with something of the character of an atlas. Another goal of this study is to provide as full and updated database as possible regarding the Jewish settlement system in Judea and Samaria. The extensive data and analyses will be accompanied by summarizing tables, figures, and maps, allowing the reader to gain an understanding of the full picture relatively simply, and to use the material for his or her own purposes (presentations, studies, articles, etc.).



# Chapter One

## Jewish Settlement Beyond the Green Line: Historical Background

The period between the end of the Six Day War in 1967 and the Oslo Agreements of 1993 may be divided into secondary periods based on the character of the Israeli government in office at the time and its policy toward the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—policy that shaped the character and deployment of the Jewish settlements. By contrast, the period from 1993 through 2020 may be regarded as a single unit, despite the fact that it included governments of various parties, since the deployment of the settlements did not change: existing settlements were expanded, while over one hundred illegal outposts and dozens of farms were established.

### **1967–1977: The Ma’arakh (“Alignment”) Governments**

Over the first decade following the 1967 war, the Israeli prime ministers were Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, and Yitzhak Rabin, all from the Labor Party. A distinction should be made between the policies of Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir concerning the future of the Jewish settlements. Eshkol was concerned about a change in the demographic balance and regarded the territories as a bargaining chip in diplomatic negotiations, at the end of which they would be returned, with the exception of Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.<sup>10</sup> Golda Meir, by contrast, saw no reason to return the occupied territories: “Drawing maps does not bring peace any closer,” she declared. Meir insisted that Israel was interested in peace, but she did not believe in the various peace plans raised in 1970–1971. When Rabin came to office, he shared Eshkol’s basic approach, but sought to achieve peace through gradual agreements: “I prefer interim arrangements, with a testing period between each stage, to the attempt to advance instantly to an overall agreement.” Similarly, Rabin declared that “a transition to true peace is a process, not a one-time act.”

This period was characterized by the beginnings of the war against the Palestinian organizations that had gained a foothold on the Jordanian side of the Jordan Valley, entering Israel to conduct attacks. The period also includes the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the separation agreements signed between Israel and Egypt and Syria in 1974, and the interim agreement with Egypt signed by Rabin in 1975.

<sup>10</sup> In 1967 the population of Israel was 2,745,000, of whom 16 percent were non-Jews. The West Bank had a population of 661,700 Palestinians and no Jews.

During this period, 32 settlements<sup>11</sup> were built in Judea and Samaria (see Map 8). Of these, 17 were built in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area, with the goal of realizing the Allon Plan, which sought to annex these areas to Israel and to make the River Jordan Israel's security border.<sup>12</sup> With the exception of Ma'ale Efra'im, which was built as an urban center, all the other settlements were established as agricultural communities—11 moshavim and five kibbutzim—along Road 90 (the final section of this road, between Jericho and Ein Gedi, was completed in the late 1960s), and along “Allon Road,” from a point in the eastern section of Route 1, close to the Good Samaritan site, through to Mekhola. In the revived settlement bloc of Gush Etsyon, two kibbutzim and four community settlements were constructed. In addition, the foundation was prepared for the construction of Ma'ale Adumim as an urban settlement, as part of the second component of the Allon Plan, added in February 1968—the “Great Triangle” of Jerusalem.<sup>13</sup>

Eight additional settlements were constructed outside the settlement areas defined in the Allon Plan for various reasons, including political struggles between the members of the government (as in the case of Ofra and Kiryat Arba). All these settlements had a community or urban character, with the exception of Mevo Khoron in the “Latrun panhandle,” which in part is a cooperative moshav.

The settlement body responsible for all the settlements during this period was the World Zionist Organization (WZO), with the exception of the urban settlements Ma'ale Efra'im and Kiryat Arba, which were established by the Ministry of Construction and Housing. Most of these settlements belonged to the kibbutz and moshav movements—the secular settlements were concentrated in the Jordan Valley while the religious ones were concentrated in Gush Etsyon: the United Kibbutz Movement (TAKAM, 6 settlements), Ha-Ikhud Ha-Khakla'i (5), the Moshav Movement (2), Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati (2), Ha-Po'el Ha-Mizrakhi (2), Ha-Oved Ha-Tsiyoni (1), and Po'alei Agudat Israel (1). Other settlements were affiliated to Kherut (3). In most cases the bodies responsible for construction were the Ministry of Construction, Kherut, and Bene Beitkha.

<sup>11</sup> In addition, the settlements of Morag, Netser Hazani, Kfar Darom, and Netzarim were established in the Gaza Strip. These settlements were evacuated as part of the Disengagement Plan, and we will not discuss them in this study.

<sup>12</sup> The Allon Plan was a diplomatic plan that proposed to divide the territories occupied in 1967 between Israel and an autonomous entity to be controlled by the Palestinian residents of the territories, or later by a confederation with the Kingdom of Jordan. The plan was submitted to Prime Minister Levy Eshkol on July 26, 1967, by Labor Minister Yigal Allon, under the title “The Future of the Territories and Methods for Attending to the Refugees.” The plan was not officially adopted, but it exerted considerable influence over Israeli policy in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip under the governments led by the Ma'arakh and Labor Party, until the Likud came to power in 1977.

<sup>13</sup> This triangle today has its points at Modi'in Illit, Beitar Illit, and Ma'ale Adumim.



Map 8: Jewish Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1967-1977

Of these settlements, 25 were established within the Palestinian districts of Jericho, Tubas, and Bethlehem. These were later unified into the regional council Arvot Ha-Yarden (1979) and Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh (1981). The six settlements in Gush Etsyon were established in the Palestinian district of Bethlehem, and later formed Gush Etsyon Regional Council (1980).

Seventeen of the settlements are defined as secular (almost all the settlements in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area), 10 as religious (Gush Etsyon), and five as mixed religious-secular communities. In 10 of these settlements the primary motivation for settlement was religious and faith-based; in all the remainder it was the desire for an improved quality of life, although in the Jordan Valley the security motive was also a factor (the desire to protect Israel from a potential Eastern Front of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq).

The results of the most recent elections (2021, based on the party receiving the largest number of votes in each settlement) reveal different political tendencies than might be implied by the original organizational affiliation of the settlements. The Likud was the largest party in 11 settlements, Yemina in eight, Religious Zionism in six, the center-left parties Kakhol Lavan and Yesh Atid in two each, and the Labor Party in one.

At the end of this period, some 5,000 Israelis lived in 32 settlements in Judea and Samaria, alongside a Palestinian population of 775,800. Israelis thus accounted for 0.5 percent of the total population of the area. The State of Israel at the time had a population of 3,613,000, so that the Israelis in Judea and Samaria accounted for just 0.01 percent of the total population of the state.

In light of these statistics, this period can be summarized as follows:

- The construction of the settlements was motivated by a security approach: to encircle a future Arab political entity, and to maintain the River Jordan as Israel's security border.
- Most of the settlements were built in two of the settlement blocs defined in the Allon Plan (although the plan was not adopted in an official government decision): primarily the Jordan Valley, and secondly the "Great Triangle" of Jerusalem.
- Almost all the settlements in these areas are agricultural, while those constructed elsewhere in the context of political struggles are urban. The WZO was the settlement body responsible for almost all these settlements, most of which were affiliated to the agricultural movements.
- The residents of one-third of these settlements are Religious Zionists, motivated to settle in the area by religious and faith-based factors; the remainder are secular, motivated by quality of life and security factors.



- The 2021 election results reflect a shift in the political attitudes of the residents and a transition from the policies of the organizations that established the settlements to the right-wing end of the political spectrum.

## **1977–1984: The Likud Governments**

In the two governments headed by Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud party, Ariel Sharon was as a key figure, serving at various times as agriculture minister, defense minister, the head of the Ministerial Committee on Settlement Affairs, and minister without portfolio (following the report of the Cohen Commission after the First Lebanon War).

In October 1977 the government approved the Sharon Plan, the main point of which was to add a western settlement zone along the Green Line to the outlines of the Allon Plan.

This zone was intended to serve as a Jewish barrier preventing the seepage of the Palestinian population into the State of Israel; to separate the Palestinians in the West Bank from Arab citizens of Israel in the Wadi Ara and “Small Triangle” areas; and to ensure control of strategic hills overlooking the coastal plain, which is home to 70 percent of the population of Israel, 80 percent of its industrial capacity, and its main airports.

The government’s policy sought to annex the territories to Israel via an interim period of limited Palestinian autonomy (according to Begin’s first autonomy plan from 1978). In 1979, Matityahu Drobles, the head of the WZO’s Settlement Division, launched his plan to establish “settlement blocs” throughout the West Bank (see Map 4), with the goal of dissecting the Palestinian settlement system: “The deployment of the settlements must be effected not only around the minority settlements, but also among them...” his plan declared, adding that this “realizes our right to the Land of Israel.”

Two key events occurred during this period. The second of the two was the (First) Lebanon War, which erupted in 1982. A few years earlier, in 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty. The agreement with Egypt followed the framework agreements signed at Camp David in 1978, one of which called for the implementation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip of an autonomy plan, leading after five years to a permanent agreement.

As part of the peace treaty with Egypt, all the Jewish settlements in the Sinai peninsula were evacuated by the summer of 1982 (see Map 9).

In response to the peace treaty with Egypt and the autonomy plan, the group

called Yesha Council was established in 1981, as a successor to the Gush Emunim settlement movement founded in 1974.<sup>14</sup>

Following the Supreme Court ruling in the Elon Moreh petition of 1979, which prohibited the seizure of private Palestinian-owned land to establish settlements on security grounds, and in light of the shortage of water, the agricultural settlement drive in the West Bank was abandoned. This direction had brought only a very small number of settlers to the area. Instead, urban settlement intensified. Over this period 71 new settlements were established.<sup>15</sup> These included 53 community settlements, nine urban settlements, and just seven moshavim and two kibbutzim (see Map 10).

The Likud governments during this period acted contrary to the policy of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had declared that “the government has adopted a defined security policy as to where it is proper to settle and where it is not. On the Golan Heights, in the Jordan Valley, in the Jerusalem area and Gush Etsyon, and in the Rafi’ah strip—yes. In Samaria—no! In the heart of the West Bank, densely populated by Arabs, we should not squeeze in Jewish settlements. Such dramatic settlement shows signs of boastfulness and provocation toward the Arabs and the United States, and is unnecessary and unjustified in security terms.”<sup>16</sup>

Under the Likud governments 33 new settlements were established along the central mountain ridge and on its slopes, mainly in Samaria. In the new settlement bloc in Western Samaria, 10 settlements were established, while 12 settlements were established in the new settlement system in the Southern Hebron Hills. In the two veteran settlement blocs of the Allon Plan, 16 additional settlements were built—nine in the Jordan Valley and Dead Sea area and seven in the Jerusalem area. Of these settlements, 37 are identified as religious, 16 as secular, 14 as mixed, and four as Haredi. The residents of 42 of the settlements arrived mainly for faith-based reasons, while the remainder came for quality of life—including the Haredim, who suffered from housing density (particularly in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak).

<sup>14</sup> “Yesha” is a Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza (maintained even after Israel’s Disengagement from the Gaza Strip). Gush Emunim (the “Block of the Faithful”) was the dominant right-wing religious force behind settlement activities for almost a decade after its establishment in the wake of the 1973 War.

<sup>15</sup> In addition the settlements of Homesh, Ganim, and Kadim were established in the West Bank, and the settlements of Neve Dekalim, Gadid, Gan Or, Bedolakh, Bnei Atzmon, Shalev, Kfar Yam, Rafiakh Yam, Katif, Ganei Tal, Nisanit, and Elei Sinai in the Gaza Strip. All these settlements were evacuated as part of the 2005 Disengagement Plan and will not be discussed here.

<sup>16</sup> Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, 1979.



Map 9: Evacuation of Sinai in Accordance with the Israel-Egypt Accords



Map 10: Jewish Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1977–1984



The settling body in 56 of these settlements was the WZO, as in the previous period, while the remainder were divided between the Ministry of Construction and private companies. The picture of organizational affiliation changed radically: the Amana movement of Gush Emunim was responsible for the establishment of 35 settlements, mainly along the mountain ridge and in the Hebron Hills; Kherut was responsible for eight settlements; and the remainder was divided among various bodies, including Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati, the Moshavim Movement, and Po'alei Agudat Israel. The United Kibbutz Movement (TAKAM) was responsible for the establishment of a single settlement. Most of the settlements adopted the Bene Beitkha ("Build Your Own Home") model, in part in order to deflect pressure from the US Administrations of Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan against the construction and expansion of the settlements.

Twenty settlements were united in the Samaria regional council (established in 1979), 17 in Binyamin regional council (1980), 12 in Har Khevron regional council (1982), five in Arvot Ha-Yarden, three in Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh, six in Gush Etsyon, while the remainder had the status of a local council (seven) and a city (one).

Fifteen settlements were added in the three Palestinian districts where settlements had already been established, while 56 settlements were dispersed around the other districts.

The results of the 2021 elections broadly reflect the original organizational affiliation of these settlements: Yemina was the largest party in 34 settlements, the Likud in 19, Religious Zionism in 12, United Torah Judaism (Ashkenazi Haredi) in three, and Shas (Sephardi Haredi) in one.

By the end of this period of the Likud governments, 35,300 Israelis were living in 103 settlements, alongside a Palestinian population of 885,900. Israelis thus accounted for 3.8 percent of the total population of the area. The State of Israel at the time had a population of 4,159,000, so that the Israelis in Judea and Samaria accounted for just 0.8 percent of the total population of the state.

In light of these statistics, this period can be summarized as follows:

- The principal motivation for the construction of these settlements was the desire to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state (as the natural progression of the 1979 autonomy agreement) by dissecting the Palestinian settlement system in the West Bank. The focus of settlement shifted from the Jordan Valley and the Jerusalem area to the central mountain ridge, from Jenin in the north to the Hebron Hills in the south, along with the western slopes of Samaria, which are densely populated by Palestinians.

- The character of the settlements changed from agricultural to urban, and accordingly the profile of the settlers also changed: from secular supporters of the Labor movement and religious members of Ha-Po'el Ha-Mizrahki to messianic-nationalist members of Gush Emunim, together with Haredim.
- There was a dramatic increase in the average number of new settlements established each year. This period included the establishment of most of the settlements in existence today, and most of those evacuated in 2005. Almost all these settlements have maintained their ideological and organizational affinity to the respective political parties.

## **1984–1990: The Rotation Governments**

This period was dominated by national unity governments led jointly by the Labor Party, under Shimon Peres, and the Likud, under Yitzhak Shamir. Throughout this period, Yitzhak Rabin served as defense minister. A development during this period that deserves mention is the attempt by Shimon Peres, while he was serving as foreign minister, to promote the resolution of the conflict through the London Agreement, signed with King Hussein of Jordan in 1987. Peres subsequently attempted to convene an international peace conference. Both initiatives were thwarted by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. In 1985 the IDF withdrew to a “security zone” in southern Lebanon. In 1987 the First Intifada erupted and Hamas was established. In 1988 King Hussein revoked the historical Jordanian annexation of the West Bank; the PLO, which became the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, recognized UN Resolutions 181 (the “Partition Resolution”) and 242 (“Land for Peace.”)

During this period 16 settlements were established. The trend toward community and urban settlement continued: 10 community and six urban settlements were established, including the Haredi city of Beitar Illit. The location of the settlements reflected a compromise between the positions of the two main parties: six settlements were built in the greater Jerusalem area, five in western Samaria, one in the Jordan Valley (the former three areas represent the settlement blocs according to the Sharon and Allon Plans)—while just three new settlements were established along the mountain ridge and one in the Hebron Hills. Six of these settlements are religious, four are secular, two are mixed, and two are Haredi. The residents of seven settlements were motivated mainly by faith-based factors, while those of the remainder sought to improve their quality of life (see Map 11).

The WZO continued to be the main settlement body, alongside private associations. Amana concentrated on settlement activities in Gush Etsyon and along the mountain

ridge, while other organizations worked mainly in other areas. The Bene Beithkha model, combined with private associations, continued to provide the most convenient framework for construction.

Five new settlements were added both in the Ramallah and the Tulkarm districts, two in the Bethlehem district, and one each in the Jericho and Hebron districts.

The results of the 2021 elections broadly reflect the original organizational affiliation of these settlements: Yemina was the largest party in three settlements, as was the Likud; Religious Zionism was the largest party in five settlements, United Torah Judaism in one, and Shas in two.

By the end of this period, 70,844 Israelis were living in 119 settlements, alongside a Palestinian population of 1,024,300. Israelis thus accounted for 6.46 percent of the total population of the area. The State of Israel at the time had a population of 4,660,000, so that the Israelis in Judea and Samaria accounted for 1.52 percent of the total population of the state.

In light of these statistics, this period can be summarized as follows:

- The average number of new settlements established each year fell sharply by comparison to the previous period.
- Agricultural settlement disappeared entirely; all the new settlements had a community or urban character.
- The “governmental” settlements areas were prioritized. The Ramallah and Hebron districts were more significant in the settlement drive than in the first two periods.

## **1990–1992: The Likud Government**

Although the Labor Party won the largest number of seats (39), Shimon Peres failed to form a government, and a new government was established under Yitzhak Shamir. This was a narrow Likud-government (which functioned as a minority government for part of the period) supported by 59-66 Members of Knesset (out of 120). This period also saw the beginning of massive Jewish immigration from the Former Soviet Union, as well as Ethiopia—a wave that brought a total of 956,319 immigrants to the country.<sup>17</sup> During this period Israel experienced the First Gulf War and, despite the opposition of Prime Minister Shamir, it ultimately attended the Madrid Peace Conference (1991).

<sup>17</sup> By way of comparison, over the following decade just 153,833 Jews made Aliyah; in the next decade 268,277; and most recently (2010–2020) 252,563.





Map 11: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria, 1984–1990


Just two settlements were established during this period, one urban and the other with a community character; both were religious, situated in Samaria (Nablus District), and affiliated with Amana.

By the end of this period, 94,834 Israelis were living in 121 settlements, alongside a Palestinian population of 1,105,300. Israelis thus accounted for 7.9 percent of the total population of the area. The State of Israel at the time had a population of 5,123,000, so that the Israelis in Judea and Samaria accounted for 1.85 percent of the total population of the state.

## **1992–2020: Various Governments**


The prime ministers during this period were Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak from the Labor Party; Ariel Sharon from the Likud and later from Kadima; Ehud Olmert from Kadima; and for 15 years Benjamin Netanyahu from the Likud. Formative events of this period include the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993; the implementation of the Interim Agreement in 1995–1996; and the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994 (see Map 12). The period also saw negotiations between Israel and the PLO toward a permanent agreement (at Camp David in 2000, Taba in 2001, and Annapolis in 2008); these negotiations were based on a map of “vital interests” (see Map 13). This period also included the unofficial Geneva Initiative negotiations in 2003 (see Maps 14-17). Other key events included: the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000; the Second Intifada from 2000 through 2007; the Disengagement Plan in 2005 (see Map 18); and the construction of the Separation Barrier in 2002–2007 (see Map 19). Significant military milestones during the period include primarily the Second Lebanon War of 2006 and four major military operations in the Gaza Strip: Cast Lead (2008), Pillar of Defense (2012), Protective Edge (2014), and Guardian of the Walls (2021, close to the end of Netanyahu’s period of office). President Trump’s Vision for Peace (see Map 20) was launched toward the end of this period, followed by dozens of initiatives to annex parts of Judea and Samaria to Israel. The Abraham Accords were also signed during this period.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> The Abraham Accord are a series of agreements for the normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab countries, reached under US mediation. The agreement was signed at the White House on September 15, 2020 by the US (as mediator), the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Israel. Sudan later joined the agreement. Around the same time an agreement was signed between Israel and Morocco; although this is not formally included in the Abraham Accord, its content is essentially identical.



Map 12: Land Swaps in the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, 1994





Map 13: Israeli National Interests in the West Bank, 2007



Map 14: Camp David, 2000, Israeli Proposal





Map 15: Taba, 2001, Israeli Proposal




Map 16: Geneva Initiative, 2003, Model for a Permanent Agreement





Map 17: Annapolis, 2008, Israeli Proposal



Map 18: Disengagement Plan, 2005







Map 20: President Trump's Vision for Peace, 2020

In 1992 the Rabin government decided to halt the construction of new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Decision 360 stated: “Proceedings relating to outline plans that have not been validated as of the date of adoption of this decision concerning Israeli communities in the Judea and Samaria and Gaza Strip Areas will be halted, unless otherwise recommended by an Exceptions Committee.”

In 1997, in response to the division of authorities in accordance with the Interim Accords into Areas A, B, and C (see Map 21), the WZO Settlement Division formulated a new settlement plan called the “Super Zones Plan” (see Map 3). The main objective of the plan was to reinforce settlement in Area C “in order to facilitate the functioning of the communities and strengthen their socioeconomic fabric.”

Despite the government decision, seven settlements were constructed or approved during this period: The Haredi city of Modi’in Illit, which was established as a private initiative and quickly became the largest Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria; an additional urban settlement; and five community settlements. Of these seven new settlements, four were located on the Green Line, one in the Jordan Valley, and two deep inside the West Bank (see Map 22).<sup>19</sup> Four of the settlements are identified as religious, and their residents settled mainly for faith-related motives; one settlement is Haredi, motivated by the housing crisis in this sector; and two are mixed, motivated by the desire to improve the quality of life. Two new settlements were added in Har Hebron Regional Council (the PA’s Hebron District), one in Arvot Ha-Yarden (Jericho District), two in Binyamin (Ramallah District), and one in Samaria (Tulkarm District).

The 2021 election results reflected the original affiliation of the settlements: the largest party in three settlements was Yemina, Religious Zionism in two, and one each for United Torah Judaism and Yesh Atid.

A new feature of this period is the construction of over 100 illegal “outposts” (see Map 23 and the attached list). These are regarded as “illegal” even under Israeli law, since no government decision was adopted regarding their establishment (we should recall that under international law all the settlements in the territories are illegal). Of these outposts, 21 have undergone a process of retroactive “whitewashing”—three were recognized as settlements (Rekhelem, Sansana, and Brukhin), one as a study institute (Brosh), and two as farms (Giv’at Eitam and Shakhari). The remainder of these 21 outposts were approved as neighborhoods of existing settlements and their residents are included in the population of the parent settlement (see Map 24).

The phenomenon of the establishment of farms has also expanded in recent years,

<sup>19</sup> The settlement of Ofarim, established through a process that lasted many years, was transferred in 2004 from Mate Binyamin Regional Council to Beit Aryeh-Ofarim Regional Council.

offering control of extensive areas through the presence of a handful of families. There are currently some 70 settlement farms in Judea and Samaria (see Map 25 and the attached list).

By the end of this period, 421,257 Israelis were living in 127 settlements, alongside a Palestinian population of 2,720,287 living in 482 communities. Israelis thus accounted for 14.2 percent of the total population of the area. The State of Israel at the time had a population of 9,219,000, so that the Israelis in Judea and Samaria accounted for 4.89 percent of the total population of the state.





Map 21: Interim Agreement, 1995-1998



Map 22: Jewish Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1990–2020



Map 23: Illegal Outposts in Judea and Samaria, 2020<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Source for the map and the list on next page: Peace Now statistics.



## List of Illegal Outposts (See Map 23)

- |                               |                               |                                |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Khavat El Nave             | 48. Khavat Mish'ol Ha-        | 90. Kheruti                    |
| 2. Maoz Zvi                   | Ma'ayan                       | 91. Elevation 468              |
| 3. Khavat Meged Ha'arets      | 49. Giv'at Harel              | 92. Ha-Ro'eh Ha-Ivri           |
| Avnei Hefetz                  | 50. Ha-Ro'eh                  | 93. Nofei Prat Darom Giv'a 324 |
| 4. Ha-Har                     | 51. Khavat Nakhal Shilo (by   | 94. Khan Erets Ha-Mirdafim     |
| 5. Karmei Doron               | Giv'at Harel)                 | 95. Mitspe Ha-Torah            |
| 6. Shirat Ha-Asavim           | 52. Esh Kodesh                | 96. Mitspe Yerikho Tsefon      |
| 7. Khavat Beinta'im           | 53. Akhiya                    | Mizrakh                        |
| 8. Khavat Maskiot Darom-Erets | 54. Kida Mizrakh              | 97. Mul Nevo                   |
| Shemesh                       | 55. Kida                      | 98. Kedam Arava                |
| 9. Um Zuqa                    | 56. Amikhai Darom             | 99. Mitspe Yehuda (Keidar      |
| 10. Khavat Goshen Hemdat      | 57. Adei Ad                   | Mizrakh)                       |
| 11. Har Khemed                | 58. Mizrakhit Le-Malakhei Ha- | 100. Nili Ma'arav-Khavat       |
| 12. Har Eival Outpost         | Shalom                        | Magnezi                        |
| 13. Khavat Ha-Shkedim Elon    | 59. Malakhei Ha-Shalom        | 101. Neve Daniel Tsafon        |
| Moreh                         | 60. Neve Akhi                 | 102. Khavat Kashuela           |
| 14. Nakhalat Yosef            | 61. Yad Akhi-Khalamish        | 103. Derekh Ha-Avot            |
| 15. Khavat Skali              | Mizrakh                       | 104. Bat Ayin Ma'arav          |
| 16. Ha-Khava Shel Moshe       | 62. Ha-Khava Shel Mikha       | 105. Masu'ot Yitzkhak Ha-      |
| 17. Khavat Beit Dajan         | Khadasha                      | Yeshana                        |
| 18. Tsufim Tsafon             | 63. Khavat Erets Ha-Tsvi-     | 106. Giv'at Ha-Khish           |
| 19. Khavat Gil'ad             | Nakhli'el                     | 107. Bat Ayin Mizrakh          |
| 20. Khavat Yetedot-Khavat     | 64. Ma'akhaz Makhrur          | 108. Oz Ve-Ga'on               |
| Gilad Darom                   | 65. Zayit Ra'anani            | 109. Ma'ale Rekhav'am          |
| 21. Brakha A                  | 66. Khavat Ras Karkar (Sde    | 110. Teko'a B-C                |
| 22. Sene Ya'akov              | Efra'im)                      | 111. Teko'a D                  |
| 23. Akhuzat Shalhevet         | 67. Ofra Tsefon Mizrakh       | 112. Teko'a E                  |
| 24. Khavat Shaked             | 68. Jabal Ghartis             | 113. Tsur Shalem               |
| 25. Lehavat Yits'har          | 69. Beit El Mizrakh           | 114. Ma'ale Amos Ma'arav       |
| 26. Giv'a 851                 | 70. Makhon Mishpeti Erets     | 115. Penei Kedem               |
| 27. Mitspe Yits'har           | 71. Ha-Khava Shel Mikha       | 116. Khavat Penei Kedem        |
| 28. Ha-Nekuda                 | 72. Kokhav Ha-Shakhar Tsefon  | 117. Asfar Darom               |
| 29. Giv'a 851                 | Mizrakh                       | 118. Ma'akhaz Gal              |
| 30. Giv'a 782                 | 73. Ahavat Khayim             | 119. Mitspe Lakhish            |
| 31. Giv'ot Olam               | 74. Mitspe Kramim             | 120. Khavat Negohot            |
| 32. Giv'a 836                 | 75. Mitspe Kramim Mizrakh     | 121. Adorayim                  |
| 33. Giv'a 777                 | 76. Ma'ale Ahuvya             | 122. Penei Khever Darom        |
| 34. Itamar 573                | 77. Ma'ale Shlomo             | 123. Um Zeituna                |
| 35. Ramat Gil'ad              | 78. Rimonim Tsafon            | 124. Khavat Ma'on              |
| 36. Alonei Shilo              | 79. Khavat Omer               | 125. Susya Ancient Synagogue   |
| 37. Khavat Ya'ir              | 80. Ha-Khava Shel Nerya Ben   | 126. Aviga'il                  |
| 38. Makhane Gadi              | Pazi                          | 127. Susya Tsefon Ma'arav      |
| 39. Magen Dan                 | 81. Giv'at Asaf               | 128. Susya Mizrakh             |
| 40. Ma'ale Yisra'el           | 82. Mevo'ot Yerikho           | 129. Mitspe Ya'ir              |
| 41. Kfar Tapu'akh Ma'arav     | 83. Mitspe Ha'ai              | 130. Khavat Mor                |
| 42. Nofei Nekhemia            | 84. Kokhav Ya'akov Ma'arav    | 131. Ha-Khava Shel Shabtai     |
| 43. Khavat Nof Avi            | 85. Kokhav Ya'akov Mizrakh    | 132. Meitarim Ma'arav          |
| 44. Palgei Mayim              | 86. Mitspe Dani               | 133. Asa'el Ma'arav            |
| 45. Nof Harim                 | 87. Neve Erez                 | 134. Asa'el                    |
| 46. Ha-Yovel                  | 88. Ma'ale Khagit             | 135. Nof Nesher                |
| 47. Ha-Karon                  | 89. Bene Adam                 |                                |



Map 24: "Whitewashed" Outposts, 2020





Map 25: Jewish Farms in Judea and Samaria<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Source for the map and the list on next page: Dror Etkes, Kerem Navot.

## List of Jewish Farms in Judea and Samaria (See Map 25)

1. Talia	24. Erets Ha-Tsvi	47. Har Eival–Meshulami
2. Shel Shabtai	25. Mikne Yehuda	48. Ahavat Olam
3. Negohot	26. Yetedot	49. Yisakhar Man
4. Har Sinai	27. Beit Khagai	50. Shel Moshe
5. Ma'on	28. Yehuda	51. Shel Koko
6. Midbar Khever	29. Le-Khatkhila	52. Mikha Ha-Khadasha
7. Penei Kedem	30. Magnezi	53. Nof Avi
8. Arugot / Tsurei Ye'elim	31. Tson Kida	54. Ma'ale Ahuvia
9. Sede Bar	32. Neve Uri	55. Nakhal Shilo
10. Kashuela	33. Sede Efra'im	56. Malakhei Ha-Shalom–Fasa'il
11. Ha-Ro'eh Ha-Ivri	34. El Nave	57. Giv'a 324
12. Omer	35. Itamar 777	58. Penei Kedem Mizrakh
13. Ma'ale Shlomo	36. Yishuv Ha-Da'at	59. Meitarim Ma'arav
14. Malakhei Ha-Shalom	37. Meged Ha-Arets	60. Shim'a Ma'arav
15. Giv'ot Olam	38. Tene Yarok	61. Ma'ale Amos
16. Itamar Cohen	39. Tapu'akh Ma'arav	62. Eden
17. Skali	40. Ma'ale Shlomo	63. Mevo'ot Yerikho
18. Ha-Shkedim	41. Mitspe Yehuda	64. Shakharit
19. Shirat Ha-Asavim	42. Erets Shemesh	65. Ya'ir
20. Maskiyot	43. Rimonim	66. Nakhal Kane
21. Uri Cohen	44. Mitspe Kramim Mizrakh	67. Mitspe Ya'ir
22. Goshen	45. Ruti	
23. Mitspe Dotan	46. Adis Alam	

## Interim Summary

### 1. Number of Settlements

A total of 148 settlements were built in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Of these, all 17 settlements in Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip and four settlements in northern Samaria were evacuated as part of the Disengagement Plan (and will not be discussed here). Today there are 127<sup>22</sup> settlements (see Map 26), as well as 135 illegal outposts whose status has not been regulated (through “whitewashing” or evacuation) and 67 farms (see Maps 23, 25, and the attached lists). The total number of Israeli-Jewish residents registered in Judea and Samaria is 451,257.

### 2. Year of Establishment

See Table 1 and Map 27.

<sup>22</sup> Ma'ale Shomron was unified with Karnei Shomron in 2020.

## List of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, 2020

- Four cities: Modi'in Illit, Beitar Illit, Ma'ale Adumim, and Ariel
- 13 local councils: Giv'at Ze'ev, Ma'ale Efra'im, Elkana, Beit El, Alfei Menashe, Oranit, Kedumim, Kiryat Arba, Har Adar, Efrat, Beit Arye-Ofarim, Karnei Shomron, and Imanu'el (there is also a local committee of the Jewish quarter in Hebron, which will not be discussed here).
- Six regional councils (in parentheses, frequently-used shortened names):
  1. Arvot Ha-Yarden: Argaman, Mekhora, Beka'ot, Ro'i, Khemdat, Maskiyot, Petsa'el, Netiv Ha-Gdud, Masu'a, Gilgal, Yitav, No'omi, Niran, Gitit, Tomer, Khamra, Mekhola, Shadmot Mekhola, Yafit, Rotem.
  2. Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh (Megilot): Vered Yerikho, Beit Ha-Arava, Almog, Ovnat, Mitspe Shalem, Kalia.
  3. Shomron: Shaked, Khinanit, Reikhan, Einav, Avnei Khefets, Mevo Dotan, Khermesh, Itamar, Yits'har, Brakha, Elon Moreh, Kfar Tapu'akh, Barkan, Yakir, Ets Efra'im, Sal'it, Tsufim, Nofim, Rekhelem, Revava, Kiryat Netafim, Shavei Shomron, Sha'arei Tikva, Pedu'el, Alei Zahav, Brukhin, Migdalim.
  4. Mate Binyamin (Binyamin): Mevo Khoron, Beit Khoron, Giv'on Ha-Khadasha, Pesagot, Ofra, Kokhav Ya'akov, Geva Binyamin (Adam), Shilo, Ma'ale Levona, Mitspe Yerikho, Ma'ale Mikhmash, Kfar Adumim, Almon, Talmon, Ganei Modi'in, Khashmona'im, Matityahu, Kfar Ha-Oranim, Nili, Na'ale, Dolev, Kokhav Ha-Shakhar, Amikhai, Rimonim, Ateret, Khalamish, Nakhli'el, Eli.
  5. Gush Etsyon (Etsyon): Kfar Etsyon, Alon Shvut, Rosh Tsurim, El'azar, Bat Ayin, Neve Daniel, Har Gilo, Teko'a, Ma'ale Amos, Nokdim, Migdal Oz, Karnei Tsur, Keidar, Asfar.
  6. Har Khevron (Khevron): Shani, Sansana, Eshkolot, Otni'el, Penei Khever, Metsadot Yehuda, Negohot, Shim'a, Ma'on, Tene, Carmel, Susya, Khagai, Telem, Adora.





**Map 26: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria by Jewish Administrative Divisions, 2020**

**Table 1: Jewish Settlements by Year of Establishment**

Year	Government	Num. of settlements	Num. of residents	Annual addition as % of residents in 2020
1967		1	-	-
1968		3	-	-
1969		1	-	-
1970		6	-	-
1971		2	-	-
1972	Labor	3	-	-
1973		2	-	-
1974		0	-	-
1975		4	-	-
1976		2	-	-
1977		14	5,000	-
1978		6	-	-
1979		4	-	-
1980		7	-	-
1981	Likud	16	-	-
1982		9	14,536	3.2
1983		16	21,002	1.4
1984		7	35,300	3.2
1985		8	37,695	0.5
1986		2	44,627	1.5
1987	Labor/Likud	1	50,474	1.3
1988		1	55,772	1.2
1989		3	61,985	1.4
1990		0	70,844	2.0
1991	Likud	2	82,865	2.7
1992		0	94,834	2.7
1993		0	110,066	3.4
1994		0	124,005	3.1
1995	Labor	0	137,466	3.0
1996		1	139,102	0.4
1997		0	151,801	2.8
1998	Likud	1	165,024	2.9
1999		3	173,782	1.9
2000		0	190,439	3.7
2001	Labor	1	200,911	2.3
2002		0	211,408	2.3
2003		0	223,325	2.6
2004	Likud	0	235,524	2.7
2005		0	247,654	2.7
2006		0	261,953	3.2
2007		0	276,462	3.2
2008	Kadima	0	282,001	1.2
2009		0	296,478	3.2
2010		0	311,144	3.3
2011		0	325,601	3.2
2012		0	341,848	3.6
2013		0	356,429	3.2
2014		0	370,212	3.1
2015	Likud	0	385,734	3.4
2016		0	399,035	2.9
2017		0	413,208	3.1
2018		1	427,616	3.2
2019		0	441,363	3.0
2020		0	451,257	2.2



























































### 3. Division into Local Authorities

See Table 2 and Map 26.












**Table 2: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria  
by Israeli Administrative Division, 2020**

Type / Name of Local Authority	Settlements		Residents	
		Num.		%
<b>Total</b>		127		451,257 100.0
<b>Cities</b>		4		196,520 43.5
Modi'in Illit		1		77,967 17.3
Beitar Illit		1		61,125 13.5
Ma'ale Adumim		1		37,846 8.4
Ariel		1		19,582 4.3
<b>Local Councils</b>		13		93,347 20.7
Giv'at Ze'ev		1		19,225 4.3
Efrat		1		11,405 2.5
Karnei Shomron		1		9,417 2.1
Oranit		1		8,965 2.0
Alfei Menashe		1		7,997 1.8
Kiryat Arba		1		7,338 1.6
Beit El		1		5,684 1.3
Beit Arye		1		5,351 1.2
Kedumim		1		4,586 1.0
Immanuel		1		4,129 0.9
Har Adar		1		4,084 0.9
Elkana		1		3,911 0.9
Ma'ale Efra'im		1		1,255 0.3
<b>Regional Councils</b>		110		161,390 35.8
Binyamin		28		71,632 15.9
Shomron		27		47,241 10.5
Gush Etsyon		14		24,935 5.5
Har Khevron		15		9,964 2.2
Arvot Ha-Yarden		20		5,650 1.3
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh		6		1,968 0.4

### 4. Organizational Affiliation

See Table 3 and Map 28.

**Table 3: Jewish Settlements  
in Judea and Samaria  
by Organizational Affiliation**

Body	Num. of Settlements
<b>Total</b>	 127
Amana	 47
Kherut	 11
Ha-Po'el Ha-Mizrakhi	 7
United Kibbutz Movement	 7
Ha-Ikhud Ha-Khakla'i	 6
Moshavim Movement	 5
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael	 4
Ha-Kibbutz Ha-Dati	 3
Ha-Oved Ha-Tsioni	 2
Other	 35













Map 28: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria by Organizational Affiliation, 2020

## 5. Type of Settlement

See Table 4 and Map 29.

























**Table 4: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria  
by Type of Settlement**

Type of settlement	Settlements		Residents	
		Num.		%
<b>Total</b>		127		100.0
Kibbutz		10		1.0
Moshav		21		2.7
Community		74		31.5
Urban		22		63.9

## 6. Division by Palestinian Districts

See Table 5 and Map 30.









**Table 5: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria  
by Palestinian Districts**

Palestinian District	Settlements		Residents	
		Num.		%
<b>Total</b>		127		100.0
Ramallah		5		28.1
Bethlehem		22		20.5
Jerusalem		20		18.9
Salfit		6		12.7
Qalqilya		3		6.7
Hebron		10		4.7
Nablus		7		4.6
Jericho		12		1.6
Tubas		14		0.6
Tulkarm		5		1.0
Jenin		13		0.8

## 7. Motivation for Settlement

See Table 6 and Map 31.

**Table 6: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria  
by Motivation for Settlement**

Motivation	Settlements		Residents	
		Num.		%
<b>Total</b>		127		100.0
Quality of life		56		34.7
Housing/Haredi		7		32.9
Faith/religion		64		32.4





Map 29: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria by Type of Settlement, 2020















Map 30: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria by Palestinian Districts, 2020



## 8. Division by Religious Character

See Table 7 and Map 32.






























**Table 7: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria  
by Religious Character**

Religious character	Settlements	Residents	
	Num.	Num.	%
<b>Total</b>	 127	 451,257	100.0
Haredi	 7	 148,541	32.9
Mixed	 24	 121,894	27.0
Religious	 59	 118,768	26.3
Secular	 37	 62,054	13.8

## 9. Political Orientation

See Table 8 and Map 33, which show the party that gained the largest number of votes in the elections to the 24th Knesset (March 2021).

**Table 8: Elections to 24th Knesset, March 2021**


Party	Num. of Settlements	Num. of Votes	Num. of Mandates
<b>Total</b>	 122	 175,383	
Religious Zionism	 24	 40,825	 1.1
United Torah Judaism	 5	 36,450	 1.0
Likud	 32	 35,436	 0.9
Yemina	 50	 25,396	 0.7
Shas	 3	 18,047	 0.4
Yesh Atid	 5	 8,211	 0.2
Kakhol Lavan	 2	 4,068	 0.1
Yisrael Beiteinu	 0	 4,051	 0.1
Labor	 1	 2,899	 0.1





Map 32: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria by Religious Character, 2020





Map 33: Elections to 24th Knesset, March 2021

## Key Findings

- The first wave of settlements, in the 1960s and 1970s, was concentrated mainly in the Jordan Valley, and to a lesser extent around Jerusalem. The second wave, in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on the central mountain ridge, including the Hebron Hills; this period also saw the first settlements in western Samaria. The third wave, in the late 1980s and 1990s, extended across the West Bank, with a particular emphasis on western Samaria.
- Most of the settlements were built from 1977 through 1985, under the Likud governments headed by Menachem Begin, and with Ariel Sharon as agriculture or defense minister (87 settlements—68 percent of those now in existence).<sup>23</sup>
- Agricultural settlements (kibbutzim and moshavim) constituted a majority of the settlements during the first decade (Ma'arakh governments), but now account for 22.6 percent of the settlements. The majority of these are secular, and their total population is 16,722—just 3.7 percent of the Jewish residents in Judea and Samaria. By contrast, urban community settlements now constitute a majority and are home to 96.3 percent of the settlers.
- Of the existing settlements, 64 (with 148,431 residents) were established for faith-based or messianic motives and 63 with the motive of improving the quality of life, including for Haredim (these settlements have a total of 302,826 residents, or 67 percent of all Israelis living in Judea and Samaria). The number of religious settlements is almost twice that of secular ones; only a third of the settlements have a mixed religious-secular character.
- In the 2021 elections, one or other of the right-wing parties was the largest party in 114 settlements; a left-wing or centrist party came first in just 13 settlements. The right-wing parties gained 4.2 Knesset seats from residents of Judea and Samaria, while other parties gained 0.3 of a seat. The Haredi parties won 1.4 seats, Religious Zionist parties won 1.8, and secular parties just 1.4.
- Most of the settlements were established in the Palestinian districts of Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Hebron—the preferred settlement areas under the Allon Plan and the Sharon Plan.
- The proportion of Israelis in the total population of Judea and Samaria has risen gradually to 14 percent, and their weight within the total population of Israel has also climbed steadily to 4.89 percent.

<sup>23</sup> As already noted, 15 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were evacuated in 2005.

**Table 9: Summary Table, 1967–2020**

Period	Government	PM	Key Events	Main Plan	Settlement Zones	Num. of Settlements	Num. of Israel at End of Period	Types of Settlements	Population	Num. of Palestinians	Israelis as % of Population	Population of Israel	Settlers as % of Israeli Population
1967-1977	Labor	Eshkol Meyer Rabin	1973 Yom Kippur War War of Attrition	Allon	Jordan Valley and Greater Jerusalem	32	Aprox. 5,000	Agricultural	Secular	775,800	0.60	3,613,000	0.01
1977-1984	Likud	Begin	First Lebanon War Peace with Egypt	Sharon Drobls	Mountain Ridge and Western Samaria	71	35,300	Community and urban	Religious Zionist and secular	885,900	3.80	4,159,000	0.80
1984-1990	Labor/Likud	Peres Shamir	London Agreement and annulment of Jordanian annexation PLO accepts Resolutions 181, 242 First Intifada Establishment of Hamas		All JS	16	70,844	Urban and community	Haredi and Religious-Zionist	1,014,300	6.46	4,660,000	1.52
1990-1992	Likud	Shamir	Gulf War Madrid Conference		Western Samaria	2	94,834	Community	Religious-Zionist	1,105,300	7.90	51,323,000	1.85
1992-2000	Labor  Likud  Kadima	Rabin Peres Barak Sharon Netanyahu Sharon Olmert	Oslo Annapolis Second Intifada Establishment of Separation Barrier Withdrawal from Lebanon Disengagement Second Lebanon War Hamas seizes control of Gaza	Superzones	Western Samaria and Mountain Ridge	7	451,257	Community and urban	Haredi and Religious-Zionist	2,720,287	14.20	9,219,000	4.89

# Chapter Two

## An Examination of the Three Political Goals According to Five Criteria

### Research Method

This chapter examines the extent to which the three political goals behind the construction of the Jewish settlement system in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank excluding East Jerusalem) have been secured. It does so by applying five criteria and indices in various spheres.

### The Three Political Goals

We will begin by reiterating the three political goals the Israeli governments defined in their settlement policies in Judea and Samaria:

1. To encircle any Arab political entity with Israeli territories controlling this territory and its desired borders.
2. To prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with territorial contiguity by ensuring a substantial Israeli presence, particularly along the central mountain ridge (Route 60).
3. To annex all or significant parts of the occupied territories to the State of Israel without impairing the Zionist vision of a democratic state with a Jewish majority.

### Three Territorial Definitions

As noted, Israel's success in securing the above-mentioned political goals will be examined both with regard to Judea and Samaria as a whole, and with reference to three additional territorial definitions:

1. *The 1977 Sharon Plan*, which includes the 1967 Allon Plan. This plan concentrates on building Jewish settlement zones in areas with a limited Palestinian population, with the goal of creating a Jewish settlement envelope around the main Palestinian settlement system along the central mountain ridge (Route 60). The plan includes three settlement zones: The Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea, western Samaria, and Judea and the greater Jerusalem area. This study also addresses the remainder of the area, principally the central mountain ridge. The Sharon Plan could be



expected to provide the easiest path to securing the first and third political goals, precisely because it excluded the main Palestinian settlement system along the central mountain ridge (see Map 2).

2. A division based on the borders of the *six Jewish regional councils*. This division, which developed over the years as the number of Jewish settlements and settlers rose, creates geographical sub-divisions that could be expected to contribute to securing the political goals in specific areas. As a general rule, regional councils inside Israel have a very large area relative to their population, due to their rural character. In many instances, the area of a regional council encircles urban “enclaves” that constitute separate municipal entities and are not part of the council’s area or jurisdiction. This division should also facilitate the securing of the political goals, since it is based on Israeli interests, albeit to a lesser extent than the Sharon Plan.
3. A division into the *11 Palestinian districts* in the West Bank (excluding the city of Jerusalem). Following the Oslo Accords, this division is based in part on the centrality of the Palestinian cities and on historical patterns of administrative division in Palestine. This division is naturally the most challenging in terms of securing the political goals of the Jewish settlement system, since the spatial delineation is grounded in Palestinian considerations and constraints. The division into Palestinian districts was examined here in order to gauge the degree of Palestinian spatial and demographic dominance in the different areas of the West Bank—to what extent do these areas feature a settlement system capable of maintaining a viable state. This examination also permits a comparison between the Palestinian and Jewish settlement systems.

The examination for all these territorial divisions will allow us to reach clear and firmly-grounded conclusions.

## **The Five Criteria and the 20 Indices**

CRITERION #1: *Has the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank reached a critical demographic mass?*

This criterion will be examined according to the following sub-indices:

1. The demographic balance between Jews and Arabs.
2. Long-term trends: annual growth, total net migration, net domestic migration, net international migration, natural growth, and age distribution.

CRITERION #2: *Has a high level of density been created among the Jewish population, potentially enabling contiguous contact and cohesion between its different parts?*

This criterion will be examined according to the following sub-indices:

1. A comparison between the density of Jewish and Arab settlement.
2. The average distance between Jewish settlements within the regional council.
3. The distance from the municipal authority and the need to pass crossings in order to reach it.
4. The distance from the service city and the need to pass crossings in order to reach it.

CRITERION #3: *Has a hierarchy of settlements been created in terms of size and location?*

This criterion will be examined according to the size, location, area, and population of Jewish and Arab settlements and the proportion between the two.

CRITERION #4: *Does the settlement structure entail a presence on the ground and are the settlements based on local agriculture and industry?*

This criterion will be examined according to the following sub-indices:

1. A comparison of Jewish and Arab land ownership.
2. Land ownership in the built-up areas of the Jewish settlements.
3. Agriculture and industry.
4. Employment sectors.
5. Salaries.
6. Workers in the Judea and Samaria District.
7. Socioeconomic ranking.
8. Higher education.
9. Government grants to the local authority.

CRITERION #5: *Is the deployment of the population and settlements based on exclusive, or at least safe, principal traffic arteries?*

This criterion will be examined according to the following sub-indices:

1. Distance between the settlements and the Green Line.
2. Length of roads used by Israelis to reach the service city.
3. Need to pass a crossing in order to enter Israel.
4. Need to cross a Palestinian settlement.

We will examine the first goal with regard to the areas that were supposed to form part of the envelope surrounding a Palestinian entity: the Jordan Valley and northern

Dead Sea to the east, and the western settlement zone along the Green Line to the west. The second goal will be examined along the central mountain ridge and in the greater Jerusalem area. The third goal will be examined for the Sharon Plan area and for Judea and Samaria as a whole.

We will also provide *two analyses*:

1. The key features of the two-state solution, including a proposal for setting the border in a permanent agreement.
2. The attitudes of Israelis living beyond the Green Line on questions relating to their possible evacuation.

# Chapter Three

## Criterion #1: Has the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank reached a critical demographic mass?

### Demographic Balance between Israelis and Palestinians

This index compares the number of Israelis and Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. A demographic balance of 3:1 or more (i.e. a majority of 75 percent and above) on either side is defined as a firm and stable demographic majority allowing the maintenance of the state's ethnic characteristics. History shows that a national minority of more than 30 percent that has conflicting and independent national aspirations eventually causes internal instability in a state.

**Table 10: Demographic Balance by Settlement Zones of the Sharon Plan**

Sharon Plan	Residents				Demographic Balance	
	Israelis		Palestinians		Balance between Israelis/Palestinians	
	Num.	%	%	Num.		
<b>Total</b>	451,257	14.2	85.8	2,720,287	1.0	6.0
Greater Jerusalem	235,495	51.9	48.1	218,098	1.0	0.9
Western Samaria and Judea	107,806	17.8	82.2	498,976	1.0	4.6
Jordan Valley	65,353	7.8	92.2	769,347	1.0	11.8
Mountain Ridge	42,603	3.3	96.7	1,233,872	1.0	29.0

**Table 11: Demographic Balance by Jewish Regional Councils**

Regional Council	Residents				Demographic Balance	
	Israelis		Palestinians		Balance between Israelis/Palestinians	
	Num.	%	%	Num.		
<b>Total</b>	451,257	14.2	85.8	2,720,169	1.0	6.0
Mate Binyamin	221,789	32.8	67.2	453,525	1.0	2.1
Gush Etsyon	97,465	18.6	81.4	426,602	1.0	4.4
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	1,968	17.3	82.7	9,382	1.0	4.8
Arvot Ha-Yarden	6,905	11.5	88.5	53,169	1.0	7.7
Shomron	105,828	8.3	91.7	1,174,230	1.0	11.1
Har Khevron	17,302	2.8	97.2	603,261	1.0	34.9



**Table 12: Demographic Balance by Palestinian Districts**

Palestinian District	Residents				Demographic Balance	
	Israelis		Palestinians		Balance between Israelis/Palestinians	
	Num.	%	%	Num.		
<b>Total</b>	<b>451,257</b>	<b>14.2</b>	<b>85.8</b>	<b>2,720,287</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>6.0</b>
Salfit	57,322	41.7	58.3	80,216	1.0	1.4
Jerusalem*	85,385	30.4	69.6	195,283	1.0	2.3
Bethlehem	92,585	29.1	70.9	225,257	1.0	2.4
Ramallah	126,619	29.1	72.9	339,989	1.0	2.7
Qalqiliya	30,038	20.2	79.8	118,944	1.0	4.0
Jericho	7,189	12.8	87.2	49,090	1.0	6.8
Nablus	20,549	4.9	95.1	402,539	1.0	19.6
Tubas	2,541	3.8	96.2	63,745	1.0	25.1
Hebron	21,062	2.7	97.3	752,794	1.0	35.7
Tulkarm	4,414	2.7	97.3	160,906	1.0	36.5
Jenin	3,553	1.1	98.9	331,524	1.0	33.3

\* The Palestinian Authority has divided this district into two areas: J1 includes the areas annexed by Israel in East Jerusalem: Isawiya, East Jerusalem, A-Shyukh, A-Sawahira al-Gharbiya, A-Sawana, A-Tur, Abu Tor, Bab a-Zahra, Beit Hanina, Beit Safafa, Jabel Mukaber, Kafr Aqab, Ras al-Amud, Shu'afat, Shu'afat Refugee Camp, Sheikh Jarah, Silwan, Sur Baher. Um Tuba, Wadi al-Joz. J2 includes the remainder of the district. This study relates solely to J2.

The figures for the three geographic divisions show that in terms of the first goal—to contain the Palestinian entity—the demographic balance leans clearly to the Palestinian side in the settlement and containment zones. In the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea, 92.2 percent of the population are Palestinians, while in western Samaria and Judea the proportion is 82.2 percent. This reflects a decisive Arab majority that does not permit the creation of an “envelope” with a Jewish majority providing an ethnic barrier between the Palestinians on the central mountain ridge and the Kingdom of Jordan to the east, nor the widening of Israel’s “narrow waist” to the west.

In terms of the second goal—preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state with territorial contiguity—two different findings must be presented. Along the central mountain ridge, from Jenin to the northern outskirts of Jerusalem, and then from Gush Etsyon to Metsadot Yehuda in the southern Hebron Hills, Palestinian dominance is absolute: 96.7 percent of the population are Palestinians. In other words, for every Jew there are 30 Palestinians. The situation is different in the greater Jerusalem area—the triangular area with its points at Modi'in Illit, Beitar Illit, and Ma'ale Adumim. Here there is a very narrow Jewish majority of 51.9 percent. In geographical terms, however, Modi'in Illit—the largest Jewish city in Judea and Samaria—cannot be combined with the central mountain ridge. Accordingly, we can conclude that the contiguous Palestinian presence along the ridge—the main axis of life and the principal

traffic artery (Route 60)—is not impaired north of Jerusalem or south of Gush Etsyon.

Conversely, the concentration of most of the Israelis who live beyond the Green Line in the greater Jerusalem area is consolidating a significant urban Jewish presence between the two halves of the West Bank. At present, it is still possible to delineate a line of territorial contiguity of the Palestinian population through the Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. However, the ongoing trends for the construction of neighborhoods and roads in the Jerusalem area are liable to impede this contiguity, requiring complex functional arrangements as part of the two-state solution (see Map 34).

The planned construction in Jerusalem includes primarily a new neighborhood in Atarot in the north of Jerusalem. The plans provides for the construction of 9,000 housing units for the Haredi population, reinforcing the Jewish urban barrier between Ramallah and East Jerusalem. To the east, the neighborhood of Mevasseret Adumim is planned (as part of the municipality of Ma'ale Adumim). The plans here call for the construction of 3,500 housing units, closing the Jewish ring around the east of East Jerusalem and creating contiguous Jewish settlement from Mt. Scopus to Ma'ale Adumim.

In the south of Jerusalem, three new neighborhoods are planned in order to create a Jewish urban ring from Gilo to Har Khoma, completely disconnecting Bethlehem from East Jerusalem. One of these neighborhoods (Giv'at Ha-Matos), which is already under construction, is planned to include 2,200 housing units, as well as a tourism compound. The function of this neighborhood is to close the gap in the built-up area between Gilo and Kibbutz Ramat Rakhel, thereby disconnecting Bethlehem from the villages of Beit Safafa and Sharafat within the municipal boundary of Jerusalem.

Another planned neighborhood, Amat Ha-Mayim Ha-Takhtona, seeks to close the gap in the built-up area between Kibbutz Ramat Rakhel and Har Khoma, and will include 1,215 housing units and an additional 250 sheltered housing units. A further neighborhood is an extension of Har Khoma, this time to the west, toward Mar Elias Monastery and Beit Ha-Shofet, with 539 housing units. These neighborhoods will mainly be inhabited by Haredim, in part due to a desire to balance the negative migration of Haredim from Jerusalem, which currently totals several thousand a year.

Another neighborhood to the south, Giv'at Eitam, forms part of Efrat local council. The planned neighborhood will strengthen the Jewish urban belt to the south of Bethlehem.

Key roads slated for construction include: The Al-Eizariya–A-Za'im road to the east of Jerusalem, which will help encourage construction in Ma'ale Adumim; the “Quarries Road” (Route 45) connecting the eastern settlements in Mate Binyamin


and the settlements in Arvot Ha-Yarden to Route 443 toward Israel, eliminating the need to pass through Jerusalem; the Eastern Ring Road (the “American Road,”) connecting the eastern settlements in Mate Binyamin to Ma’ale Adumim and the eastern settlements in Gush Etsyon; and the expansion and upgrading of Route 437 between Kokhav Ya’akov and Mishor Adumim.

In terms of the third goal—to annex all or significant parts of Judea and Samaria to Israel, the overall figures show that at the end of 2020 there were 451,257 Israelis and 2,720,287 Palestinians in the area. In other words, for every Israel there are 6.03 Palestinians. The Palestinians constitute a firm majority, at 85.2 percent. Accordingly, the annexation of all of Judea and Samaria, sooner or later leading to the granting of full rights to the Palestinians, implies a democratic state with an Arab majority (including the Gaza Strip) that will only increase as the Palestinian refugees are absorbed. The presence of a Jewish minority of 14 percent would not be expected to destabilize the Palestinian Authority areas were it not for the state of occupation, the protection afforded to the settlers by the IDF, and the violence used by an extreme minority among them with the goal of displacing the Palestinians (see Map 35).

Palestinian demographic dominance remains intact when we apply the other territorial divisions of the area. Both when the examination focuses on the six Jewish regional councils and when it encompasses the 11 Palestinian districts, the Palestinian majority in each case is obvious, without exception.

Accordingly, it is still possible in physical and spatial terms to establish a Palestinian state with a firm demographic majority (even if the permanent agreement allows for isolated settlements within the territory of the Palestinian state to remain on the ground). It should be noted, however, that in the Jerusalem area a significant Jewish presence is being consolidated that is liable to impede the maintenance of Palestinian contiguity along the central mountain ridge.









Map 35: Settler Violence in the West Bank, January 2020—July 2021

## **Long-Term Demographic Trends**

This section seeks to examine the direction of long-term trends relating to the demographic balance between Israelis and Palestinians in Judea and Samaria, in order to define the probable future reality. Although the full official data in our possession do not cover every year, they provide a very clear picture concerning the trends over the past thirty years.

### **Annual Growth**

The change in population size over the given period is due to three factors: birth, mortality, and total net migration. This change may be positive (the population increases) or negative (the population decreases).

As Table 13 shows, until the formation by Yitzhak Shamir of a Likud-led minority government in 1990, and the beginning of the wave of mass immigration from the Former Soviet Union, an average nominal increase of approximately 7,000 was maintained. During the 1990s, when the first Oslo Accords were signed and implemented and meaningful negotiations took place toward a permanent agreement, alongside the mass Jewish immigration, a significant increase was recorded in this annual average to almost 12,000. From 2001 through 2012, a slight and gradual increase was seen, followed by a slight fall through 2020. The average for all this period rose slightly compared to the previous period and reached 13,000. The following years stand out for their low nominal growth relative to the average: 1996, when the Interim Agreement was implemented; 1999, when negotiations toward a permanent agreement began; 2008, when negotiations took place at Annapolis; and 2020, when the Trump plan was rejected and Trump was defeated by Biden in the US presidential elections at the end of the year (in addition to three elections in Israel).

























Under Shamir's minority government (1990–1992), the annual growth rate in the settlements was unprecedented. It continued to rise gradually, reaching a peak of 16 percent a year in the year when the first Oslo Accord (the Declaration of Principles) was signed. This was accompanied by an annual nominal growth in the number of Israelis in Judea and Samaria. In 1993 the trend reversed and the annual growth rate began to fall gradually reaching a low point of 3.21 percent in 2019 and 2.24 percent in 2020 (in 2020, 22 Jewish settlements recorded negative annual growth).

It is worth noting that the registered residents of 33 Jewish settlements include Arabs, for various reasons. In most cases the numbers involved are very small, with the exception of 573 Arabs in Ariel (the vast majority of whom are students at Ariel University who changed their registered address), and a few dozen in Ma'ale Adumim, Giv'on Ha-Khadasha, Kfar Etsyon, and Giv'at Ze'ev.

**Table 13: Annual Growth of the Jewish Population in Judea and Samaria**

Year	Population Size	Size of Annual Change	
		Num.	%
1982	14,536		
1983	21,002	6,466	44.5
1984	35,300	14,298	68.1
1985	37,695	2,395	6.8
1986	44,627	6,932	18.4
1987	50,474	5,847	13.1
1988	55,772	5,298	10.5
1989	61,985	6,213	11.1
1990	70,844	8,859	14.3
1991	82,865	12,021	17.0
1992	94,834	11,969	14.4
1993	110,066	15,232	16.1
1994	124,005	13,939	12.7
1995	137,466	13,461	10.9
1996	139,102	1,636	1.2
1997	151,801	12,699	9.1
1998	165,024	13,223	8.7
1999	173,782	8,758	5.3
2000	190,439	16,657	9.6
2001	200,911	10,472	5.5
2002	211,408	10,497	5.2
2003	223,325	11,917	5.6
2004	235,524	12,199	5.5
2005	247,654	12,130	5.2
2006	261,953	14,299	5.8
2007	276,462	14,509	5.5
2008	282,001	5,539	2.0
2009	296,478	14,477	5.1
2010	311,144	14,666	4.9
2011	325,601	14,457	4.6
2012	341,848	16,247	5.0
2013	356,429	14,581	4.3
2014	370,212	13,783	3.9
2015	385,734	15,522	4.2
2016	399,035	13,301	3.4
2017	413,208	14,173	3.6
2018	427,616	14,408	3.5
2019	441,363	13,747	3.2
2020	451,257	9,894	2.2

**Table 14: Annual Growth Rate of the Jewish Population in the Local Authorities in Judea and Samaria**

Local Authority	Years											Size of Change
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.2</b>	<b>2.2</b>	
Beit El	2.4	2.5	2.3	0.0	1.6	0.9	1.1	-0.2	-1.0	-1.1	-4.8	
Ariel	0.6	1.2	1.7	-0.5	1.7	1.8	2.7	2.1	4.2	0.4	-4.7	
Ma'ale Adumim	3.9	1.6	1.9	0.8	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.4	1.0	-0.1	-0.8	
Ma'ale Efra'im	-1.6	-5.5	-5.3	-1.9	4.3	5.3	0.3	-0.3	3.0	1.6	-0.5	
Har Adar	6.7	6.4	1.6	1.5	0.5	2.2	3.2	2.0	-0.1	0.8	-0.1	
Oranit	4.8	7.0	8.6	6.0	6.0	5.1	1.9	0.0	1.8	1.7	0.1	
Kiryat Arba	2.2	1.9	2.9	-5.6	-3.0	2.3	2.3	0.9	-0.2	0.0	0.2	
Alfei Menashe	5.4	5.4	1.7	0.1	0.4	0.3	1.9	0.3	0.8	1.1	0.6	
Kedumim	2.8	0.7	5.8	1.2	0.3	3.6	-0.4	3.7	2.6	-1.1	0.9	
Beit Arye	5.4	4.4	2.2	3.7	4.5	4.5	2.6	2.3	3.7	2.2	1.9	
Har Khevron	3.8	4.7	1.3	8.4	0.1	7.8	5.9	5.2	6.3	3.6	1.9	
Elkana	3.0	4.2	3.4	0.3	0.0	1.9	-1.2	-0.4	-1.9	0.7	1.9	
Modi'in Illit	5.4	6.7	7.1	8.2	5.2	1.6	4.2	4.8	4.3	4.5	2.1	
Gush Etsyon	5.5	7.9	10.6	6.7	5.6	4.4	3.4	2.7	1.4	2.3	2.2	
Shomron	6.7	5.9	6.1	6.7	8.6	6.9	5.6	6.7	6.0	5.1	3.1	
Beitar Illit	7.6	5.9	6.9	5.8	4.3	5.3	4.7	5.7	4.0	4.5	3.1	
Mate Binyamin	5.0	4.3	4.8	3.9	4.1	8.3	3.1	2.8	2.6	3.3	3.4	
Arvot Ha-Yarden	3.6	3.4	7.2	3.9	6.8	4.5	7.3	4.2	5.9	5.1	3.7	
Giv'at Ze'ev	9.2	7.7	6.4	6.6	5.2	6.8	4.6	2.7	3.5	2.8	4.4	
Efrat	3.8	3.4	1.5	1.3	2.8	2.1	4.3	5.3	10.7	7.1	5.5	
Imanuel	1.8	0.5	1.7	3.4	2.6	1.8	1.7	4.0	7.4	5.8	5.7	
Megilot Yam Ha-Mela	5.3	2.3	6.2	3.4	1.5	7.9	9.8	8.9	7.6	9.3	7.7	
Karnei Shomron	1.2	2.9	1.7	-0.2	1.4	3.8	2.9	3.8	4.7	5.5	15.8	

As Table 14 shows, the two Haredi cities are remarkable for their high annual growth rates, which are far above the average in Israel. Conversely, the secular cities show growth rates below those in Israel—less than one percent, and in 2020 they even recorded negative growth.

The downward trend in annual growth remains consistent in the local authorities. Karnei Shomron, Efrat, and Giv'at Ze'ev show an unusually high growth rate. Conversely, settlements with growth rates below the average for Israel include Kiryat Arba, Beit El, Kedumim, Alfei Menashe, Oranit, and Har Adar, which have also experienced negative growth in certain years.

The situation is different in the regional councils, all of which show positive growth. The annual growth rate in all these councils is higher than the average for Israel and for Judea and Samaria. Particularly high growth rates can be seen in Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh (the smallest of the councils) and Shomron (the largest).



## Sources of Annual Growth

The main sources of annual growth are net total migration (domestic and international),<sup>24</sup> and natural growth (births less deaths). We did not address marginal components such as inter-institutional migration or family unification.

## Total Net Migration

Total net migration refers to changes in the population of a given area due to the physical relocation of individuals, i.e. to the differential between the number of migrants arriving in a given settlement and the number of those leaving it.

When the number of migrants arriving in a settlement is greater than the number leaving, the result is positive net migration; when the number leaving is greater than the number arriving, the result is negative net migration. Total migration includes domestic migration and international migration.<sup>25</sup>


As Table 15 shows, during the 1990s there was no consistent trend in net migration in Judea and Samaria and the figures rose and fell. The annual average was 7,837, while the peak year was 1991 (9,600). During the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the annual average fell to 5,175, and in the second decade it again dropped sharply to 3,240.

In 2020, for the first time, negative net migration was recorded, at -423. In the same year, 44 Jewish settlements reported negative net migration, headed by four cities (home to 43.5 percent of all the Israelis in Judea and Samaria) where total net migration was -2,219. In the case of Modi'in Illit (see Table 16), this was the second year when negative net migration was recorded (-759), following 2018 (-120). The figures for Beitar Illit are similar: -101 for 2018 and -419 for 2020. The downward trend in the secular cities is much more pronounced. Ma'ale Adumim has recorded negative net migration for every year since 2011; the small city of Ariel has recorded just four years of positive net migration since 2003.



















<sup>24</sup> It is important to note that the statistics for international migration are not completely accurate. A reliable calculation for this figure could only be calculated for the period 2014–2020, when data included overseas residents as well as immigrants. For the other years, we relied on the initial place of settlement of immigrants, and later on statistics for immigrants included in the scanned files of the local authorities (from 1998).

<sup>25</sup> The calculation by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) also includes data not published in detail for the general public.

**Table 15: Sources of Annual Growth of the Jewish Population  
in Judea and Samaria**



**Table 16: Total Net Migration of the Jewish Population  
in Judea and Samaria, by Local Authorities**

Local Authority	Years											Trend
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	
	Numbers											
Total	4,313	3,647	5,132	5,286	3,540	3,549	2,237	1,999	1,479	1,159	-637	
Ma'ale Adumim	550	-8	-30	-142	-90	-391	-506	-421	-400	-560	-779	
Modi'in Illit	932	1,091	1,304	1,974	520	26	93	23	-120	66	-759	
Beitar Illit	575	430	738	719	330	355	513	772	-101	102	-419	
Ariel	8	-124	-75	-160	-80	167	207	183	-63	-169	-262	
Beit El	-34	-93	-187	-176	-130	-118	-214	-202	-264	-228	-245	
Kiryat Arba	-106	-8	-94	-102	-110	-28	-116	-171	-148	-208	-181	
Kedumim	-72	-46	52	-82	10	34	-66	37	-55	-172	-55	
Oranit	143	207	453	356	370	272	27	-82	42	32	-44	
Ma'ale Efra'im	-41	-36	-46	-44	0	25	-31	-34	-57	-15	-18	
Har Adar	148	62	28	28	-10	42	88	60	-24	-15	-14	
Alfei Menashe	152	103	27	-64	-50	-69	82	-72	27	10	-2	
Gush Etsyon	284	637	1,219	678	530	317	-15	-84	-343	-23	9	
Beit Arye	127	15	41	109	110	131	52	44	111	47	32	
Elkana	4	50	-1	-79	-120	-23	-94	-80	-126	-75	41	
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	36	8	79	16	-20	41	46	93	90	114	55	
Binyamin	387	463	758	522	450	780	237	-59	130	364	57	
Imanuel	-120	-88	-35	-5	-40	-92	-98	-5	111	59	84	
Arvot Ha-Yarden	35	-9	-22	36	140	30	106	86	149	117	91	
Karnei Shomron	-82	-46	-87	-96	-100	72	75	88	164	250	154	
Har Khevron	-18	-36	-56	133	70	81	143	247	273	10	175	
Giv'at Ze'ev	680	565	440	531	340	657	363	-64	147	-41	213	
Efrat	56	-37	-120	-45	-40	-21	263	278	734	496	292	
Shomron	669	547	746	1,179	1,460	1,261	1,082	1,362	1,202	998	938	

In the local authorities, which are home to 20.7 percent of all the Israelis in Judea and Samaria, the picture is varied, but in the vast majority of cases negative, without any clear pattern. Har Adar, situated on the Green Line, has reported negative net migration for three years running. Alfei Menashe has shown negative net migration in five out of the last nine years, and Giv'at Ze'ev in two out of the last four years. Since 2001, Kedumim has recorded 13 years with negative net migration. Since 1997, Beit El has recorded just five years with positive net migration. Since 1999, Elkana

has recorded just three years with positive net migration; Kiryat Arba has done so for just two years since 1994. In Ma'ale Efra'im, only six years with positive net migration have been recorded since 1992. Conversely, Beit Arye has shown positive net migration every year. After five years of negative net migration (2011–2015), the trend in Efrat has been reversed and five years of positive net migration have been recorded. The same is true of Karnei Shomron, which experienced six years of negative net migration in 2009–2014 but has since seen significant positive migration (in 2020 Ma'ale Shomron merged with Karnei Shomron).

In the regional councils, which are home to 35.8 percent of Jewish settlers, the situation is different and more positive. With the exception of Gush Etsyon, the regional councils have reported positive net migration over the past six years (for which data were collected on the level of the individual settlement). However, within most councils several settlements have shown significant negative net migration over the same period. All the settlements in Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh show positive net migration; in Har Khevron the exceptions reporting negative net migration are Carmel, Ma'on, and Penei Khever; in Mate Binyamin the exceptions are Khashmona'im, Eli, and Ofra; in Arvot Ha-Yarden the exception is Tomer; and in Shomron–Kiryat Netafim and Sha'arei Tikva. Gush Etsyon Regional Council reported negative net migration over the past four years; the downward trend is particularly notable in El'azar, Migdal Oz, Neve Daniel, Alon Shvut, and Rosh Tsurim.

## **Net Domestic Migration**

























Total migration comprises domestic migration and international migration. This section examines net domestic migration: migration from Israel to Judea and Samaria, and vice versa.<sup>26</sup>

The statistics and the graph in Table 15 do not reveal a stable trend in net domestic migration over the 1990s, when the Oslo Accord was signed and the Interim Agreements were implemented. Average annual growth was 6,650, peaking in 1991 at 8,000. In the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, average net domestic migration fell sharply to 4,192; this trend continued in the following decade, falling to 2,502. In 2020 negative net domestic migration of -943 was reported. In other words, 943 more people left the settlements in Judea and Samaria and moved to Israel than moved in the opposite direction.

<sup>26</sup> Migration also takes place between settlements, but this is reflected in the total calculations.



**Table 17: Net Domestic Migration of the Jewish Population  
in Judea and Samaria, by Local Authorities**

Local Authority	Years											Trend
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	
	Numbers											
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,546</b>	<b>3,107</b>	<b>4,337</b>	<b>4,534</b>	<b>2,700</b>	<b>2,468</b>	<b>1,659</b>	<b>1,341</b>	<b>922</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>-943</b>	
Ma'ale Adumim	445	-81	-153	-265	-170	-502	-589	-494	-464	-624	-826	
Modi'in Illit	824	1034	1215	1927	480	-104	67	-7	-180	24	-801	
Beitar Illit	488	384	665	647	270	244	494	706	-161	51	-454	
Ariel	-60	-191	-140	-212	-190	49	142	126	-115	-271	-319	
Beit El	-44	-103	-195	-176	-130	-130	-218	-202	-277	-228	-238	
Kiryat Arba	-110	-8	-103	-108	-130	-33	-129	-179	-144	-215	-176	
Gush Etsyon	234	571	1142	589	420	214	-104	-98	-402	-108	-64	
Kedumim	-73	-47	51	-90	0	28	-70	44	-63	-181	-55	
Oranit	143	206	448	352	360	263	33	-88	38	33	-52	
Har Adar	142	61	23	23	-20	42	81	51	-33	-15	-19	
Ma'ale Efra'im	-44	-36	-46	-44	10	16	-31	-34	-57	-23	-13	
Alfei Menashe	158	99	21	-67	-70	-79	97	-68	21	-5	-11	
Mate Binyamin	215	393	648	354	310	611	172	-147	62	213	15	
Beit Arye	126	15	41	109	120	131	52	52	111	45	37	
Elkana	-2	50	-8	-79	-120	-27	-94	-80	-126	-83	41	
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	36	8	78	14	-20	37	46	93	90	114	55	
Imanuel	-120	-89	-36	-5	-40	-92	-94	-5	111	55	84	
Arvot Ha-Yarden	35	-11	-30	35	140	30	106	86	149	117	91	
Karnei Shomron	-96	-50	-104	-107	-120	51	38	66	149	232	161	
Har Khevron	-18	-40	-63	110	70	77	157	197	293	43	162	
Giv'at Ze'ev	662	542	399	502	320	584	333	-113	134	-64	200	
Efrat	-6	-113	-198	-118	-130	-132	219	199	678	408	299	
Shomron	611	513	682	1143	1340	1190	951	1236	1108	889	940	

















As Table 17 shows, the four main cities also lead with their net domestic migration in the period 2010-2020. Ma'ale Adumim has suffered from negative net domestic migration for a decade, with an accumulative loss of 4,168 residents. Ariel lost 1,121 residents over the same period. In 2020 alone, 2,400 more people left the four cities than moved to them.

The picture in the local councils is more varied. The population of Imanu'el fell consistently over eight years, but has recovered over the past three years. Kiryat Arba and Beit El have both reported negative net domestic migration for 11 consecutive

years, with a net loss of 1,335 residents in the former council and 1,941 in the latter. The same is true of Ma'ale Efra'im, which lost 302 residents over the past 11 years—one-fourth of its current population. Karnei Shomron and Efrat have recovered after six years of negative domestic migration and have reported positive growth in recent years. In Kedumim the figures fluctuate, but in total the council has lost 456 residents over the past 11 years.

The situation in the regional councils is positive: five of the councils show positive net domestic migration, while only Gush Etsyon has recorded negative net domestic migration for several years.

**Table 18: Net International Migration of the Jewish Population in Judea and Samaria, by Local Authorities**

Local Authority	Years											Trend
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	
	Numbers											
Total	789	540	795	790	840	1,081	578	658	557	752	520	
Ma'ale Efra'im	0	0	0	0	-10	9	0	0	0	8	-5	
Beit Arye	0	0	0	0	-10	0	0	-8	0	2	-5	
Kiryat Arba	13	0	9	13	20	5	13	8	-4	7	-1	
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	0	0	1	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	
Arvot Ha-Yarden	0	2	8	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Elkana	0	0	7	1	0	4	0	0	0	8	0	
Kedumim	0	1	1	7	10	6	4	-7	8	9	0	
Imanuel	0	1	1	0	0	0	-4	0	0	4	0	
Karnei Shomron	13	4	17	10	20	21	37	22	15	18	1	
Har Adar	6	1	5	5	10	0	7	9	9	0	5	
Beit El	9	10	8	4	0	12	4	0	13	0	7	
Oranit	0	1	5	4	10	9	-6	6	4	-1	8	
Alfei Menashe	5	4	6	3	20	10	-15	-4	6	15	9	
Har Khevron	0	4	7	23	20	14	-8	4	-13	-12	13	
Beitar Illit	87	46	73	72	60	111	19	66	60	51	35	
Mate Binyamin	172	70	110	168	140	169	65	88	68	151	42	
Modi'in Illit	108	57	89	47	40	130	26	30	60	42	42	
Ma'ale Adumim	105	73	123	123	80	111	83	73	64	64	47	
Efrat	71	76	78	89	90	111	44	79	56	88	57	
Ariel	68	67	65	52	110	118	65	57	52	102	57	
Shomron	58	34	64	36	120	71	131	126	94	109	67	
Giv'at Ze'ev	24	23	41	41	20	73	30	49	13	23	68	
Gush Etsyon	50	66	77	89	90	93	83	60	52	64	73	

## **Net International Migration**

Since 1990, and as Table 15 shows, net international migration figures do not reveal a consistent trend and feature peaks and lows, although the figures are always positive. The average contribution of international migration is 564 persons a year. The proportion of immigrants and returning residents arriving directly in Judea and Samaria accounts for just 1.17 percent of all immigrants to Israel during this period. This nevertheless constitutes a significant addition to the population, representing on average 18.3 percent of net migration to Judea and Samaria over these years. It should be noted, however, that while for the first 20 years international migration contributed 14.6 percent to total net migration, over the past decade its weight has more than doubled, to 36.5 percent. The contribution of international migration to annual growth averages 4.6 percent, compared to eight percent inside Israel.

Table 18 shows that the four cities report positive net international migration; each gained over 600 residents by this means over the past 11 years; Ma'ale Adumim heads the list at 946 people. The local councils also show positive net migration, though the figures are lower for the same period, with the exception of Efrat (839), Giv'at Ze'ev (405), and Karnei Shomron (178).

The regional councils also report positive net international migration. In three cases the increase is negligible, but Shomron Regional Council reported an increase of 910 residents, Gush Etsyon 797, and Binyamin 782 thanks to international migration.

## **Natural Growth**

Natural growth refers to the differential between births and deaths for a given population over a given period. The natural growth trend in Judea and Samaria is consistently and clearly positive, with the exception of the past two years. Over the past 30 years, natural growth increased from approx. 1,200 persons in 1990 to 12,422 in 2019. In 2020 a slight fall was reported to 12,129 (see Table 15).

The detailed Table 19 tells a more nuanced story. Due to the proportion of Haredi society within the Jewish population of Judea and Samaria, and the very high natural growth rate among this sector, the distribution of natural growth within the population is highly uneven. In 2020, the two Haredi cities contributed 46 percent of total natural growth, while the two secular cities added just 5.35 percent. The local councils contributed 15.9 percent and the regional councils 32.75 percent.

Additional figures also illustrate the major contribution of the Haredi cities to natural growth. In 2019, for example, of 8,747 families in Modi'in Illit who received child benefits, 5,536 (61 percent) received benefits for five or more children.

Furthermore, according to CBS figures published in December 2019 for the years 2013–2017, life expectancy in Modi'in Illit was the highest in Israel, at 87.6 years.

**Table 19: Natural Growth of the Jewish Population in Judea and Samaria, by Local Authorities**

Local Authority	Years											Trend
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	
	Numbers											
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,596</b>	<b>9,832</b>	<b>10,007</b>	<b>10,455</b>	<b>11,830</b>	<b>11,845</b>	<b>12,064</b>	<b>12,065</b>	<b>12,522</b>	<b>12,422</b>	<b>12,098</b>	
Har Adar	58	55	53	36	40	39	50	21	31	35	23	
Ma'ale Efra'im	21	33	25	21	30	33	33	30	27	25	27	
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	20	26	19	33	30	26	31	30	35	39	43	
Beit Arye	67	77	59	72	90	71	72	73	77	65	54	
Alfei Menashe	150	117	103	121	120	105	76	91	63	88	67	
Elkana	100	82	124	110	120	96	100	83	76	94	78	
Kedumim	150	124	120	145	120	116	138	123	145	100	83	
Oranit	115	103	118	121	130	144	121	107	107	133	100	
Arvot Ha-Yarden					130	126	128	112	121	124	119	
Immanuel	120	108	95	133	130	129	122	130	146	136	159	
Beit El	218	214	215	202	190	202	201	195	181	174	176	
Ariel	185	205	184	216	210	233	206	213	216	227	180	
Kiryat Arba	219	225	225	228	210	210	200	221	199	192	185	
Karnei Shomron	159	174	125	138	160	151	167	183	198	193	207	
Efrat	186	187	183	171	160	165	188	194	214	207	236	
Har Khevron	210	242	224	259	250	240	267	242	290	290	290	
Ma'ale Adumim	683	611	616	635	630	549	589	555	611	586	460	
Giv'at Ze'ev	272	344	369	406	460	460	505	509	534	547	523	
Gush Etsyon	492	570	577	649	650	679	663	643	640	557	587	
Shomron					1,130	1,139	1,154	1,213	1,297	1,291	1,245	
Mate Binyamin	1,650	1,615	1,688	1,701	1,700	1,840	1,847	1,811	1,816	1,799	1,682	
Beitar Illit	1,817	1,875	1,920	1,979	1,990	2,099	2,154	2,141	2,320	2,356	2,425	
Modi'in Illit	2,704	2,845	2,965	3,079	3,150	2,993	3,052	3,145	3,178	3,164	3,149	

## Age Distribution

Age distribution figures reflect the potential for future population growth and economic growth. The population of Judea and Samaria is younger than that anywhere inside Israel; the mean age is 19.2 years. Israel has the highest population growth rate of any of the developed countries, and ranks second in the OECD's index of young countries (and 89<sup>th</sup> for the world as a whole).



**Table 20: Age Distribution in Judea and Samaria, by Local Authorities and by Comparison to Israel (Percents)**

Local Authority	Age Groups						Distribution
	0-9	10-19	20-34	35-49	50-64	65+	
	%						
Jews in Israel	19.2	15.7	19.3	18.1	13.5	14.2	
Judea & Samaria	29.6	21.8	20.1	15.2	8.5	4.9	
Alfei Menashe	15.7	19.9	16.1	22.5	15.6	10.2	
Ariel	15.3	12.3	25.7	17.2	16.4	13.0	
Arvot Ha-Yarden	28.6	20.2	17.1	19.0	7.8	7.3	
Beit Arye	18.3	19.1	17.9	21.7	15.7	7.3	
Beit El	22.2	27.6	25.3	10.3	8.9	5.6	
Beitar Illit	37.4	25.8	19.3	12.5	3.8	1.1	
Efrat	25.3	20.7	20.8	15.5	10.9	6.9	
Elkana	22.3	16.6	21.8	15.1	10.3	14.0	
Giv'at Ze'ev	29.2	16.8	22.8	13.2	10.3	7.6	
Gush Etsyon	27.0	22.0	20.9	16.7	8.8	4.6	
Har Adar	13.4	20.7	17.6	18.3	18.1	12.0	
Har Khevron	32.3	21.0	21.6	15.4	8.0	1.7	
Imanuel	35.8	17.8	24.3	10.4	7.8	3.9	
Karnei Shomron	25.7	16.0	23.4	15.3	11.1	8.6	
Kedumim	26.2	22.3	18.6	16.0	8.5	8.3	
Kiryat Arba	24.9	20.7	22.1	13.5	9.7	9.0	
Ma'ale Adumim	17.6	17.6	21.3	16.7	16.0	10.7	
Ma'ale Efra'im	23.5	18.0	20.8	12.9	13.5	11.2	
Mate Binyamin	27.5	24.1	20.2	15.4	9.0	3.8	
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	25.4	20.3	20.5	19.5	11.7	2.6	
Modi'in Illit	40.7	25.5	18.0	12.6	2.3	1.0	
Oranit	17.5	19.5	16.5	21.2	16.1	9.1	
Shomron	32.0	19.8	18.9	17.8	7.7	3.8	

The population of Judea and Samaria is much younger than that of Israel. As Table 20 shows, 51.4 percent of the total Jewish population of the area are under the age of 20, and only 4.9 percent are above the age of 65. By way of comparison, only 35 percent of the Jewish population of Israel are under the age of 20, and 14.6 percent are above the age of 65. The settlements with the youngest populations are Haredi: Modi'in Illit, Beitar Illit, and Imanu'el. Conversely, the settlements with the oldest populations are Ariel, Har Adar, secular Ma'ale Efra'im and Ma'ale Adumim, and Elkana.

## **Long-Term Demographic Trends: Summary**

Firstly, the annual growth rate in Judea and Samaria is higher than the average inside Israel. Over the past 30 years, nominal growth has been relatively consistent, averaging between 12,000 and 13,000 persons. However, following a long-term rise in the annual growth rate, reaching its peak in 1993 at 16 percent, a consistent fall in the rate was recorded through 2020 (2.24 percent).

The sources of annual growth are more important to note. While total and domestic net migration rose gradually through 2000, over the past 20 years there has been a steady decline, culminating in negative figures for 2020 (-423 for total net migration and -943 for total net domestic migration). The shortfall between the number of Israelis leaving the settlements and returning/moving inside the Green Line and the number of Israelis moving in the opposite direction narrowed to just 400 in 2019. In 2020, net domestic migration was negative for the first time: in other words, more Israelis left Judea and Samaria than moved to the area. The weight of immigrants and of Israelis returning from abroad within net migration has grown each year, and now accounts for over one-third of the figure. Total net migration has contributed just 10 to 15 percent to annual growth over the past decade. It is worth noting that the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip also shows negative net migration: in 1997–2016, total net migration was -501,573, of which -322,707 was contributed by Judea and Samaria.

The large Jewish cities are particularly prominent in the context of negative net migration. In 2020, all four cities recorded negative net migration. In Modi'in Illit, the largest city, negative net migration has only been seen in two of the past six years (the first time negative figures have been recorded). In Beitar Illit, the second-largest city, net migration has been negative in two of the past three years. Meanwhile, Ma'ale Adumim has recorded negative net migration consistently for the past 10 years; in Ariel, 17 of the years since the signing of the Interim Accords in 1996 have seen negative net migration.

Many of the settlements have recorded negative net migration for most of the past seven years. They can be found in all areas, but some patterns can be seen: The vast majority of these settlements belong to the Amana organization, which belongs to the Religious Zionist stream (the organization was founded by Gush Emunim). One cluster of such settlements can be found in Gush Etsyon (Rosh Tsurim, Alon Shvut, Migdal Oz, Karnei Tsur, and Bat Ayin); another includes settlements in Mate Binyamin, which has the largest number of residents of any regional council in Judea and Samaria or Israel (Ofra, Neve Tsuf, Mitspe Yerikho, Giv'on Ha-Khadasha,

Ma'ale Mikhmash, Pesagot, Dolev, Eli, Geva Binyamin, Khashmona'im, and Kfar Ha-Oranim). Local councils reporting negative net migration include Kedumim, Kiryat Arba, Elkana, Beit El, and Ma'ale Efra'im. Conversely, some settlements have shown an impressive level of positive net migration over recent years relative to their size. All these are small settlements, with the exception of Karnei Shomron, which in 2020 merged with Ma'ale Shomron. Prominent examples include Alei Zahav (mainly due to the construction of Leshem, a large new neighborhood), as well as Ma'ale Amos, Sansana, Beit Ha-Arava (following the absorption of the new neighborhood Kedem Arava), Na'ale, Talmon, Sal'it, Migdalim, Ets Efra'im, and Revava.

*Natural growth has become the main—indeed, almost the sole—factor behind annual growth.* However, a deeper examination shows that the two Haredi cities, Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit, over the past 25 years accounts for between 37 and 64 percent of annual natural growth. In other words, *the weight of the Haredi population is increasing each year*, and due to negative migration the Jewish population of Judea and Samaria is becoming more Haredi, with all the economic and other ramifications this implies. Settlements where the natural growth rate is close to zero have seen a decrease in their total number of residents, given the absence of positive net migration. For the past year, such settlements include Ariel, Ma'ale Adumim, El'azar, Kfar Ha-Oranim, Beit El, and Alon Shvut.

The young age distribution creates significant potential for growth of the population in Judea and Samaria, particularly in the Haredi sector, assuming that solutions are found in the spheres of employment and housing. However, national plan to develop the south of Israel through construction for Haredi society may reinforce the negative migration trend that has been seen in recent years.

Thus it can be seen that alongside an average growth rate higher than that in Israel, Judea and Samaria shows negative demographic trends: a consistent and ongoing decline in the annual growth rate; the inversion of the sources of growth—a low to negative net migration rate and high natural growth (half of which is due to the Haredi cities). In addition, some settlements show both negative migration and a low natural growth rate, and as a result their population is falling.

*If these trends continue, the following characteristics may develop in Judea and Samaria over the coming years: a Haredi majority, a small secular minority, a fall in the proportion of Israelis within the total population (despite negative net Palestinian migration), settlements whose population falls to the point that they close (even if not necessarily officially), and so forth.*

# Chapter Four

**Criterion #2: Has a high level of density been created among the Jewish population, potentially enabling contiguous contact and cohesion between its different parts?**

In order to test this criterion, we will examine population density, which relates to the number of residents relative to the size of territory (persons per square kilometer—sq.km.). Given appropriate policies and management, high population density is an extremely important engine for successful processes of urbanization, development, and economics. Complex societies develop in part as a result of high density. We will also include reference to population deployment, i.e. the number of residents in a particular place. Positive deployment, creating contiguous connections and cohesion between its constituent parts, describes a situation where the population is dispersed across a given territory in a more or less equal manner. Poor deployment means that the population is concentrated mainly in certain areas, rather than throughout the territory in question. An example of this is linear deployment along main roads or borders.

## **Comparison of Density between Jews and Arabs**













Judea and Samaria has an area of 5,759 sq.km.<sup>27</sup> As of the end of 2020, this area is home to a population of 451,257 Israelis and 2,720,287 Palestinians—a total of 3,171,544 persons. Overall density is thus 551 persons per sq.km. Judea and Samaria is more congested than Israel, where there are 425 persons per sq.km. (the 29<sup>th</sup>-most congested country in the world). Israel also features poor deployment: density in the Southern District, which accounts for 65 percent of the territory of the State of Israel, is approx. 90 persons per sq.km., while in the Tel Aviv District, which accounts for just 0.8 of the territory, it is 8,100 persons per sq.km. Judea and Samaria is also less congested than the overall figure for the Palestinian Authority, which also includes the Gaza Strip, where density is 842 persons per sq.km. (ranking 14<sup>th</sup> in the world).

<sup>27</sup> During the negotiations between Israel and the PLO at Annapolis in 2008, it was agreed that the Palestinian state—including the Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and half of the no-man's land at Latrun—will have an area of 6,205 sq.km. East Jerusalem has an area of 70 sq.km., the Gaza Strip 363 sq.km., and no-man's land 46 sq.km.



The density of the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria is 78 persons per sq.km.—less than that in the desert Negev region, and equivalent to a ranking of 132 out of the 246 nations of the world. Palestinian population density is 472 persons per sq.km.—26<sup>th</sup> in the world.


































**Table 21: Population Density in the Settlement Zones in Judea and Samaria according to the Sharon Plan**

Sharon Plan	Area (sq.km.)	Density (residents per sq.km.)	
		Israelis	Palestinians
Mountain Ridge	 1,812.8	 23.5	 681.0
Greater Jerusalem	 477.9	 492.7	 456.3
Western Samaria and Judea	 1,126.4	 95.7	 443.1
Jordan Valley	 2,338.3	 28.0	 329.0



















With reference to the Sharon Plan for Jewish settlement zones, Table 21 shows that only in the greater Jerusalem area (which accounts for just 8.3 percent of the total area of Judea and Samaria) is Jewish density slightly higher than Palestinian density, permitting contiguous contact and cohesion between the population centers. In the other areas, Jewish density is at a level usually associated with peripheral and desert regions that cannot maintain contiguous contact and cohesion between their constituent population centers. Population deployment is primarily linear and is regarded as poor. In the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea, settlement is concentrated mainly along Route 90; on the central mountain ridge along Route 60; in the southern Hebron Hills along Route 317; and in the west along the Green Line. By contrast, Palestinian population density is very high in all areas, and settlement deployment is relatively uniform, with the exception of the Jordan Valley.

An examination according to the Palestinian Districts (Table 22) shows the same picture: the greater Jerusalem area and western Samaria, close to the Green Line, have a significant level of Jewish population density. However, the absence of a substantial Israeli presence north of Ramallah and south of Gush Etsyon is evident. By contrast, Palestinian density is very high in all the districts, with the exception of the Jericho District.

**Table 22: Population Density in the Settlement Zones in Judea and Samaria according to the Palestinian Districts**

Palestinian District	Area (sq.km.)	Density (residents per sq.km.)	
		Israelis	Palestinians
Hebron	 998	 21	 754
Qalqiliya	 177	 171	 676
Nablus	 600	 32	 671
Tulkarm	 247	 18	 651
Jenin	 579	 6	 573
Jerusalem	 348	 245	 561
Ramallah	 849	 149	 400
Salfit	 205	 280	 391
Bethlehem	 657	 141	 343
Tubas	 404	 6	 152
Jericho	 591	 12	 83

**Table 23: Population Density in the Settlement Zones in Judea and Samaria according to Regional Councils**

Regional Council	Area (sq.km.)	Density (residents per sq.km.)	
		Israelis	Palestinians
Har Khevron	 691	 25	 873
Shomron	 1,751	 60.4	 659
Gush Etsyon	 678	 143.7	 629
Mate Binyamin	 992	 223.6	 457
Arvot Ha-Yarden	 931	 7.4	 57
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	 482	 4.1	 20

\*The Jewish population includes the cities and local councils within the area of each regional council

The examination of population density based on the Jewish regional councils (including in each council the Jewish cities and local councils within the relevant area) shows that the only councils where success has been secured in this criterion are in the greater Jerusalem area—Gush Etsyon and Mate Binyamin. Palestinian density in the areas of all the Jewish regional councils is very high, with the exception of Arvot Ha-Yarden (Table 23).

In conclusion, regarding the first political goal—to enclose any future Palestinian political entity—in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea, Jewish density is virtually non-existent, while Palestinian density is almost 12 times greater. Similarly, in the western settlement zone along the Green Line, Palestinian density is 4.6 times greater than Jewish density. Regarding the second political goal—to prevent the establishment

of a Palestinian state with territorial contiguity and viability—Jewish density along the central mountain ridge is negligible (lower even than in the Jordan Valley). Palestinian density in the same area is 29 times greater.

Moreover, the deployment of the Jewish population is mainly linear, along four key traffic arteries—a pattern that is regarded as poor. However, Jewish density is high in the greater Jerusalem area (equal to Palestinian density in this area), and together with the positive deployment of Jewish settlement in this area, this is gradually shaping a significant Jewish presence between the north and the south of the West Bank, in both of which the Palestinians enjoy high density and positive deployment.

Regarding the third goal—the annexation of all or part of Judea and Samaria—Jewish density across the area as a whole is low; Palestinian density is six times higher. The Jewish presence does not maintain an area of density permitting settlement consolidation, in contrast to the very dense Palestinian settlement system. The same is true of the various sub-divisions of the territory. With the exception of the Israeli success in the Jerusalem area, the Jewish settlement system lacks the necessary density and deployment to secure its underlying political goals. This is particularly evident south of Gush Etsyon and north of Ramallah. Accordingly, the influence of this settlement system on the feasibility of a Palestinian state is low to negligible.

### **Average Distance between Settlements**

A further index for evaluating the conditions for the creating of settlement cohesion is the average distance between settlements, which influences the scope of interaction among them in economic and social terms, and even in security terms, given the status of the territories. As Table 24 shows, the average driving distance between the settlements in all the regional councils is considerable: from Gush Etsyon, where the average distance settlements is 18.2 km, and up to Shomron, where it is 44.7 km. Due to the linear deployment of the settlements in Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council, driving distances between each subsequent settlement rise consistently and sharply. For example, from Vered Yerikho it is just 6.9 km to Almog and 7.5 km to Beit Ha-Arava, but 18.8 km to Kalia, 25.5 km to Ovnat, and 40.8 km to Mitspe Shalem to the south. This deployment is similar to that of Arava Tikhona Regional Council inside Israel, which comprises eight communities, with an average driving distance of 18.3 km: the distance between Idan, the northernmost community, and Paran in the south of the council is 70 km.

**Table 24: Average Driving distance between the Jewish Settlements in the Regional Councils in Judea and Samaria**

Regional Council	Avg. driving time btw. settlements (km)
Shomron	44.7
Mate Binyamin	35.0
Har Khevron	30.0
Arvot Ha-Yarden	28.2
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	20.3
Gush Etsyon	18.2

**Distance between nearest settlements (km)**

Nofim-Yakir	2.4
Ganei Modi'in-Khashmona'im	0.8
Adora-Telem	3.0
Netiv Ha-Gdud-Gilgal	2.0
Almog-Beit Ha-Arava	5.5
Kfar Etsyon-Alon Shvut	1.9

**Distance between furthest settlements (km)**

Migdalim-Mevo Dotan	110.9
Kokhav Ha-Shakhar-Dolev	69.9
Penei Khever-Negohot	66.2
No'omi-Rotem	62.5
Mitspe Shalem-Vered Yerikho	40.8
Asfar-Keidar	53.4

The linear deployment along Route 90 and Allon Road has a similar impact on Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council. The distance between the settlement of No'omi, to the north of Jericho, and Rotem, in the north of the West Bank not far from Beit She'an, is 62.5 km, similar to the driving distance between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. This may be compared to Khevel Eilot Regional Council, a desert area in the Southern District and the most southerly regional council in Israel. Khevel Eilot is home to 12 communities, including 10 kibbutzim; it has an area of 2.2 million dunams (2.5 times larger than Arvot Ha-Yarden), and the average driving distance between all the settlements is 19.6 km.





















Residents of the settlements in Mate Binyamin and Shomron, each of which extends across both sides of the central mountain ridge where much of the Palestinian population is concentrated, are required to travel an average of 35 km and 45 km, respectively, between each pair of Israeli settlements. The greatest distance is that between Migdalim and Mevo Dotan in Shomron Regional Council—110 km, similar to the distance between Akko and Tel Aviv.

Even the compact character of Gush Etsyon is impeded by the settlements in the east of the council, near the Herodium site, which lie on the far side of the Bethlehem urban conglomeration, as well as the settlement of Keidar close to Ma'ale Adumim. The average driving distance between the settlements in this council is 18 km. The distance between Asfar in the south and Keidar in the north is the same as the distance between Ashkelon and Tel Aviv.

The situation is similar in the settlements of Har Khevron Regional Council. The average distance between the settlements, which extend from the Green Line in the west to the Judean Desert in the east, is 30 km. The driving distance between Penei Khever in the east and Negohot in the west is the same as that between Ashkelon and Herzliya.

**Table 25: Distribution of Settlements in the Regional Councils in Judea and Samaria by Religious Character**

Regional Council	Religious-Zionist	Secular	Mixed	Haredi
Mate Binyamin	 16	0	 6	 2
Shomron	 15	 9	 5	 2
Har Khevron	 10	 3	 2	0
Gush Etsyon	 8	 2	 1	0
Arvot Ha-Yarden	 4	 14	 2	0
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	 2	 5	0	0

As already noted, some of the regional councils in Israel have a particular identity, culture, and shared economic foundations, to a lesser or greater extent, which—alongside the geographical definition—help to promote cohesion and consolidation between the settlements. Table 25 shows that in each of the regional councils in Judea and Samaria, between one-third and half of the settlements have a distinct religious character relative to the majority of the settlements. This is an extremely important factor that requires, for example, differential services in the education system for all age groups, including afternoon activities, activities on Shabbat and the festivals, joint cultural and sporting events, observance of Kashrut in institutions, and so forth.

The fact that the area of the regional council also includes cities and local authorities does not necessarily contribute to regional consolidation. In Gush Etsyon, Efrat has a Religious Zionist character, but Beitar Illit, which is six times larger, is a Haredi city; Ma'ale Efra'im is situated in the center of Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council, which is mainly secular, but it is too small, poor, and remote from most of the settlements to function as a center for significant joint activities.

## **Distance from the Municipal Authority and Need to Pass Crossings**

A further index for gauging settlement cohesion is the distance between the settlements and the offices of the respective regional council (see Table 26 and Map 36). The greater the distance, the lower the contribution to settlement cohesion. Of the 127 Jewish settlements, 110 are incorporated in a regional council. The council offices provide numerous services, including municipal services, education, culture, and for many of the residents—employment. As a general rule, the aspiration in Israel is to locate the council offices in the center of the council's area or jurisdiction. The average area of a regional council in Judea and Samaria is 920 sq.km.<sup>28</sup>—2.5 times the average area of a regional council inside Israel (374 sq.km.). Conversely, the average population of a regional council in Judea and Samaria is 27,700, just 1.5 times the average inside Israel. In Judea and Samaria, Areas A and B account for 40 percent of the total area of the West Bank. Israeli citizens are not permitted to enter these areas, and their presence requires the use of long bypass roads in order to reach the offices of the regional council. In some cases, residents must also pass a crossing point, increasing journey times. All these constraints impair cohesion among the settlements in the council.

The offices of Gush Etsyon Regional Council are situated in Alon Shvut. The average distance to this settlement is 12 km. However, while the long-standing settlements in Gush Etsyon are on average just two km from the council offices, residents of the settlements in the east of the council area must travel 15-20 km, while residents of Keidar, situated close to Ma'ale Adumim, must travel 38 km. Residents of Har Gilo are required to pass through the Tunnels (Ha-Minharot) crossing, while residents of Keidar must pass through both A-Za'im and the Tunnels crossings.

<sup>28</sup> Excluding Areas A and B, and the areas of local councils and cities, the average size of a regional council in Judea and Samaria is 562 sq.km. However, since the regional councils encircle Areas A and B, it is appropriate to relate to the total area of the territory when discussing the distance between the settlements and the council offices.



Map 36: Regional Council Offices in Judea and Samaria, 2020

The offices of Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council are situated close to Masu'a, alongside Route 90, along which most of the settlements in the council are situated. The average distance between the settlements and the offices is 20.2 km. Masu'a is the closest settlement (2.2 km), while Rotem is the most remote (37 km). No crossings are involved in this council.

The offices of Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council are situated at the northern end of the Dead Sea, close to Route 90; most of the settlements in the council are located along or close to this road. The average distance is 13.1 km. The closest settlement is Beit Ha-Arava (6 km), while the most remote is Mitspe Shalem (29.8 km). No crossings are involved in this council.

The offices of Mate Binyamin Regional Council, which has the largest population of all the councils in Judea and Samaria, are located in Sha'ar Binyamin industrial zone. The average distance to the council offices from all the settlements in the council, which extend from Mitspe Yerikho in the east to Mevo Khoron in the west, is 28.4 km. The closest settlement is Geva Binyamin (3.5), and the most remote are Matityahu (40.2 km) and Nili (43 km). Many of the residents of the council, whose settlements are spread out on either side of the central mountain ridge, are forced to pass one or more of the following crossings: Maccabim, Ofer, Akhim, and Khashmona'im.

The offices of Shomron Regional Council are situated near the settlement of Barkan, close to Route 5. The average driving distance is 30.5 km. The closest settlement is Barkan (1.3 km) and the most distant Kharmesh (84 km). Some residents of the council must pass one or more of Shomron, Te'enim, and Tsufim Crossings to reach the offices.

The offices of Har Khevron Regional Council are situated in Meitarim industrial zone by Route 317. The average driving distance is 20.8 km. The closest settlement is Shim'a (2.8 km) and the most distant Adora (43.6 km). Some residents of the council must pass Metsadot Yehuda or Meitar Crossings to reach the offices.

**Table 26: Distance of Settlements in Judea and Samaria from Service Cities  
and Need to Pass Crossings**

Settlement	Distance from municipal authority (km)	Crossing/s used to reach municipal offices	Service city	Distance from service city (km)	Crossing/s used to reach service city
<b>Gush Etsyon Regional Council</b>					
Alon Shvut	0.0		Jerusalem	24.1	The Tunnels
Asfar (Metsad)	20.3		Jerusalem	32.5	Mazmuriya
Bat Ayin	2.9		Jerusalem	26.1	The Tunnels
El'azar	4.9		Jerusalem	20.5	The Tunnels
Har Gilo	16.4	Tunnels	Jerusalem	15.0	Ein Ya'el
Karmeit Tsur	10.2		Jerusalem	30.5	The Tunnels
Keidar	38.8	A-Za'im, Tunnels	Ma'ale Adumim, Jerusalem	6.4	
Kfar Etsyon	2.0		Jerusalem	25.2	The Tunnels
Ma'ale Amos	15.8		Jerusalem	27.7	Mazmuriya
Migdal Oz	4.8		Jerusalem	21.0	The Tunnels
Neve Daniel	6.8		Jerusalem	17.9	The Tunnels
Nokdim	18.3		Jerusalem	18.7	Mazmuriya
Rosh Tsurim	2.1		Jerusalem	25.7	The Tunnels
Teko'a	15.3		Jerusalem	18.3	Mazmuriya
<b>Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council</b>					
Argaman	10.2		Beit Shean, Afula	44.4	Ha-Bik'a
Beka'ot	21.3		Beit Shean, Afula	34.9	Ha-Bik'a
Gilgal	14.6		Jerusalem	61.5	A-Za'im
Gitit	22.6		Jerusalem, Ariel	29.5	
Khamra	16.1		Beit Shean, Afula	43.7	Ha-Bik'a
Khemdat	29.8		Beit Shean, Afula	33.8	Ha-Bik'a
Maskiyot	33.6		Beit Shean	23.9	Ha-Bik'a
Masu'a	2.2		Jerusalem	75.2	A-Za'im
Mekhola	33.0		Beit Shean, Afula	17.6	Ha-Bik'a
Mekhora	19.9		Beit Shean, Afula	47.5	Ha-Bik'a
Netiv Ha-Gdud	15.0		Jerusalem	61.6	A-Za'im
Niran	18.1		Jerusalem	58.9	A-Za'im
No'omi (Na'ama)	24.2		Jerusalem	49.7	A-Za'im
Petsa'el	9.6		Jerusalem, Ariel	39.5	
Ro'i	24.7		Beit Shean, Afula	33.9	Ha-Bik'a
Rotem	37.0		Beit Shean	21.3	Ha-Bik'a
Shadmot Mekhola	30.2		Beit Shean, Afula	22.4	Ha-Bik'a
Tomer	11.3		Jerusalem	63.2	A-Za'im
Yafit	5.9		Beit Shean, Afula	55.8	Ha-Bik'a
Yitav	24.1		Jerusalem	42.2	Hizma
<b>Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council</b>					
Almog	9.5		Jerusalem	32.7	A-Za'im
Beit Ha-Arava	6.0		Jerusalem	33.3	A-Za'im
Kalia	7.8		Jerusalem	44.5	A-Za'im
Mitspe Shalem	29.8		Jerusalem	66.6	A-Za'im
Ovnat	14.2		Jerusalem	51.0	A-Za'im
Vered Yerikho	11.3		Jerusalem	33.7	A-Za'im
<b>Mate Binyamin Regional Council</b>					
Almon	11.2		Jerusalem	14.9	Akhirim
Amikhai	31.1		Ariel	23.6	
Ateret	29.8		Modi'in	33.7	Khashmona'im
Beit Khoron	23.5	Ofer, Akhirim	Jerusalem	23.8	Ofer



Settlement	Distance from municipal authority (km)	Crossing/s used to reach municipal offices	Service city	Distance from service city (km)	Crossing/s used to reach service city
Dolev	55.8		Modi'in	25.9	Khashmona'im
Eli	31.1		Jerusalem,Ariel	17.1	
Ganei Modi'in	38.8	Khashmona'im	Modi'in	8.5	
Geva Binyamin (Adam)	3.5		Jerusalem	19.4	Akhim
Giv'on Ha-Khadasha	21.6		Jerusalem	15.3	
Kfar Adumim	19.6		Jerusalem	21.0	A-Za'im
Kfar Ha-Oranim	38.0	Khashmona'im	Modi'in	7.9	
Khalamish	34.3		Jerusalem	56.0	Khashmona'im, Maccabim, Ofer
Khashmona'im	38.1	Khashmona'im	Modi'in	8.1	
Kokhav Ha-Shakhar	19.4		Jerusalem	35.4	Hizma
Kokhav Ya'akov	4.6		Jerusalem	23.1	Akhim
Ma'ale Levona	27.8		Jerusalem	43.2	Akhim
Ma'ale Mikhmas	9.7		Jerusalem	25.2	Hizma
Matityahu	40.2	Khashmona'im	Modi'in	10.8	
Mevo Khoron	45.5	Maccabim, Ofer, Akhim	Modi'in	9.6	
Mitspe Yerikho	21.9		Jerusalem	23.6	A-Za'im
Na'ale	46.5		Modi'in	16.5	Khashmona'im
Nakhli'el	43.1		Modi'in	27.1	Khashmona'im
Nili	43.8		Modi'in	13.7	Khashmona'im
Ofra	13.4		Jerusalem	29.4	Hizma
Pesagot	8.8		Jerusalem	27.2	Akhim
Rimonim	14.8		Jerusalem	30.8	Akhim
Shilo	27.5		Jerusalem	42.9	Akhim
Talmon	50.9		Jerusalem	53.4	Maccabim, Ofer
<b>Shomron Regional Council</b>					
Alei Zahav	13.7		Tel Aviv, Kfar Sava	33.9	Shomron
Avnei Khefets	38.9		Netanya	27.2	Te'enim
Barkan (Beit Aba)	1.3		Tel Aviv, Ariel	8.0	
Brakha	26.0		Ariel	21.6	
Brukhin	7.6		Ariel	11.0	
Einav	30.5		Tel Aviv, Kfar Sava	32.8	Te'enim
Elon Moreh	36.5		Tel Aviv, Netanya	70.0	Te'enim
Ets Efar'im	22.1		Tel Aviv, Petakh Tikva	21.9	
Itamar	26.0		Tel Aviv, Ariel	21.6	
Kfar Tapu'akh	15.7		Tel Aviv, Ariel	11.4	
Khermesh	84.1	Reikhan, Trans-Samaria	Hadera	35.8	Reikhan
Khinanit	81.1	Trans-Samaria	Hadera	29.5	
Kiryat Netafim	1.6		Tel Aviv, Ariel	7.9	
Mevo Dotan	87.5	Trans-Samaria	Hadera	34.1	Reikhan
Migdalim	26.7		Ariel	22.2	
Nofim	9.0		Tel Aviv, Ariel	12.7	
Pedu'el	11.6		Tel Aviv, Petakh Tikva	28.6	
Reikhan	79.8	Trans-Samaria	Hadera	30.1	
Rekhelim	15.8		Ariel	9.0	
Revava	3.3		Ariel	7.0	
Sal'it	44.0	Trans-Samaria	Tel Aviv, Kfar Sava	20.3	
Sha'arei Tikva	18.8		Tel Aviv, Petakh Tikva	18.7	
Shaked	80.7	Trans-Samaria	Hadera	29.1	
Shavei Shomron	26.1		Tel Aviv, Netanya	38.4	Te'enim
Tsufim	28.6	Tsufim	Tel Aviv, Kfar Sava	16.8	Eliyahu
Yakir	7.3		Tel Aviv, Ariel	11.0	

Settlement	Distance from municipal authority (km)	Crossing/s used to reach municipal offices	Service city	Distance from service city (km)	Crossing/s used to reach service city
Yits'har	24.3		Ariel	19.8	
<b>Har Khevron Regional Council</b>					
Adora	43.6		Kiryat Gat	31.4	Tarkumia
Carmel	21.5	Meitar Crossing	Beersheba	27.1	
Eshkolot	20.9		Beersheba	48.1	Meitar
Khagai	19.4		Beersheba	46.0	Meitar
Ma'on	18.5		Beersheba	45.7	Meitar
Metsadot Yehuda	13.5	Metsudat Yehuda Crossing	Beersheba	40.9	Metsudat Yehuda, Meitar
Negohot	37.6	Meitar	Beersheba	43.1	
Otni'el	11.1		Beersheba	37.7	Meitar
Penei Khever	30.1		Beersheba	56.7	Meitar
Sansana	14.2	Meitar	Beersheba	22.8	
Shani	9.0		Beersheba	37.2	
Shim'a	2.8		Beersheba	28.9	Meitar
Susya	13.2		Beersheba	40.6	Meitar
Telem	41.6		Kiryat Gat	32.9	Tarkumia
Tene	15.2		Beersheba	26.0	Meitar
<b>Local Councils</b>					
Alfei Menashe			Tel Aviv, Kfar Sava	15.8	
Beit Arye			Tel Aviv, Petakh Tikva	22.8	
Beit El			Jerusalem	29.1	Hizma
Efrat			Jerusalem	22.2	The Tunnels
Elkana			Tel Aviv, Kfar Sava	21.9	
Giv'at Ze'ev			Jerusalem	17.7	
Har Adar			Jerusalem	17.8	
Imanuel			Netanya	55.9	Eliyahu
Karnei Shomron			Tel Aviv, Kfar Sava	24.5	Eliyahu
Kedumim			Netanya	45.3	Te'enim
Kiryat Arba			Jerusalem	40.8	The Tunnels
Ma'ale Efra'im			Jerusalem	55.9	Hizma
Oranit			Tel Aviv, Kfar Sava	19.7	
<b>Cities</b>					
Ariel			Ariel	0.0	
Beitar Illit			Jerusalem	18.8	The Tunnels
Ma'ale Adumim			Jerusalem	16.2	A-Za'im (Ma'ale Adumim)
Modi'in Illit			Modi'in	10.3	

## **Distance from the Service City and Need to Pass Crossings**

Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria cannot receive numerous services in the area and must travel into Israel to this end. Accordingly, the presence of a city inside Israel close to the settlements can serve as a substitute and contribute to the cohesion of the nearby settlements across the Green Line. If the service city is more remote, and/or if residents must pass a crossing to reach it, its contribution to settlement cohesion will be more limited. Given the absence of a large city in Judea and Samaria that can meet all the residents' needs, Israelis who live beyond the Green Line usually travel to a city inside Israel. In broad terms, most of them will travel to one of the four main metropolises: the majority to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and much smaller numbers to Beersheva and Haifa. As can be seen in Table 26, we included one or two secondary cities in each metropolis in order to relate to secondary traveling times.

Residents of Gush Etsyon who travel to Jerusalem will travel an average of 21.7 km, almost entirely along Route 60. The closest settlement to the city is Keidar (6.4 km) and the most remote Asfar (32.5 km). Residents will need to pass one of four crossings: Mazmuriya, the Tunnels crossing, A-Za'im, and Ein Yahel.

Residents of 11 settlements in Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council will travel to Beit She'an, an average distance of 34.4 km (in some cases they may travel as far as Afula, an additional 28 km). The closest settlement to Beit She'an is Mekhola (17.6 km) and the most remote is Yafit (55.8 km). The residents of seven other settlements in this regional council will travel to Jerusalem, an average distance of 58.9 km. The closest settlement to Jerusalem is Yitav (42.2 km) and the most remote Masu'a (75.2 km). Some residents may occasionally travel to Ariel, a distance of around 40 km.

Jerusalem is the service city for six settlements in Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council, an average distance of 43.6 km. The closest settlement is Almog (32.7 km) and the most remote is Mitspe Shalem (66.6 km). Some residents may travel to Arad or Beersheva, both of which are further away.

The residents of 15 settlements in Mate Binyamin Regional Council travel to Jerusalem, an average distance of 30.7 km. The closest settlement is Almon (14.9 km) and the most remote Talmon (53.4 km). The residents of 10 other settlements will prefer the nearby city of Modi'in, an average driving distance of 13.5 km. The nearest settlement is Kfar Ha-Oranim (7.9 km) and the most remote Ateret (33.7 km). Residents will pass various crossings: Akhim, Ofer, Khashmona'im, and Maccabim.

Residents of Shomron Regional Council will travel to the main cities on the coastal plain—Hadera, Kfar Sava, Petakh Tikva, Netanya, and so forth, at an average driving distance of 23.5 km. They will pass various crossings: Reikhan, Te'enim, Eliyahu, and Shomron.

Residents of Har Khevron Regional Council travel to Beersheva and Kiryat Gat, an average driving distance of 37.6 km, using Meitar and Tarqumiya Crossings.

Residents of the local councils will use the same major cities inside Israel, an average driving distance of 30 km. Residents of the Haredi cities will travel to Jerusalem or Bnei Brak; residents of Ariel to Tel Aviv; and residents of Ma'ale Adumim mainly to Jerusalem.

In conclusion, the average distance between the settlements and their deployment in a linear pattern, or on either side of the central mountain ridge, most of which is defined as Area A or B, does not encourage cohesion among the Jewish settlements and regional councils in Judea and Samaria. Similarly, the heterogeneous religious identity of the regional councils mitigates against intensive social and cultural interactions. The long driving distances between the settlements and their regional offices means that these cannot become cultural and social centers offering easy access. The result is that the residents of each settlement are forced to look for the municipal services they require in the four main metropolises inside Israel, which are too remote to create conditions for settlement cohesion.

# Chapter Five


## Criterion #3: Has a hierarchy of settlements been created in terms of size and location?

The deployment of settlements in a given country or region is evaluated on the basis of their size and socioeconomic function, with reference to the geographical distances between the settlements. An optimal settlement system comprises a large, central city, followed by a hierarchy of medium-sized and small cities, towns, villages, and farms. Every country and region includes cities of differing sizes, from mega-cities to small urban communities. The relationship between the number of cities and their size is inverted: there are a large number of small cities, while for each increase in size their number decreases. A ranking of urban settlements in a country by size and an examination of their mutual relations yields the urban ranking of a country. As a general rule, the more developed a country and the longer its process of urbanization, the more developed its urban ranking will be. Such a country will include cities of most size groups—large, medium, and small. Developed countries often meet the model of a “normal urban ranking” whereby the second-largest city has about half as many residents as the largest city, the third-largest city has a population about one-third that of the largest city, and so forth.


### **Jewish and Palestinian Settlements: Number, Area, Population**

The definition of a city's size is based not only on the number of residents, but also on its physical size relative to other cities in the same country or around the world. For the purpose of this study we adopted the Israeli definition that a settlement with a population of over 200,000 constitutes a large city. Accordingly, and setting aside Jerusalem due to its unique status for both populations, there are only two large cities in the West Bank: Hebron and Nablus. There is no Jewish large city. Moreover, 88 percent of the Jewish settlements, jointly home to 35 percent of the Israelis in the area, each have a population of no more than 5,000. The same is true of 74 percent of the Palestinian settlements, jointly home to almost one-fourth (24 percent) of the Palestinian population. Settlements with a population of between 5,000 and 20,000 constitute 9.5 percent of the Jewish settlements and are home to one-fourth of Jewish





Map 37: Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria by Population Size, 2020



Map 38: Palestinian Settlements in Judea and Samaria by Population Size, 2020



















residents; in the Palestinian system settlements of this size constitute 21 percent of the total and are home to 34.5 percent of residents. The upper category (cities with a population of over 20,000) accounts for 2.5 percent of all Jewish settlements and 39 percent of residents, and for 11.5 percent of all Palestinian settlements and 41 percent of residents. The ratio between these three groups in the Jewish system is 1:4:37 in terms of the number of settlements and 1:1.4:1.5 in terms of the number of residents. In the Palestinian system the ratio in terms of the number of settlements is 1:4.5:15, and in terms of the number of residents 1:1.4:1.9. On average, while each large Arab settlement is the focus and service center for an average of 4.5 medium-sized and 15 small settlements, a single large Jewish settlement plays this role for an average of four medium-sized and 37 (!) small settlements. According to this index, the Palestinian settlement system in Judea and Samaria is more urbanized and developed than the Jewish system.

The largest Jewish city, Modi'in Illit in the west of the Binyamin region, is only 1.27 times larger than the second-largest city, Beitar Illit in western Judea. Modi'in Illit is 2.06 times larger than the third-largest city, Ma'ale Adumim on the edge of the Judean Desert, and four times larger than the fourth-largest city, Ariel in central Samaria. By way of comparison to Israel: Jerusalem, the largest city, is 2.05 times larger than Tel Aviv, the second-largest city, and 3.4, the largest city, is 2.05 times larger than Tel Aviv, the second-largest city, and 3.4 to four times larger than the third tier of cities, which all have similar populations (Haifa, Rishon Le-Tsion, Petakh Tikva, Ashdod, Netanya, Bnei Brak, and Beersheva). Hebron, the largest Palestinian city, which is situated in Judea and serves as the "Palestinian capital" of the region, is just 1.3 times larger than the second-largest city, Nablus in Samaria, which serves as the "Palestinian capital" of that area. However, Hebron is 3.16 times larger than the third-largest city, Yata in the Southern Hebron Hills, and Tulkarm (western Samaria); four times larger than the fourth-largest city, Qalqiliya (western Samaria) and than Jenin (northern Samaria).



















Jerusalem could be included in these calculations, but this is problematic, since the city constitutes a separate size category that lacks an intermediate rank relative to the next-largest cities (this is particularly true for the Jewish settlement system). Jerusalem is 13 times larger than the largest Jewish city in Judea and Samaria, but only four times larger than the largest Palestinian city. Jerusalem's position on the center of the mountain ridge, between Nablus and Hebron, creates a perfect Palestinian ranking of a large city in the center of the West Bank, two cities—each one-fourth the size of Jerusalem—in the center of the area to the north and south of Jerusalem, respectively,

and a network of smaller towns between these cities and the Green Line. In terms of the Jewish population, Jerusalem forms the center of the large Jerusalem triangle, with its points at the three largest Jewish cities in Judea and Samaria: Modi'in Illit, Beitar Illit, and Ma'ale Adumim.



















**Table 27: Jewish and Palestinian Settlements in Judea and Samaria: Number of Residents and Population Size**

Size of Settlement (By num. of residents)	Num. of Settlements			
	Israelis		Palestinians	Ratio (%)
<b>Total</b>	 <b>127</b>		 <b>482</b>	
0 - 1,000	 59		 125	
1,001 - 5,000	 53		 232	
5,001 - 10,000	 9		 70	
10,001 - 20,000	 3		 32	
20,001 ≤	 3		 23	

	Num. of Residents (000's)			
	Israelis		Palestinians	Ratio (%)
<b>Total</b>	 <b>451</b>		 <b>2,720</b>	
0 - 1,000	 30		 56	
1,001 - 5,000	 128		 604	
5,001 - 10,000	 66		 509	
10,001 - 20,000	 50		 430	
20,001 ≤	 177		 1,121	

	Built-up area (sq.km.)			
	Israelis		Palestinians	Ratio (%)
<b>Total</b>	 <b>137</b>		 <b>353</b>	
0 - 1,000	 35		 12	
1,001 - 5,000	 55		 88	
5,001 - 10,000	 18		 61	
10,001 - 20,000	 14		 52	
20,001 ≤	 14		 141	



**Table 28: Jewish and Palestinian Settlements in Judea and Samaria  
(No. of Settlements and Population Size): Sharon Plan,  
Regional Councils, Palestinian Districts**

	0-1,000		1,001-5,000		5,001-10,000		10,001-20,000		20,000 +	
By Sharon Plan										
	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians
Total	59	125	53	232	9	70	3	32	3	23
Jordan Valley	32	35	10	49	2	16	1	11	0	7
Mountain Ridge	15	55	8	89	2	26	0	9	0	13
Western Samaria and Judea	10	27	19	73	5	19	1	8	0	2
Greater Jerusalem	2	8	16	21	0	9	1	4	3	1
By Regional Councils										
	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians
Total	59	125	53	232	9	70	3	32	3	23
Gush Etsyon	5	14	9	24	0	13	1	11	1	4
Har Khevron	14	33	2	23	1	4	0	3	0	8
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	6	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
Mate Binyamin	6	16	21	62	4	16	1	2	2	3
Arvot Ha-Yarden	20	10	1	9		2	0	0	0	1
Shomron	8	52	21	114	4	35	1	16	0	7
By Palestinian Districts										
	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians	Israelis	Palestinians
Total	59	125	53	232	9	70	3	32	3	23
Bethlehem	4	11	7	19	0	8	1	6	1	1
Jenin	3	22	2	33	0	11	0	5	0	3
Hebron	17	35	2	27	1	7	0	7	0	10
Tubas	7	6	0	5	0	2	0	1	0	1
Tulkarm	1	10	2	16	0	6	0	4	0	1
Jerusalem	1	4	5	12	2	7	1	3	1	1
Jericho	14	4	2	4	0	2	0	0	0	1
Salfit	2	1	10	13	1	3	1	2	0	0
Qalqiliya	0	13	2	15	3	3	0	0	0	1
Ramallah	5	11	14	50	2	11	0	0	1	3
Nablus	5	8	7	38	0	10	0	4	0	1



The small Jewish settlements, characterized by low-rise private construction (“villas,”) account for 66 percent of the total Jewish built-up area, whereas in the Palestinian system such settlements account for only 28 percent of the built-up area. The built-up area of the large Jewish settlements, home to 39 percent of the Jewish population, accounts for just 10.6 percent of the total Jewish built-up area, whereas in the Palestinian system the same proportion of the population (40 percent) accounts for 40 percent of the total built-up area. Again, these figures reflect much more developed processes of urbanization in the Palestinian settlement system.

In addition to the statistics, it is important to bear in mind that the two largest Jewish settlements, Modi’in Illit and Beitar Illit, are Haredi cities. They do not include industry, service centers or cultural, educational, and sports facilities relevant to the non-Haredi residents of the area. Moreover, both these cities are situated on the Green Line, at a great distance from the other settlements. These cities themselves rely on Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, and Beit Shemesh inside Israel. The third-largest city, Ma’ale Adumim, has a mixed population in terms of religious identity. However, it is situated on the edge of the desert, with very few Jewish communities in its vicinity. Its fabric of life relies on Jerusalem. The fourth-largest city, Ariel, has an excellent location in the center of Samaria, on the mountain ridge. However, it is relatively small,<sup>29</sup> although it benefits from the presence of a university that serves as a regional focus of attraction (16,000 students from across Israel). In other words, *the Jewish settlements as a whole do not maintain an internal settlement ranking, but rely entirely on large cities in Israel*. This has numerous ramifications in the fields of transportation, infrastructures, security, education, the economy, etc.

It is interesting to compare these findings for Judea and Samaria with Israel itself. From the earliest stages of the Zionist movement, settlement was intended to secure political goals, first during the struggle to determine the borders of the Jewish state, and later to consolidate its control in the areas occupied in the 1948 War of Independence. This comparison reinforces the conclusions based on the findings presented above. Within the State of Israel, small settlements (up to 5,000 people) account for 84 percent (919 settlements) of the total number of settlements, but are home to just 8.8 percent of residents (one-fourth the proportion in the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria). Medium-sized settlements account for 7.7 percent of the total (84 settlements) and are home to just 9.9 percent of residents (compared to 25 percent in Judea and Samaria). Large settlements account for eight percent of

<sup>29</sup> On 24 Oct. 2021, the Ministry of Housing published a tender for 731 housing units in Ariel. The tenders published in Ariel are in accordance with Plan No. 130/3/1, approved in 1991, providing for the construction of approx. 1,600 housing units on land declared “state land” years before. Formally, these units are to be included in Ariel’s jurisdiction area, but in practice they constitute a separate and independent settlement, 2 km. away from the city.

**Table 29: Density of Jewish Cities and Local Councils in Judea and Samaria  
(Built-up Area and Area of Jurisdiction)**

Settlement	Num. of Residents	Area			Density (Residents per sq. km.)	
		Area of Jurisdiction (sq. km.)	Built-up Area Sq. km.	% of area of jurisdiction	Area of Jurisdiction	Built-up Area
Modi'in Illit	77,967	4.8	3.3	67.7	16,142.2	23,843.1
Beitar Illit	61,125	4.9	4.0	81.9	12,423.7	15,167.4
Ma'ale Adumim	37,846	46.5	7.2	15.5	814.2	5,263.6
Ariel	19,582	14.4	7.2	50.0	1,363.6	2,727.2
Giv'at Ze'ev	19,225	4.5	4.1	92.8	4,310.5	4,643.7
Efrat	11,405	6.9	2.4	35.0	1,643.3	4,693.4
Karnei Shomron	9,417	7.3	3.8	52.3	1,298.8	2,484.6
Oranit	8,965	2.2	1.8	80.7	4,020.1	4,980.5
Alfei Menashe	7,997	4.6	2.9	62.2	1,746.0	2,805.9
Kiryat Arba	7,338	4.4	1.8	41.1	1,667.7	4,054.1
Beit El	5,684	1.5	1.1	70.4	3,739.4	5,312.1
Beit Aye	5,351	2.9	1.8	63.0	1,851.5	2,940.1
Kedumim	4,586	2.9	2.0	69.4	1,592.3	2,293.0
Imanuel	4,129	5.0	1.3	25.6	819.2	3,469.0
Har Adar	4,084	1.4	1.2	87.2	2,968.0	3,403.3
Elkana	3,911	5.0	1.3	25.6	3,286.5	4,116.0
Ma'ale Efra'im	1,255	5.6	1.9	33.8	224.1	664.0

**Table 30: Density of Palestinian Cities and Local Councils in Judea and Samaria  
(Built-up Area and Area of Jurisdiction)**

Locale	Num. of Residents	Area			Density (Residents per sq.km.)	
		Area of Jurisdiction (sq.km.)	Built-up Area Sq.km.	% of area of jurisdiction	Area of Jurisdiction	Built-up Area
Hebron	215,571	74.1	29.5	67.7	2,909.1	7,312.4
Nablus	164,758	28.6	13.9	81.9	5,760.7	11,853.0
Yatta	68,094	133.0	8.7	15.5	511.9	7,853.9
Tulkarm	67,497	28.8	7.6	50.0	2,343.6	8,869.5
Qalqiliya	54,737	25.6	3.9	92.8	2,138.1	14,143.9
Jenin	52,632	37.3	6.3	35.0	1,411.0	8,354.2
El-Bireh	48,625	22.4	4.8	52.3	2,170.7	10,109.1
Dura	42,174	49.0	5.5	80.7	860.6	7,695.9
Ramallah	41,246	16.3	8.1	62.2	2,530.4	5,092.0
Dahariya	38,516	133.0	5.7	41.1	289.5	6,816.9
Bethlehem	30,233	29.8	4.8	70.4	1,014.5	6,246.4
Halhul	28,981	37.3	4.7	63.0	776.9	6,192.5
Beitunia	28,138	26.2	2.6	69.4	1,073.9	11,034.5
Samu'a	27,888	13.8	3.1	25.6	2,020.8	8,967.2
Idna	27,886	25.5	4.6	87.2	1,093.5	6,009.9
Bani Na'im	26,405	-	7.4	25.6	-	3,573.0
Qabatiya	25,773	8.6	3.1	33.8	3,010.8	8,450.1
Tubas	22,690	-	2.5	-	-	9,076.0
Azariya	22,434	-	2.8	-	-	8,157.8
Sa'ir	22,217	117.0	3.5	2.95	189.8	6,439.7
Yamun	21,908	-	2.3	-	-	9,443.1
Jericho	21,891	59.0	2.8	4.81	371.0	7,708.0
Tarqumiya	20,704	-	3.0	-	-	6,994.5

the total (88 settlements)—over three times the proportion in Judea and Samaria—and are home to 81.3 percent of residents, twice the figure in Judea and Samaria. Thus, on average, Israel is much more developed and urbanized than the Jewish settlement system in Judea and Samaria, and than the Palestinian system. In Israel there are an average of 1.54 cities to every 2.3 local councils and one regional council. In Judea and Samaria, by contrast, there is on average one very small city (the two Haredi cities out of the four in the area are not relevant in this context) to every 3.25 local councils and to every 1.5 regional councils.

The two Haredi cities are the most congested cities in Judea and Samaria (even by comparison to the Palestinian cities) and they constitute a distinct category. Haredi communities in general typically have high density levels. For example, Bnei Brak is the most congested city in Israel, at 28,865 persons per sq.km.; even in Elad, a relatively new city, the density rate is 14,191 per sq.km. Five of the 10 most congested cities in Israel are Haredi, including Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit. Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit are more congested than the main cities in Israel: Jerusalem has a population density of 7,652 per sq.km., Tel Aviv 9,001, and Petakh Tikva 7,037. Density rates in the secular cities and councils in Judea and Samaria are much lower—between 1,500 and 4,200 persons per sq.km.

As for the larger Palestinian settlements (over 20,000 inhabitants), density rates are lower for the area of jurisdiction as a whole, but much higher for the built-up area, ranging from 1,500 to almost 14,000 persons per sq.km. The most congested Palestinian city is Qalqiliya, trapped in the small piece of Area A it was allocated; density in the city is 14,143 persons per sq.km. However, even the dense Palestinian settlements offer diverse services within their area of jurisdiction, including public transportation, commercial areas, industry, education, and so forth—something that is far less common in the large Jewish settlements, and particularly in the Haredi cities.

## **Jewish and Palestinian Settlements in the Settlement Zones according to the Sharon Plan**

As noted, the Sharon Plan is the most favorable in terms of Israel's interests, since it seeks to refrain from including large Palestinian settlements. As can be seen in Table 28, in the Jordan Valley, which accounts for 40 percent of the territory of Judea and Samaria, 93 percent of the settlements are small (under 5,000 residents); indeed, most of them have a population of less than 1,000. The three medium-sized settlements are not really relevant to this region. The largest, Efrat, is situated on the central mountain ridge in the Gush Etsyon area, dozens of kilometers from most

of the settlements. Moreover, Efrat itself relies on Jerusalem. The same applies to Kiryat Arba in the southern Hebron Hills, and Geva Binyamin near Jerusalem. In other words, in approximately 40 percent of the territory of Judea and Samaria, the Jewish settlements are of the same size (small) without any hierarchy. Accordingly, the service cities for these settlements extend from Arad and Beersheva to the south, through Jerusalem in the center, and as far as Beit She'an and Afula in the north. By contrast, the Arab settlements in this region include seven large towns situated in the center of the territory, with a firm hierarchy of size. This region includes approximately one-third of the Jewish built-up area in Judea and Samaria, most of which constitutes hothouses of the settlements in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea.

The picture is the same in western Judea and Samaria. There is only one medium-sized settlement (Ariel, with almost 20,000 residents), alongside 29 small settlements that once again account for 83 percent of all the Jewish settlements in the area, and five medium-sized ones. Despite Ariel's location in the heart of Samaria, it is located on the eastern edge of this settlement region, dozens of kilometers from remote settlements in Judea and northern Samaria. Accordingly, this settlement zone also lacks a hierarchical structure and the vast majority of settlements are small.

The Palestinian settlement system in this area includes only two large settlements, but as the map shows, Qalqiliya and Tulkarm are adjacent to this zone on its west and effectively form an integral part of it. In addition, the zone includes 27 medium-sized settlements that serve as centers to 100 small settlements. Thus the hierarchy in the Palestinian system is present and clear. The size of the built-up area reflects the higher rate of density in the Palestinian system—an average of 540 dunams per locale, compared to 1,126 in the Jewish system.

At first glance, the picture regarding the Jewish settlements in the greater Jerusalem area is very different. There are three relatively large cities that could maintain patterns of settlement cohesion with 18 small settlements and a single medium-sized settlement. In reality, however, as already noted, two of the three cities are Haredi cities situated on the Green Line, far from the other settlements. Both have a ranking of 1 in the socioeconomic index, and the fabric of life of their Haredi populations are intricately linked to Jerusalem, Bnei Brak, and Beit Shemesh. Ma'ale Adumim to the east of Jerusalem does not have many other settlements in its vicinity, and it relies itself on Jerusalem. Conversely, Efrat can be regarded as a small-scale urban center for the residents of Gush Etsyon. Be this as it may, even in this area, which has the largest number of Israeli residents, there is no hierarchy among the settlements, and the largest settlements are situated at the points of the area and do not maintain interaction with the smaller settlements. By contrast, the hierarchy of the Palestinian



settlement system in this zone is clear, despite the fact that the six adjacent Palestinian cities—Ramallah, Beitunia, El-Bireh, Bethlehem, Beit Sakhur, and Beit Jala—are not part of greater Jerusalem according to the Israeli definition.

In conclusion, even the territorial division that favors the concentrations of Jewish settlements and excludes the major Palestinian settlements cannot be said to show signs of a hierarchy of size and location within the overall Jewish settlement system.

On the central mountain ridge—outside the Sharon Plan borders—the situation is the same: 92 percent of the Jewish settlements are small (under 5,000 residents), and most of them have a population of under 1,000. The two medium-sized settlements (each of which has a population of under 10,000) are Beit El and Kokhav Ya’akov, both of which are in the lowest third of the socioeconomic ranking (3 and 2, respectively). Kokhav Ya’akov, which has almost twice as many residents as Beit El, has a Haredi population and the settlement functions as a neighborhood of Jerusalem. Accordingly, in this area, too, there is no settlement hierarchy and almost all the settlements are small and thus rely on Jerusalem. Conversely, this area is the heartland of Palestinian settlement, with 40 percent of the settlements and 13 out of 23 large settlements, each serving an average of 11 small settlements and just 2.7 medium-sized settlements. These settlements are distributed along Route 60, which follows the central mountain ridge.

## **Jewish and Palestinian Settlements according to the Palestinian Districts**

An examination of this criterion according to the division into Palestinian districts (Table 28) sharpens and accentuates the findings presented for the Sharon Plan. Five Palestinian districts—Nablus, Jericho, Tulkarm, Tubas, and Jenin—each include just a handful of small Jewish settlements, most of which have a population of less than 1,000. In the Hebron District, alongside 19 small settlements, there is only one local council—Kiryat Arba, in cluster 3 of the socioeconomic index; most of the settlements lie to the south of Kiryat Arba. The situation in the Jerusalem District is the strongest in terms of the Jewish settlement system: the district includes six small settlements, three medium-sized ones, and a single large settlement located in the center of the district. In Salfit District, the city of Ariel is situated on the far eastern edge of the district, at a great distance from the 12 small settlements and one medium-sized settlement within the district borders. In the Bethlehem District, the city of Beitar Illit is situated on the Green Line on the western edge of the district. The medium-sized settlement of Efrat, by contrast, has a central situation relative to most of the small settlements. In the Ramallah District the picture is the same: the largest city,

Modi'in Illit, is situated in the far west of the district, at a great distance from most of the settlements; moreover it has a Haredi and poor character. In the Qalqiliya District there is no large Jewish settlements and the number of Jewish settlements of other sizes is extremely small.

Once again, it is clear that the Palestinian settlement system in all the districts enjoys a hierarchical pattern in terms of size and location, with the exception of Tulkarm and Qalqiliya, which for historical reasons are situated on the edge of their respective districts.

## **Jewish and Palestinian Settlements by Size in the Regional Councils**

An examination of this criterion based on the Jewish regional councils (including the local councils and cities enclosed by their borders) reveals a similar picture to that of the previous analyses (see Table 28). The two eastern regional councils—Arvot Ha-Yarden and Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh—include only small settlements, most of which have a population of a few hundred Israelis. In Har Khevron, the one medium-sized settlement, Kiryat Arba, is situated on the edge of the regional council, which also includes 19 small settlements.

In Shomron, Ariel is situated in the center of the regional council, in an excellent location, with four medium-sized and 29 small settlements. In Gush Etsyon, the large city (Haredi Beitar Illit) is situated on the western edge of the regional council and does not service it; the medium-sized settlement of Efrat is situated in the center of the council, which also includes 14 small settlements. Mate Binyamin includes large settlements. However, Modi'in Illit, with its Haredi population, is situated on the western edge of the council and does not serve it at all. Ma'ale Adumim, on the southern edge of the council, is dozens of kilometers from most of the settlements in the council area. Giv'at Ze'ev, a medium-sized settlement on the central mountain ridge, close to Jerusalem and the Green Line, is also situated on the southern edge of the council. This regional council includes four medium-sized settlements, three of which are situated relatively centrally (Geva Binyamin, Beit El, and Kokhav Ya'akov), as well as 29 small settlements.

In terms of the Palestinian settlement system, Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh includes just one Palestinian settlement. The reason is that this council is based on Route 90, which was only constructed in this section after the 1967 Six Day War; the remainder of the area is an IDF firing zone. In Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council, the centrality of Jericho is obvious. In the remaining Jewish regional councils, the hierarchy and even the central location of the main Palestinian cities is self-evident.

An analysis of the various territorial divisions shows clearly that the Jewish settlement system was built without any hierarchy of size and location. The two largest settlements—Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit—are situated on the edge of the area, on the Green Line, at a great distance from most of the settlements. Moreover, these settlements have a Haredi population at the lowest socioeconomic ranking that does not maintain meaningful interactions with the adjacent settlements. The third-largest settlement, Ma'ale Adumim, is situated on the edge of the desert and there are very few Jewish settlements in its vicinity. Moreover, the proximity of Ma'ale Adumim to Jerusalem makes the capital a preferable center. The fourth-largest city, Ariel, has a central and positive location in Samaria. Kiryat Arba in the south is situated on the edge of the Jewish settlement zone; in addition to Jerusalem, its residents prefer to turn to Arad and Beersheva, which are not much further away. Moreover, Kiryat Arba is too small and poor to offer significant services. Givat Ze'ev and Efrat in the Jerusalem area cannot compete with nearby Jerusalem, just a few kilometers away. In northern Samaria, the Jordan Valley, and the northern Dead Sea, the settlements are small and lack any hierarchy.

*In practice, Jerusalem, situated between the two major Palestinian cities—Nablus and Hebron—is the central city on which all the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria rely directly, without any intermediate hierarchy of other Jewish cities.* The distance between Jerusalem and the Green Line in the south of the West Bank is just 36 kilometers, so that it serves as a center for the small number of settlements in Judea. Conversely, Jerusalem is twice as far from the Green Line in the north of the West Bank (74 km), so that it is difficult for the small proportion of the Jewish population that lives north of Nablus to rely on the capital.

In conclusion, on the basis of these findings it can be determined that *the lack of a settlement hierarchy based on location and size in all parts of Judea and Samaria prevents the Jewish settlement system in the area from maintaining a stable and independent fabric of life.* On the whole, the area features a very high proportion of small settlements, many of them very small. The Jewish settlement system does not maintain meaningful interactions with the Palestinian system, and instead relies on the Israeli cities inside the Green Line, particularly the capital Jerusalem. In some cases this entails journeys of dozens of kilometers in order to reach the nearest city, such as Beersheva, Arad, Afula, Beit She'an, Kfar Sava, Hadera, Netanya, Petakh Tikva, Rosh Ha-Ayin, and so forth. The similar results of the analyses based on the Jewish regional councils and the settlement zones in the Sharon Plan show that any area annexed to Israel will be forced to rely on the nearest city inside the Green Line.

# Chapter Six

Criterion #4: Does the settlement structure entail a presence on the ground and are the settlements based on local agriculture and industry?

## Land Ownership

This study will relate solely to Area C,<sup>30</sup> which accounts for 60 percent of the West Bank—3,207 sq.km. We will begin by examining the distribution of land ownership (see Table 31 and Map 39).

**Table 31: Land Ownership in Area C (Percent)**


As can be seen, the area is divided between state-owned land (declared land and

Type of Ownership	Land Ownership	
	Sq.km.	%
Total	3207.4	100.0
Jewish land	8.9	0.3
Declared	713.4	22.2
Regulated	527.3	16.4
Claimed by Custodian	422.2	13.2
Private - not regulated	958.8	29.9
Private - regulated	576.7	18.0

regulated land)—approx. 39 percent, and privately-owned Palestinian land (regulated and non-regulated)—approx. 48 percent. However, it should be noted that declared state land that have been surveyed and announced are still disputed, since they were farmed intermittently by Palestinians. The same is true of land in the “custodian claims ownership” category—i.e. land where the survey process has not yet been completed. Whatever calculation is used, the proportion of privately-owned Jewish land is infinitesimal. Thus the development and expansion of the Jewish settlement system,

<sup>30</sup> According to the Interim Accord signed in 1995, Israel reserves powers in this area in the fields of security and law and order, as well as 17 territorial powers. Within this area, Israel has transferred 24 personal and functional powers to the Palestinian Authority (PA). Area C was supposed to come under the authority of the PA in three realignments over a period of 18 months, with the exception of military sites and the Jewish settlements.





Map 39: Land Ownership in Judea and Samaria, 2020



in light of Palestinian policy rejecting the sale of land to Jews, is possible mainly by means of the allocation of state land. It should be emphasized that this procedure has been rejected by the international community in various UN resolutions, particularly Resolution 2334, adopted by the Security Council in 2016 (the US abstained).

**Table 32: Land Ownership in Judea and Samaria:  
Sharon Plan / Regional Councils / PA Districts**

	Jewish Land	Declared	Regulate	Custodian claims ownership	Private - not regulated	Private - regulated
<b>By Sharon Plan</b>						
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>713.4</b>	<b>527.3</b>	<b>422.2</b>	<b>958.8</b>	<b>576.7</b>
Jordan Valley	1.6	252.0	456.0	273.5	273.3	320.1
Mountain Ridge	1.7	328.6	36.7	85.5	252.2	156.3
Western Samaria and Judea	0.1	93.9	23.3	35.1	298.8	74.7
Greater Jerusalem	5.5	38.9	11.3	28.1	134.5	25.6
<b>By Regional Councils</b>						
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>713.4</b>	<b>527.3</b>	<b>422.2</b>	<b>958.8</b>	<b>576.7</b>
Arvot Ha-Yarden	1.18	53.06	350.3	150.1	96.3	198.61
Shomron	1.23	88.42	55.6	29.2	338.2	189.93
Mate Binyamin	3.21	63.12	83.0	61.8	210.2	187.94
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	0.03	313.2	36.2	39.4	9.0	0.07
Har Khevron	0.00	69.3	1.3	83.7	172.9	0.00
Gush Etsyon	3.04	122.6	0.0	57.4	127.4	0.01
Outside Judea & Samaria	0.24	3.7	0.9	0.6	4.7	0.16
<b>By Palestinian Districts</b>						
<b>Total</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>713.4</b>	<b>527.3</b>	<b>422.2</b>	<b>958.8</b>	<b>576.7</b>
Jericho	1.2	53.2	217.2	111.7	28.2	93.3
Ramallah	0.9	35.9	76.6	44.6	179.5	149.6
Hebron	1.4	147.0	1.3	95.1	214.1	0.0
Bethlehem	1.9	274.1	0.0	57.3	79.9	0.0
Tubas	0.0	6.8	157.1	18.6	19.9	103.1
Nablus	0.1	31.7	9.1	56.5	113.5	47.0
Jerusalem	2.3	85.4	23.6	17.5	44.6	46.5
Jenin	0.0	5.7	41.5	1.2	31.7	108.9
Salfit	0.2	48.1	0.3	9.8	88.0	0.0
Qalqiliya	1.0	15.2	0.1	5.4	93.5	11.1
Tulkarm	0.0	10.4	0.7	4.4	65.8	17.2

As Table 32 shows very clearly, the picture of land ownership does not change in any of the other divisions of Area C, so that the conclusions also remain the same.

## Land Ownership in the Jewish Settlements

This index addresses the fact that even within the Jewish settlements, some of the land is still under private Palestinian ownership (see Table 33). There are various reasons for this, including the military seizure orders issued in the 1960s and 1970s, later incursions, or “islands” within the municipal boundaries.

According to the Peace Now figures, almost all the Jewish settlements include privately-owned Palestinian land. Around 47 percent of the area of the local councils is owned privately by Palestinians. The proportion is particularly high in Beit El,

**Table 33: Palestinian-Owned Land in Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria<sup>31</sup>**

Authority	Built-up Area (000s Dunams)	Palestinian-Owned Land (000s Dunams)
Gush Etsyon	34.5	15.9
Arvot Ha-Yarden	30.0	13.5
Mate Binyamin	28.2	8.0
Shomron	21.4	3.9
Har Khevron	16.6	3.9
Cities	10.4	2.6
Local Councils	7.7	2.2

Imanu'el, Kiryat Arba, and Oranit, where over half the land is owned by Palestinians. In Giv'at Ze'ev, Kedumim, and Karnei Shomron half the land is under private Palestinian ownership.

In the cities of Modi'in Illit and Ariel, 40 and 30 percent of the total area, respectively, is owned privately by Palestinians. By contrast, there is almost no such land in Beitar Illit and Ma'ale Adumim. Among the regional councils, the proportion of privately-owned Palestinian land ranges from almost zero in Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh to 19 percent in Arvot Ha-Yarden and 36 percent in Shomron. The settlements with the highest rate of Palestinian ownership are: in Arvot Ha-Yarden–Ro'i (100 percent privately-owned Palestinian land); in Mate Binyamin–Rimon (99 percent), Pesagot (99 percent), Kokhav Ha-Shakhar (92 percent), Ofra (85 percent), Kfar Ha-Oranim (74 percent), Matityahu (69 percent); in Shomron–Shavei Shomron (67 percent), Sal'it (65 percent), Elon Moreh (65 percent); in Gush Etsyon–Har Gilo (65 percent).

## Agriculture

We will now turn to an examination of the Jewish settlements based on the type of settlement. In addition to the built-up area, agricultural settlements have a particularly strong influence in terms of the presence on the ground through various features—crops, hothouses, packing plants, and so forth. They are also important economically in terms of employees, suppliers, service providers, etc. Industrial zones also enhance the presence on the ground: factories, businesses, leisure sites, and again in terms of employees, suppliers, and service providers. Agriculture and industry are two productive sectors that can create economic independence and regional development; they also help to finance other spheres, including education and welfare.

<sup>31</sup> Peace Now statistics.

## Settlement Types

Table 34 and Map 29 present the distribution of settlements by settlement type as of the end of 2020. The total area of land in Judea and Samaria farmed by Israelis is 142.843 sq.km. Agricultural settlements account for 24.4 percent of all Jewish settlements and are home to 3.8 percent of the Jewish population. These figures are very low by comparison to Israel within the Green Line: kibbutzim and moshavim account for 62.3 percent of all settlements and are home to 5.5 percent of the total population (these figures include Arab citizens and settlements, which do not include kibbutzim or moshavim). Of the total Jewish workforce in Judea and Samaria—some 169,000 persons—only 0.6 percent are employed in agriculture (including forestry and fishing). The proportion inside Israel is one percent of the workforce (which totals 3,913,400 persons).

### **Distribution according to the Sharon Plan**

The Jordan Valley includes 74 percent of the Jewish agricultural settlements in Judea and Samaria, but is home to only 42.7 percent of Israelis who live in agricultural settlements. These settlements are small, with a few dozen plots each, not all of which are occupied or active. The total farmed area is 110,191 sq.km. (77 percent of the total area in Judea and Samaria farmed by Israelis). Of this area, 96.425 sq.km. lies within Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council (see Map 40), out of a total area of 860 sq.km. (11.2 percent). These figures can be compared to Eshkol Regional Council in the area around the Gaza Strip, inside Israel, which has a similar size (approx. 1,000 sq.km.) and a similar number of agricultural settlements. The total farmed area in Eshkol is 284 sq.km. (28.4 percent). It is also important to add that agriculture in the Jordan Valley is dependent on Palestinian workers from local communities, such as Tubas and Tamun. In Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council, which has an area of 482.44 sq.km., the total farmed area is 13.766 sq.km. (2.8 percent), of which 12.516 sq.km. is in area from Kalia north. In the other settlement zones, the total farmed area is just 32.652 sq.km., and the number of agricultural settlements is negligible to non-existent. In the area around Jerusalem, there are four settlements that are home to one-third of the residents of agricultural settlements, but which jointly farm just 1,300 dunams.

**Table 34: Types of Jewish Settlements and No. of Residents: Sharon Plan /  
Regional Councils / Palestinian Districts**

	Type of Settlement					
	Community			Urban		
	Settlements	Residents	142,085	Settlements	Residents	291,890
	By Sharon Plan			Moshav		
	Settlements	Residents	12,559	Settlements	Residents	4,723
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>142,085</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>
Mountain Ridge	22	39,461	1	2,433	0	2
Western Samaria and Judea	22	33,455	11	70,898	2	0
Jordan Valley	19	43,613	3	14,354	17	6
Greater Jerusalem	11	25,556	7	204,205	2	2
<b>By Regional Councils</b>						
	Community			Urban		
	Settlements	Residents	142,085	Settlements	Residents	291,890
	By Sharon Plan			Moshav		
	Settlements	Residents	12,559	Settlements	Residents	4,723
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>142,085</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>
Mate Binyamin	24	64,013	8	154,192	2	0
Shomron	21	34,395	11	67,980	2	0
Har Khevron	13	8,923	1	7,338	2	0
Gush Etsyon	12	33,614	1	61,125	0	3
Anot Ha-Yarden	3	885	1	1,255	14	3
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	1	255	0	0	1	4
<b>By Palestinian Districts</b>						
	Community			Urban		
	Settlements	Residents	142,085	Settlements	Residents	291,890
	By Sharon Plan			Moshav		
	Settlements	Residents	12,559	Settlements	Residents	4,723
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>142,085</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>
Hebron	15	10,904	1	7,338	2	2
Ramallah	15	31,675	5	91,360	2	0
Bethlehem	10	30,269	1	61,125	0	2
Nablus	10	19,793	0	0	2	0
Salfit	7	14,830	6	40,448	1	0
Jerusalem	6	22,088	3	62,832	0	1
Jenin	5	3,553	0	0	0	0
Tubas	3	885	0	0	4	0
Tulkarm	1	925	1	2,080	1	0
Jericho	1	2,577	1	1,255	9	5
Qalqiliya	1	4,586	4	25,452	0	0

### **Distribution according to Jewish Regional Councils**

As already noted, the regional councils in Israel have a very large area relative to their population, due to their mainly rural character. This is not the case in Judea and Samaria, where the borders of the Jewish regional councils were drawn with the goal of controlling areas of land that are mainly under Palestinian ownership. Only two regional councils in the area have an agricultural character—Arvot Ha-Yarden and Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh. These are together home to 71 percent of the agricultural settlements, but to just 37 percent of the residents of all the Israeli agricultural settlements in Judea and Samaria. In the four other regional councils, the number of agricultural settlements is extremely low—two each in most of the councils.

### **Distribution according to Palestinian Districts**

The picture remains similar when the area is divided according to the Palestinian districts. Approximately half the Jewish agricultural settlements are situated in the Jericho District, followed in declining order by Tubas in the north (4), Hebron (4), Bethlehem District (which extends east to the Dead Sea—3 settlements), and one or two Jewish agricultural settlements each in the other districts.

## **Industry**

Of the total Israeli workforce in Judea and Samaria, 5.3 percent are employed in industry (mainly mining and quarrying). This figure is significantly less than that for Israel together with Judea and Samaria—9.9 percent. There are currently 20 active industrial zones in Judea and Samaria (see Map 41); the three main zones are Barkan, Ariel Industrial Zone, and Adumim Industrial Park. Another important industrial park is Atarot, which is within the Jerusalem municipal boundaries.

The industrial zones in Judea and Samaria enjoy several advantages: locations close to central Israel or Jerusalem; proximity to main roads; various grants for business owners; and low municipal tax and rental fees. Industrial parks in Judea and Samaria are defined as “A”-class priority zones in accordance with the Encouragement of Investments Law, so that factories are eligible for government benefits. Our review here will focus on the three main parks.





### **Adumim Industrial Park (Recently Renamed Israel Park)**

Situated within the municipal boundaries of Ma'ale Adumim. As of 2020 the park included 340 factories and businesses in a wide range of fields: industry, commerce, a car licensing shop, car repair shops, food, textiles, building materials, aluminum, metals, carpentry, printing, etc. The park employs 4,800 Palestinian workers and 2,500 Israeli workers. It extends over a site of 3,540 dunams, of which 1,545 dunams are owned by factories, private companies, and public buildings. The total built area is approx. 350,000 sq.m. The park has extensive reserves of land for planning and development—an urban building plan was recently deposited for an extension in the south of the park comprising a gross area of 450 dunams and a net area of 230 dunams. The land in the extension area is intended for industry, commerce, offices, employment, and public buildings.

### **Barkan Park**

Situated in Shomron Regional Council. The park has an area of 1,820 dunams (an extension of 260 dunams is planned), of which industrial plots account for approx. 650 dunams. The number of businesses is 170, in such fields as: storage, electronics, rubber, textiles, food, recycling, metal, plastics, furniture, marble and stone. The park employs 3,500 Israeli and 4,500 Palestinian workers, and 80 percent of its output is earmarked for exports.

### **Ariel Industrial Park**

Situated within the city limits of Ariel. The industrial park has an area of 850 dunams and includes 65 factories. The main field of activity is the metal industry, including iron and aluminum. The park employs 1,500 Israeli and 3,500 Palestinian workers and has a total built area of 260,000 sq.m.

The proportion of Palestinian employees in all three industrial zones is high—63 percent. The high number of Palestinian workers (12,800) highlights the employment dependency on Palestinian workers in Judea and Samaria, as within Israel.













In April 2020, the Civil Administration's Supreme Planning Council approved a plan to establish Sha'ar Ha-Shomron Industrial Park. The park is due to be established to the east of Rosh Ha-Ayin, on either side of Route 5, with an area of 2,700 dunams. The park is due to become the largest industrial zone in Judea and Samaria, with a planned total built area of around 2,000,000 sq.m. According to the plans, it will include areas for commerce and offices, public buildings, and industry. The project includes the upgrading of Sha'ar Ha-Shomron transportation terminal, including a

railroad station as part of the development of the line from Rosh Ha-Ayin to Ariel and Tapu'akh Intersection. The land in the area is defined as state land in Area C, situated east of the Green Line but west of the Separation Barrier. The industrial zone will be managed by Shomron Development Company.

## Employment Sectors

The rate of workforce participation among Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria is similar to or even higher than that among residents of Israel as a whole. The CBS workforce survey for 2014 found that average participation in Judea and Samaria is the highest in Israel, at 70.5 percent—compared to a national average of just 64.2 percent. The workforce participation rate is significantly higher than that in the Jerusalem, Northern, and Southern Districts, and similar to that in the Central and Tel Aviv Districts. Bearing in mind that the Haredi population in Beitar Illit, Modi'in Illit, and Imanu'el accounts for 32 percent of the Israeli population in Judea and Samaria, the workforce participation rate among the non-Haredi Israeli population is even higher by comparison to the districts inside Israel. The area also shows the highest workforce participation rate of women.

**Table 35: Distribution of Employees in Jewish Settlements  
in Judea and Samaria by Branch (Percent)**


Sector	Number of residents in workforce	
	Israel	Judea & Samaria
	3,913,400	169,000
Sector	Percent Employed in Sector	
	Israel	Judea & Samaria
Education	 12.7	 22.7
Local, public, and security administration	 10.7	 16.2
Health and welfare	 12.0	 13.2
Industry, mining & quarrying	 9.9	 5.3
Agriculture, forestry & fishing	 1.0	 0.6
Other	 53.7	 42.0



Map 41: Jewish Industrial Zones in Judea and Samaria, 2020



**Table 36: Distribution of Employees in Jewish Settlements  
in Judea and Samaria by Profession,  
Compared to Israel National Average (Percent), 2016**



Source: Data processed by the Macro Center from the 2016 Social Survey, Central Bureau of Statistics

A study by Roby Nathanson and Itamar Gazala<sup>32</sup> found that the proportion of salaried employees in Judea and Samaria is slightly above the national average for Israel and Judea and Samaria together (85.5 percent and 84.9 percent, respectively); the proportion of salaried employees in part-time positions in Judea and Samaria is also higher than the national average (30.7 percent and 18.1 percent, respectively). The main sphere of employment among residents of Judea and Samaria is education, which accounts for 22.4 percent of employees, compared to the national average of 12.8 percent. Other branches where the proportion of employees is higher than the national average are local, public, and security administration, as well as professional and technical services. Conversely, branches such as transportation, hospitality, commerce, agriculture, industry, electricity, and water all employ lower proportions of salaried workers than the national average. In other words, *the proportion of employees in Judea and Samaria in branches that are funded by the state is significantly above the average in Israel.*

<sup>32</sup> *Characteristics of the Israeli Workforce in the West Bank*, Macro Institute, 2017 (Hebrew).




## Salaries in Judea and Samaria

As Table 37 clearly shows, average salaries for self-employed workers in Judea and Samaria (the gray line) are around NIS 500–800 less than the average for Israel


In 2017, the average salary in Israel for a salaried employee was NIS 9,885. The figures in Table 38 show that the residents of just five local councils that have a mainly secular population (accounting for 6.7 percent of the Israeli population of Judea and Samaria) earned above this average. The lowest figures were seen for the two Haredi cities and Imanu’el local council, where the average was below half that for Israel; the populations of these local authorities accounts for 31.7 percent of the Israeli population in Judea and Samaria.

**Table 37: Average Salary for Self-Employed Workers, 2002–2014, by Areas of the West Bank**



Source: Data processed by the Macro Center from the CBS local authorities data file, 2003–2015

**Table 38: Average Salaries of Salaried Employees in Judea and Samaria in 2014, by Local Authorities**



Source: Data processed by the Macro Center from the CBS local authorities data file, 2003-2015

## Persons Employed in the Area

The proportion of residents employed inside and outside a given area provides an indication of the long-term independent viability of that area. The higher the proportion of workers outside the area, the lower the potential for independent viability. Moreover, employment outside the area requires travel to and from the workplace. The longer these journeys are, the greater the damage to quality of life and leisure time, the greater the expenses incurred, and (in the case of Judea and Samaria) the greater the security threat encountered on the roads.

It is not possible to draw conclusions about the situation in the regional councils due to the lack of adequate data. Regarding the local councils and cities, Table 39 highlights the following aspects. In the poor local authorities—the Haredi cities, Imanu'el, and Kiryat Arba (Kedumim almost falls in this category)—over half of people in employment are employed in the locale (mainly, it can be assumed, in municipal services and education). Residents of Ariel tend to work in Tel Aviv and residents of Ma'ale Adumim in Jerusalem. In the wealthy local authorities along the Green Line (with the exception of Giv'at Ze'ev), which are mainly secular, over half of those in employment travel to work in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.

**Table 39: Distribution of Workforce in the Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria, by Workplace and Distance from Place of Residence**















Settlement	% employed in the settlement	% employed in Tel Aviv region	% employed in Jerusalem	Average distance (road kms) from home to workplace
<b>Gush Etsyon Regional Council</b>				
Alon Shvut	34.9	-	33.6	13.0
Asfar (Metsad)	-	-	-	-
Bat Ayin	-	-	-	13.7
El'azar	-	-	38.1	16.3
Har Gilo	-	-	74.6	14.7
Karmeit Tsur	-	-	-	20.3
Keidar	-	-	79.8	16.9
Kfar Etsyon	-	-	-	-
Ma'ale Amos	-	0.0	-	12.4
Migdal Oz	-	-	-	9.7
Neve Daniel	-	-	58.2	18.4
Nokdim	-	-	51.3	19.1
Rosh Tsurim	-	-	-	20.7
Teko'a	43.2	-	37.0	12.2
<b>Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council</b>				
Argaman	-	-	-	29.4
Beka'ot	56.7	-	-	17.5
Gilgal	55.5	-	-	24.6
Gitit	-	-	-	35.3
Khamra	-	-	-	25.9
Khemdat	-	-	-	41.5
Maskiyot	-	-	-	-
Masu'a	73.2	-	-	10.7
Mekhola	-	-	-	11.1
Mekhora	-	-	-	32.5
Netiv Ha-Gdud	-	-	-	31.6
Niran	-	-	-	-
No'omi	-	-	-	24.5
Petsa'el	44.7	-	-	23.3
Ro'i	-	-	-	30.7
Rotem	-	-	-	-
Shadmot Mekhola	-	0.0	0.0	21.6
Tomer	46.3	-	-	22.5
Yafit	-	-	-	22.4
Yitav	-	-	-	24.6
<b>Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council</b>				
Almog	53.8	-	-	15.9
Beit Ha-Arava	-	0.0	-	38.2
Kalia	68.4	-	-	18.2
Mitspe Shalem	59.6	-	-	21.0
Ovnat	-	-	-	-
Vered Yerikho	-	0.0	-	22.8
<b>Mate Binyamin Regional Council</b>				
Almon	-	-	-	-















Settlement	% employed in the settlement	% employed in Tel Aviv region	% employed in Jerusalem	Average distance (road kms) from home to workplace
Amikhai	-	-	-	-
Ateret	-	-	-	-
Beit Khoron	-	-	55.1	23.1
Dolev	34.1	-	-	19.1
Eli	44.8	-	-	20.8
Ganei Modi'in	-	-	-	-
Geva Binyamin (Adam)	-	-	79.3	15.9
Giv'on Ha-Khadasha	-	-	59.2	24.4
Kfar Adumim	27.7	-	59.5	18.4
Kfar Ha-Oranim	-	49.3	-	25.7
Khalamish	-	45.4	-	24.5
Khashmona'im	-	32.7	-	21.0
Kokhav Ha-Shakhar	31.5	-	49.1	27.5
Kokhav Ya'akov	33.1	-	52.4	12.8
Ma'ale Levona	37.6	-	-	22.6
Ma'ale Mikhmarsh	-	-	54.7	24.6
Matityahu	-	-	-	18.1
Mevo Khoron	39.8	-	-	19.9
Mitspe Yerikho	32.8	-	50.8	18.2
Na'ale	-	44.1	-	30.3
Nakhli'el	-	-	-	15.4
Nili	-	41.9	-	23.6
Ofra	40.5	-	38.0	21.0
Pesagot	-	-	50.7	14.2
Rimonim	-	-	60.2	28.1
Shilo	45.8	-	-	21.0
Talmon	-	-	-	24.8
<b>Shomron Regional Council</b>				
Alei Zahav	-	-	-	34.2
Avnei Khefets	-	-	0.0	22.8
Barkan (Beit Aba)	-	66.7	-	24.9
Brakha	36.8	-	-	38.0
Brukhin	-	-	-	-
Einav	35.1	-	-	22.3
Elon Moreh	-	-	-	24.5
Ets Efar'im	-	-	-	22.6
Itamar	-	-	-	-
Kfar Tapu'akh	-	-	-	22.2
Khermesh	-	-	0.0	46.7
Khinanit	-	-	-	-
Kiryat Netafim	-	-	-	-
Mevo Dotan	-	-	-	-
Migdalim	-	-	-	36.2
Nofim	-	-	0.0	24.0
Pedu'el	-	-	-	27.1
Reikhan	-	-	0.0	24.7
Rekhelem	-	-	-	-
Revava	-	41.2	-	22.0

Settlement	% employed in the settlement	% employed in Tel Aviv region	% employed in Jerusalem	Average distance (road kms) from home to workplace
Sal'it	-	64.2	-	23.2
Sha'arei Tikva	-	67.9	-	17.6
Shaked	-	-	-	27.3
Shavei Shomron	-	-	-	17.7
Tsufim	-	64.2	0.0	21.8
Yakir	-	52.0	-	30.4
Yits'har	-	-	-	12.2
<b>Har Khevron Regional Council</b>				
Adora	-	-	-	28.8
Carmel	36.6	-	-	21.0
Eshkolot	-	-	-	29.7
Khagai	-	-	-	18.9
Ma'on	-	-	0.0	20.9
Metsadot Yehuda	-	-	-	26.5
Negohot	-	-	0.0	31.3
Otni'el	51.2	-	-	23.1
Pnei Khever	-	0.0	-	30.3
Sansana	-	-	-	-
Shani	-	-	-	-
Shim'a	-	0.0	0.0	23.9
Susya	55.0	-	-	23.0
Telem	-	-	-	37.3
Tene	-	-	-	-
<b>Local Councils</b>				
Alfei Menashe	21.1	68.2	0.0	18.6
Beit Arye	17.2	63.9	-	23.4
Beit El	53.3	-	21.4	14.9
Efrat	31.3	-	50.0	16.7
Elkana	18.8	65.3	-	21.6
Giv'at Ze'ev	12.8	5.6	71.1	15.0
Har Adar	18.2	17.0	51.7	20.6
Imanuel	51.5	-	-	20.5
Karnei Shomron	29.1	48.9	-	24.1
Kedumim	48.0	32.7	-	19.2
Kiryat Arba	56.5	-	22.3	15.4
Ma'ale Efra'im	-	-	-	34.5
Oranit	16.5	73.9	-	16.8
<b>Cities</b>				
Ariel	21.6	51.8	1.8	27.5
Beitar Illit	55.9	-	33.5	10.5
Ma'ale Adumim	25.1	3.5	71.4	14.2
Modi'in Illit	59.6	13.1	14.2	11.7




**Table 40: Proportion of Employed Persons  
in the Jewish Settlements  
in Judea and Samaria, by Year**

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Total residents (000s)	261.6	276.1	290.4	296.7	311.1	325.5	341.4	356.5	370.7	385.9	399.3	413.4	427.8	434.7
Num. in employment (000s)	85.8	92.7	97.6	103.5	105.0	106.7	124.4	126.6	138.1	144.4	150.4	156.2	157.0	162.4
% in employment														

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Within district (000s)	35.5	39.6	39.4	41.8	43.4	44.6	50.1	53.3	58.1	58.0	63.6	67.8	63.8	66.8
% employed in district														


**Table 41: Proportion of Employed Persons in Israel  
and the Jewish Settlements  
in Judea and Samaria, by District of Residence**



Source: Data processed by the Macro Center from the 2014 Manpower Survey.


The proportion of persons in employment in Judea and Samaria who are employed outside the area is particularly high, averaging almost 60 percent. By way of comparison, the next-highest district, inside Israel, is the Central District, where just 33 percent of the workforce is employed outside the district. This figure highlights the lack of places of employment in Judea and Samaria.

**Table 42: Proportion of Persons in the Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria Employed in Their Locale and Average Distance to Work**



Source: Data processed by the Macro Center from 2008 Census data


**Table 43: Commuting from Local Authorities in Judea and Samaria to the Four Metropolitan Areas**



Source: Data processed by the Macro Center from 2008 Census data

Many Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria employed outside the area face a journey of over one hour—32.3 percent, compared to a national average of 11.2 percent. Long travel times are a source of inconvenience for a very high proportion of residents of Judea and Samaria who are in employment—72 percent, compared to a national average of 47 percent. Around 42.1 percent of residents of Judea and Samaria who are in employment reach their workplace by public transportation, compared to a national average of 20.3 percent.<sup>33</sup>

**Table 44: Travel Times to Work from Settlements in Judea and Samaria Compared to the National Average, 2016**



Source: Data processed by the Macro Center from the 2016 Social Survey, Central Bureau of Statistics

## Socioeconomic Ranking





















The socioeconomic ranking of a population is measured by collating statistics for various basic features: demography, education and higher education, economic wellbeing (income, mobility level, housing patterns), employment and unemployment, and economic deprivation.

The cluster analysis method is used to divide the researched units into groups that are as homogenous as possible relative to the calculated value. The division is based on a distance function. The Ward method serves to minimize variance in the index values within each cluster and to maximize the variance between the clusters. The proportion of Israelis in Judea and Samaria ranked in the lowest cluster is very high—almost one-third of the total Israeli population in the area, comprising those who live in the two main Haredi cities: Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit (see Table 44).

<sup>33</sup> Nathanson and Gazala, 2017.

By way of comparison, in the State of Israel as a whole,<sup>34</sup> alongside these two cities, cluster 1 includes 10 Arab local authorities that jointly account for just 3.4 percent of Israel's population. Similarly, half of the settlements in cluster 2 in Judea and Samaria are Haredi; the remainder are Religious Zionist, but together account for less than four percent. In Israel as a whole, the 42 local authorities in this cluster again comprise a majority of Arab authorities, alongside Haredi authorities such as Bnei Brak, Elad, Rekhasim, and so forth. Inside Israel, half the population in cluster 2 lives in Jerusalem, where Arabs (Palestinians in the annexed areas granted residency status in 1967) and Haredi together form a majority.

**Table 45: Socioeconomic Ranking of the Settlements**

Cluster*	Settlements**		Residents			
		Num.	%		Num.	%
1		2	1.6		139,092	30.9
2		6	4.8		17,379	3.85
3		12	9.7		25,118	5.6
4		20	16.1		37,627	8.3
5		23	18.5		52,986	11.8
6		18	14.5		86,947	19.3
7		25	20.1		55,448	12.3
8		8	6.4		17,356	3.8
9		10	8.0		18,444	4.1

### in Judea and Samaria, by Clusters

\* According to the most recently published ranking, 2017.

\*\* No index was published for three settlements (Shani, Amikhai, and Niran)

Forty percent of the Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria are situated in the bottom one-third of the socioeconomic clusters, while only eight percent are in the top third. In Israel as a whole (including East Jerusalem), the bottom one-third includes 31 percent of the population (79 percent of whom are Arabs, and most of the remainder Haredim). The top one-third includes 20.4 percent of the population (all the authorities in these clusters are Jewish).

<sup>34</sup> According to the 2015 ranking.

**Table 46: Socioeconomic Ranking of Jewish Local Authorities  
in Judea and Samaria, 1995–2017**

	1995	1999	2001	2003	2006	2008	2013	2015	2017
<b>Gush Etsyon</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>
Kfar Etsyon							3	3	4
Rosh Tsurim							5	6	6
Alon Shvut							5	6	6
Har Gilo							7	7	7
El'azar							6	6	7
Teko'a							5	5	5
Migdal Oz							3	3	4
Ma'ale Amos							2	2	2
Neve Daniel							6	7	7
Nokdim							5	5	5
Asfar (Meitsad)							2	2	3
Karmeit Tsur							4	5	5
Keidar							6	7	7
Bat Ayin							2	2	3
<b>Arvot Ha-Yarden</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>
Argaman							8	8	8
Mekhola							6	6	6
Gilgal							4	4	5
Yitav							3	2	3
Masu'a							8	8	9
Khamra								7	7
Beka'ot							8	8	9
Mekhora							7	7	7
Gitit							4	5	5
Petza'el							8	8	9
Netiv Ha-Gdud							8	8	9
Ro'i							7	7	7
Niran									
Tomer							9	9	9
Shdemot Mekhola							5	6	6
Yafit							5	6	6
Khemdat							3	3	5
No'omi (Na'ama)									9
Maskiyot							2	2	3
Rotem							3	2	3
<b>Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>
Kalia							7	7	8
Mitspe Shalem							8	8	8
Almog							7	7	7
Beit Ha-Arava							6	6	6
Vered Yerikho							7	7	7
Ovnat								5	4



	1995	1999	2001	2003	2006	2008	2013	2015	2017
<b>Mate Binyamin</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>
Beit Khoron							7	7	7
Khalamish							6	6	6
Mevo Dotan							3	3	4
Ofra							4	5	4
Kokhav Ha-Shakhar							4	3	4
Rimonim							6	7	6
Mitspe Yerikho							3	3	4
Kfar Adumim							7	7	7
Giv'on Ha-Khadasha							8	8	8
Ma'ale Mikhmash							4	5	5
Matityahu							2	2	2
Nili							8	8	8
Ateret							3	3	4
Pesagot							4	5	5
Almon							7	7	7
Dolev							5	5	6
Ma'ale Levona							2	2	3
Geva Binyamin (Adam)							4	4	4
Nakhli'el							2	2	3
Kokhav Ya'akov							2	2	2
Ganei Modi'in								3	3
Khashmona'im							7	7	7
Na'ale							7	7	7
Talmon							3	4	4
Kfar Ha-Oranim (Menora)							8	8	9
Shilo							3	3	4
Amikhai									
Eli							3	3	4
<b>Shomron</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>
Sal'tit							9	9	9
Shavei Shomron							5	4	5
Reikhan							6	7	7
Mevo Dotan							5	5	5
Kfar Tapu'akh							4	3	4
Elon Moreh							3	3	4
Ma'ale Shomron							7	6	6
Khinanit							5	5	5
Shaked							7	7	7
Barkan (Beit Aba)							8	8	8
Yakir							6	6	6
Einav							5	5	6
Khermesh							5	5	5
Alei Zahav							5	6	6
Brakha							2	2	3
Yits'har							2	2	2
Migdalim							5	5	5

	1995	1999	2001	2003	2006	2008	2013	2015	2017
Kiryat Netafim							5	5	6
Itamar							2	2	3
Pedu'el							5	6	7
Ets Efra'im							7	7	7
Nofim							5	6	5
Tsufim							6	7	7
Avnei Khefets							4	4	5
Rekhelem							4	5	6
Revava							4	5	5
Brukhin							4	5	6
Sha'rei Tikva	3	5	5	5	4	5	8	8	7

<b>Har Khevron</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>
Carmel							4	5	5
Ma'on							3	4	4
Shani									
Adora							5	5	5
Eshkolot							6	7	7
Penei Khever							2	2	2
Telem							3	4	4
Tene							6	6	7
Metsadot Yehuda							4	5	5
Susya							3	4	4
Otni'el							3	3	4
Khagai							4	4	4
Shim'a							5	5	5
Negohot							3	3	4
Sansana							6	6	7

	Local Councils								
Ma'ale Efra'im	6	5	4	6	5	5	5	5	4
Kiryat Arba	4	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	3
Elkana	9	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	8
Beit El	5	4	4	4	4	5	3	3	3
Kedumim	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5
Karnei Shomron	6	6	5	5	5	6	5	6	6
Efrat	7	6	6	6	6	7	6	6	7
Beit Arye	9	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	7
Giv'at Ze'ev	8	7	7	7	6	5	6	5	5
Alfei Menashe	9	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Imanuel	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Oranit	9	8	8	8	7	8	8	8	9
Har Adar	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9

	Cities								
Ma'ale Adumim	7	6	5	6	6	5	6	6	6
Ariel	6	5	5	6	6	5	6	6	6
Beitar Illit	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

In examining the long-term trends in the socioeconomic ranking of the settlements in Judea and Samaria, it is important to distinguish between the rankings published through 2008, which did not provide separate data for the settlements in the regional councils, and the three subsequent rankings, which included this information (see Table 46). Etsyon Regional Council was stable throughout the first period, in cluster 4; Arvot Ha-Yarden was stable in cluster 6; Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh reached cluster 7; Binyamin fluctuated around clusters 3–5; Shomron was also classified in clusters 4–5; while Har Khevron rose from cluster 3 to cluster 5. Thus through 2008 the regional councils were ranked in the lower half of the socioeconomic scale, with the exception of two very small councils: Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh and Arvot Ha-Yarden. The situation in the local councils was better: five local councils were ranked in cluster 8–9, two in clusters 2–3, and six in clusters 4–7. The cities were divided sharply into two groups—the Haredi cities in cluster 1 and the secular ones in clusters 5–6.

The local councils showed a normal distribution, as did three regional councils. Etsyon and Har Khevron did not include any settlements in the top third of the clusters, but the vast majority were in the middle clusters; the distribution in terms of residents was the same. By contrast, the small regional council of Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh does not include any settlements in the lower third of the clusters. The picture for the cities is exceptional. The two Haredi cities, which are home to 70 percent of Israeli city-dwellers in Judea and Samaria, are in the bottom third, while the two secular cities are in the middle third.

**Table 47: Ranking of Settlements and Residents, 2013–2017 (Average),  
by Three Groups of Clusters**

Local Authority	Num. of Residents	Clusters 1-3		Clusters 4-7		Clusters 8-10	
		Num. of Settlements	% of Residents	Num. of Settlements	% of Residents	Num. of Settlements	% of Residents
Etsyon	24,935	5	20.4	9	79.6	0	0.0
Arvot Ha-Yarden	5,650	4	21.4	9	49.5	7	29.1
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	1,968		0.0	4	64.0	2	36.0
Binyamin	71,632	8	33.7	17	58.6	3	7.7
Shomron	47,241	5	21.7	17	57.5	3	20.8
Har Khevron	9,964	3	20.4	12	79.6	0	0.0
Local councils	93,347	3	18.4	7	59.1	3	22.5
Cities	196,520	2	70.1	2	29.9	0	0.0

The three most recent rankings (2013–2017), presented in Table 47, provide a slightly more accurate picture. The ranking of the four cities remains unchanged. The local authorities are also broadly the same as in the previous period, though four

authorities recorded a fall in their socioeconomic ranking: Beit El, Kiryat Arba, Beit Arye, and Ma'ale Efra'im. The vast majority (68) of the settlements in the regional councils are ranked in the middle clusters; 25 are ranked in the lowest cluster and 15 in the highest. The ranking of Etsyon and Arvot Ha-Yarden improved slightly in the second period, while all the others remained unchanged.

In conclusion, although the ranking of the settlements as a whole has not improved and has remained stable around the center of the clusters, the ongoing and dramatic increase in the weight of the Haredi settlements, and particularly Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit, is increasing the already high proportion of the poor population in the area, slowly but surely pulling the average down. Naturally, this reality has economic and social ramifications in terms of the viability of the area, the scope of government support required, and other aspects.

## Education

There is no need to explain the positive correlation between education (and particularly higher education), employment, and salary levels. Given this correlation, it is worth examining the potential of residents of Judea and Samaria in these fields, which will be gauged by eligibility for matriculation—the entrance ticket to higher education—and the proportion of graduates.

The figures in Table 48 show that in seven local authorities, together home to 170,062 residents (37.4 percent of the total Israeli population in Judea and Samaria), eligibility for matriculation is below the average in Israel (73.4 percent), while the majority of the population is above this average. The situation in the cities is highly polarized. The two Haredi cities, along with Bnei Brak, lie at the bottom of the table for all of Israel (where the rate of eligibility for matriculation in Haredi society is just 23.2 percent). In other words, the Haredi residents of Judea and Samaria are at the bottom of the scale even relative to Haredi society as a whole. By contrast, the two secular cities are situated around the top of the table. As for the local councils—the Haredi council of Imanu'el lies at the bottom of the table, as does Giv'at Ze'ev, where a Haredi neighborhood (Agan Ha-Ayalot) was inaugurated a decade ago; the Religious Zionist and secular authorities are around the top of the table: Elkana, Kedumim, Har Adar, Beit Arye, Ma'ale Efra'im, and Oranit. The situation in the regional councils is different, particularly in terms of the secular settlements: Arvot Ha-Yarden and Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh, with their secular population, are around the bottom of the table, while the predominantly Religious Zionist regional councils Shomron, Etsyon, Har Khevron, and Binyamin are all at the top of the table.

**Table 48: Eligibility for Matriculation and Possession of an Academic Degree in the Local Authorities in Judea and Samaria (Percent)**

Local Authority	% Eligible for Matriculation	% with Academic Degree
Modi'in Illit	5.5	3.8
Beitar Illit	14.7	5.9
Imanuel	46.8	6.7
Giv'at Ze'ev	57.0	22.1
Arvot Ha-Yarden	64.1	45.4
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	71.4	38.3
Kiryat Arba	73.2	26.4
<b>Israel</b>	73.4	27.9
Karnei Shomron	75.7	38.9
Binyamin	81.7	44.7
Har Khevron	83.3	54.1
Alfei Menashe	84.3	36.5
Beit El	85.4	47.9
Etsyon	85.6	49.2
Oranit	87.0	48.8
Beit Arye	87.3	30.0
Ma'ale Efra'im	87.5	18.7
Shomron	88.2	49.6
Ariel	88.2	24.1
Kedumim	89.0	54.4
Ma'ale Adumim	89.8	24.9
Har Adar	91.5	55.7
Elkana	94.0	68.9

The figures for the proportion of residents over the age of 34 who hold an academic degree paint a different picture. In eight local authorities that are together home to half the Israelis in Judea and Samaria, the proportion of graduates is lower than in Israel, while for the other half it is higher. The two Haredi cities continue to occupy the bottom places in the table, but the two secular cities also rank very low relative to the other local authorities. Among the local councils, Elkana, Har Adar, and Kedumim again head the table, but Ma'ale Efra'im now appears at the bottom, alongside Imanu'el and Giv'at Ze'ev. In the regional councils, Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh and Arvot Ha-Yarden are again at the bottom of the table, joined by Binyamin. Shomron and Har Khevron maintain their strong positions.

In conclusion, the figures reflect a population that has a higher level of eligibility for matriculation than Israel and a proportion of graduates close to average. In other words, the potential is not exploited, or finds its way out of Judea and Samaria. The situation in this respect varies considerably among the different settlements. The



growing weight of the Haredi population, which suffers from particularly low rates of eligibility for matriculation and graduates, will continue to influence the average for the area as a whole.

## **Government Grants for Local Authorities**

Government assistance includes general grants and special or earmarked grants. A general grant is a “balancing grant,” while a special grant is received by a local authority in accordance with a special decision by the interior minister, such as a security grant or elections grant. A special grant is always earmarked for a specific budgetary item.

A “balancing grant” is provided by the government, through the Interior Ministry, in order to compensate local authorities who face an inferior economic condition and low self-generated income, and in order to help solve specific problems. In 2007 the total size of this grant in Israel was 2.143 billion shekels, accounting for 18 percent of the government contribution to the budgets of the local authorities. Until 1994 there were no clear criteria for the allocation of the balancing grant, and its size was determined in part based on the percentage of implementation of the local authorities’ budget—in other words, authorities that spent more (and accumulated deficits) received more. Naturally, this method encouraged waste and created deficits.

In 1994–1999, the Interior Ministry acted in accordance with the recommendations of the Suari Committee and adjusted the size of the balancing grant on the basis of such criteria as socioeconomic condition (larger grants to weaker authorities), size (larger grants to smaller authorities), and so forth. However, some of the committee’s recommendations proved to be problematic, such as the allocation of greater support to smaller local authorities. This contradicted the effort to encourage the unification of local authorities and failed to pay sufficient attention to the authorities’ socioeconomic condition.

Accordingly, at the beginning of the 2000s several changes were made to the Suari Committee formulas and the Gadish Committee was formed to consolidate more efficient and appropriate criteria. In 2004 the Interior Ministry began to allocate balancing grants on the basis of the Gadish Committee’s recommendations. The ministry forwards grants to local authorities to cover their deficits and for development actions.

On the whole, the figures in Table 49 show that the total proportion of grants increases according to socioeconomic ranking and the population size of the local authorities in Judea and Samaria. However, the grants to the two regional councils

on the central mountain ridge—Shomron and Binyamin—are unusually high relative to these criteria. Binyamin Regional Council, which is ranked in socioeconomic cluster 5, received 2.33 times more money in grants than Modi'in Illit, which has a larger population and is ranked in cluster 1. Shomron Regional Council, which is ranked in socioeconomic cluster 6 and has a much smaller population than the two Haredi cities ranked in cluster 1, received 1.2 and 1.3 times as much money in grants than each of these cities. The average grant per resident in Israel, in local authorities that receive grants, is NIS 1,135, while the figure in Judea and Samaria is NIS 1,899 per resident. According to the State Ombudsman's Report for 2017, Mate Binyamin Regional Council receives 66 percent of its budget from the state, compared to an average of 48 percent for all the regional councils in Israel.

**Table 49: Government Grants to Jewish Local Authorities in Judea and Samaria**

Settlement	Socioeconomic	Grant to authority (NIS, millions)	Num. of Residents
Har Adar	9	0.7	4,084
Alfei Menashe	8	4.5	7,997
Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh	7	5.1	1,968
Ma'ale Efra'im	4	5.7	1,255
Oranit	9	6.0	8,965
Elkana	8	6.7	3,911
Beit Arye	7	9.4	5,351
Kedumim	5	11.0	4,586
Immanuel	2	13.4	4,129
Karnei Shomron	6	13.5	9,417
Beit El	3	15.0	5,684
Efrat	7	16.4	11,405
Ariel	6	17.5	19,582
Kiryat Arba	3	18.4	7,338
Arvot Ha-Yarden	6	22.8	5,650
Giv'at Ze'ev	5	23.2	19,225
Etsyon	6	28.4	25,935
Ma'ale Adumim	5	31.5	37,846
Har Khevron	5	31.8	9,964
Beitar Illit	1	58.7	61,125
Modi'in Illit	1	61.7	77,967
Shomron	6	81.9	47,241
Binyamin	5	144.1	71,632

In their study, Avner Inbar and Omer Eynav of the Molad Institute<sup>35</sup> offered a cogent summary of the economic comparison between Israel and the settlements. We will quote a lengthy excerpt from the report:

<sup>35</sup> *Non-Violent Civilian Evacuation: Rethinking the End of the Settlement Enterprise*, Molad Institute, 2021 (Hebrew).

It is important to recognize the socioeconomic condition of the settlements. We will begin with the economic support from the state. Over recent decades, the State of Israel has provided preferential budgetary support for the Jewish settlements beyond the Green Line. This situation continues to the present day.

In 2019, the Adva Center prepared a comprehensive analysis of the various forms of support the state provided for all local authorities between 1997 and 2017. The researchers divided the local authorities into five groups: The “Forum of 15” (prosperous authorities that do not receive balancing grants), Arab authorities, development towns, Haredi settlements, and non-Haredi settlements. They first examined the overall expenditure of each local authority, and found that the highest expenditure per capita over the 20 year period they examined was in the non-Haredi settlement (NIS 8,548 a year). This was above the average for the Forum of 15 (NIS 8,291), which as noted are the wealthiest local authorities in Israel.<sup>36</sup>

If this figure were examined in isolation, it might erroneously be concluded that the high level of per capita expenditure in the non-Haredi settlements is due to particularly efficient municipal management. This is not the case; when the sources of income of these settlements are examined, the true reason for the high level of expenditure becomes apparent. Over the past two decades, out of all the local authorities in Israel and Judea and Samaria, the non-Haredi settlements have consistently received the highest earmarked governmental support. In 1997 this support was equivalent to NIS 2,123 per person per year, and in 2017–NIS 3,623. The gap between these settlements and other local authorities has been maintained over the years, even as governmental support for local authorities as a whole expanded. In terms of the internal composition of this support, the largest item in earmarked governmental support is education. The substantial gap in favor of the non-Haredi settlements is partly due to their unique security needs (armored buses for students, etc.). However, this consideration cannot explain such a large gap. Ultimately the figures reflect a clear and long-term government policy to favor (isolated) settlements at the expense of other local authorities.

An examination of the government’s balancing grants, which as noted are intended to support local authorities struggling with low self-generated income, the non-Haredi settlements again appear at the head of the list. On the whole, the balancing grants have gradually been reduced over the years, but once again the gap in favor of the non-Haredi settlements has been maintained. In 2017, these settlements received balancing grants equivalent to NIS 1,071 per capita per annum, compared to NIS 1,049 for Arab locales in Israel, NIS 756 for Haredi settlements, and NIS 715 for development towns.

<sup>36</sup> Shlomo Swirski and Etti Konor Attias, *Government Participation in the Funding of the Budgets of Local Authorities, 1997–2017: Government Participation Earmarked for the Funding Social Services*, Adva Center, August 2019 (Hebrew). The study is also available on the website of the Adva Center (adva.org).

The government's prioritization of these settlements is even clearer given that citizens in the three other groups mentioned—Arabs, Haredim, and residents of the development towns—all face harsher economic conditions than the residents of the non-Haredi settlements.

Special and earmarked grants are forwarded to the local authorities for specific needs that go beyond earmarked contributions and balancing grants. Once again, the non-Haredi settlements receive significantly higher sums than other groups. For example, the state transfers NIS 459 per capita per annum to residents of non-Haredi settlements, compared to just NIS 262 to residents of development towns.

A study published in 2015 by the Macro Center for Political Economics analyzed the costs of the settlements assumed by the state.<sup>37</sup> For example, the researchers compared the government capital invested in the settlements with that invested in various parts of Israel. The findings showed that in 2014, average annual support for the local authorities in the territories (Judea and Samaria) was NIS 3,762 per person, compared to a national average of just NIS 2,282. In addition to this investment, the state also provided “individual support” in the territories—i.e. money channeled directly to households and businesses in the settlements. In 2014, the estimated total of special government expenses was over one billion shekels, equivalent to NIS 3,090 per person and NIS 13,689 per household.

Given the definition of the West Bank as a national priority area, it is important to examine budgeting for the settlements by comparison to the other national priority area—the Negev and Galilee. Another study by the Macro Center, published in 2016, compared the support provided for the settlements with that provided for the Negev and Galilee through government grants for local authorities, tax benefits, support due to the security situation, and support from the Settlement Division.<sup>38</sup> Once again the findings are unequivocal: in 2017, the average settler could expect to receive NIS 1,922 in grants and tax benefits—NIS 303 more than a resident of Galilee, NIS 367 more than a resident of the Negev, and NIS 1,416 more than the overall average for Israel.

These economic figures highlight the fragile position of the settlements in the West Bank by comparison to areas within the borders of the State of Israel. In the absence of massive and ongoing governmental support, the local authorities in Judea and Samaria will find it difficult to maintain their current standard of living, and most of them can be expected to face insolvency.

<sup>37</sup> *A comprehensive analysis of the settlements' economic costs and alternative costs to the State of Israel, 2015*, Macro Center for Political Economics, 19 Feb. 2015. The study is also available on the Macro Center's website ([www.macro.org.il](http://www.macro.org.il)).

<sup>38</sup> Roby Nathanson and Itamar Gazala, *Settlement Monitoring, Special Report: The Settlements in Judea and Samaria in the 2017–2018 Budget*, Macro Center for Political Economics, December 2016 (Hebrew). The study is also available on the Macro Center's website ([www.macro.org.il](http://www.macro.org.il)).





# Chapter Seven

## Criterion #5: Is the deployment of the population and settlements based on exclusive, or at least safe, principal traffic arteries?

In order to permit a fabric of life based on settlement cohesion and a high standard of living, it is vital for a population to have access to safe, short, and rapid traffic arteries for the purpose of reaching work, services, and suppliers, meeting with family and friends, and so forth. This factor is particularly important in the case of the Israelis who live in Judea and Samaria, for several reasons: 60 percent of the workforce travels across the Green Line and back every day (the average distance from the workplace is higher than in Israel—18 km and 13,2 km, respectively); the vast majority of products in Judea and Samaria are supplied from inside Israel; and the main service cities for the Jewish population in the area are situated inside the Green Line. During periods of security tension, most of this traffic requires accompaniment by IDF forces, the deployment of military outposts along roads, and forces that can respond to terror incidents.

### **Distance from the Green Line (Aerial Distance)**

The maximum width of the West Bank, between the River Jordan and the Green Line close to Qalqiliya, is 57 km, and its maximum length from north to south is 131 km. The distance between the Jordanian border and Jerusalem is 27 km. Distances from the Green Line were measured as aerial distances, the shortest type. In practice, however, many of the journeys Israelis in Judea and Samaria make to the center of Israel require significantly longer travel distances. This is true, for example, of residents of the regional councils Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh, Arvot Ha-Yarden, Har Khevron, and Shomron.

As can be seen in Map 43, as well as in Table 51, six percent of Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria live on the Green Line; approximately 40 percent live at a distance of up to 3 km; 50 percent at a distance of 5 km; and over 75 percent at a distance of up to 10 km. In other words, most residents live along a strip adjacent to the Green Line that comprises just one-sixth the width of the West Bank. Together with Israelis who live in East Jerusalem, who are not included in this study, 84 percent of Israelis

beyond the Green Line live in this strip.

The settlements of Har Khevron are situated at an average aerial distance of 4.7 km to the north and east of the Green Line. The closest settlements to the Green Line are Sansana and Shani, situated on the Green Line in the south of Har Khevron Regional Council; the most distant is Penei Khever (12.5 km) to the southeast of Hebron. Similarly, the settlements of Binyamin are situated at an average aerial distance of 5.13 km to the north of Jerusalem and to the east of the Green Line. The closest settlement is Kfar Ha-Oranim on the Green Line, and the most distant is Shilo (27 km), east of the watershed. The settlements of Gush Etsyon are situated at an average aerial distance of 6.17 km from the Green Line. The closest is Har Adar (1.8 km), south of Jerusalem, and the most distant Asfar (14.5 km) on the edge of the desert. The average aerial distance in Shomron is 11.3 km east of the Green Line. The closest settlement is Tsufim (1.8 km), southeast of Qalqiliya, and the most distant Migdalim (32.7 km), east of Ariel. The settlements in the eastern regional councils reach an average distance of 18.9 km in Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council; the closest is Mitspe Shalem (7.8 km), north of Ein Gedi, and the most distant Beit Ha-Arava (22.5 km), east of Jericho. The average aerial distance in Arvot Ha-Yarden is 22.3 km; the closest settlement to the Green Line is Shadmot Mekhola (3.4 km), south of Beit She'an, and the most distant Gitit (37 km), east of Ariel.

## **Driving Distances within Judea and Samaria**

An examination based on driving distances (see Table 50) yields a clearer picture. Residents of Har Khevron Regional Council will on average travel 9.2 km before reaching a crossing into Israel. In this respect, Shani and Sansana on the Green Line are the closest settlements, while Beit Khagai south of Hebron is the most distant (26.9 km).

Residents of Binyamin will travel 14.9 km on average. The closest settlement in Beit Khoron in the Latrun panhandle (3.7 km), while Eli, southeast of Ariel, is the most distant (36.7 km).

Residents of Gush Etsyon will travel 12.08 km on average within Judea and Samaria. The closest settlement is Har Gilo south of Jerusalem (4.5 km), and the most distant Ma'ale Amos near the Herodium (18.8 km).

Residents of Shomron will travel an average of 17.86 km. The closest settlement is Sal'it to the southeast of Tulkarm (2.9 km) and the most distant Itamar, east of Nablus (36.6 km).

**Table 50: Travel Distances from Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria to the Green Line, and the Need to Pass Crossings or Palestinian Settlements**

Settlement	Aerial Distance from Green Line	Need to Cross Palestinian Locale	Driving Distance from Green Line	Crossings to Reach Israel
<b>Gush Etsyon Regional Council</b>				
Kfar Etsyon	4.7		12.4	Lamed-Hei
Rosh Tsurim	3.9		12.8	Lamed-Hei
Alon Shvut	4.6		11.6	Lamed-Hei
Har Gilo	1.8		4.5	Ein Yael
El'azar	5.5		8.0	Beitar Illit
Teko'a	8.4		9.6	Lamed-Hei
Migdal Oz	7.4		10.1	Lamed-Hei
Ma'ale Amos	3.0		18.8	Mazmuriya, Lamed-Hei
Neve Daniel	4.2		7.1	Lamed-Hei
Nokdim	8.2		9.9	Lamed-Hei
Asfar (Meitsad)	14.5		23.3	Lamed-Hei
Karmeit Tsur	8.3	Beit Umar	17.8	Lamed-Hei
Keidar	6.0		10.0	A-Za'im
Bat Ayin	2.8		13.3	Lamed-Hei
<b>Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council</b>				
Argaman	23.7	Al-Uja	31.8	Ha-Bik'a
Mekhola	2.9	Al-Uja	5.0	Ha-Bik'a
Gilgal	30.2	Al-Uja	52.8	Ha-Bik'a
Yitav	24.7	Al-Uja	31.7	Ha-Bik'a
Masu'a	30.0	Al-Uja	37.5	Ha-Bik'a
Khamra	22.5		31.0	Ha-Bik'a
Beka'ot	17.1		22.4	Ha-Bik'a
Mekhora	26.4		34.9	Ha-Bik'a
Gitit	37.0		46.7	Ha-Bik'a
Petza'el	34.5		46.8	Ha-Bik'a
Netiv Ha-Gdud	29.0	Al-Uja	52.2	Ha-Bik'a
Ro'i	15.0		21.3	Ha-Bik'a
Niran	28.3	Al-Uja	50.5	Ha-Bik'a
Tomer	31.2	Al-Uja	48.5	Ha-Bik'a
Shadmot Mekhola	3.4		9.8	Ha-Bik'a
Yafit	36.0		43.2	Ha-Bik'a
Khemdat	14.7		21.3	Ha-Bik'a
No'omi	25.6		45.1	Ha-Bik'a
Maskiyot	8.5		11.4	Ha-Bik'a
Rotem	5.9		8.7	Ha-Bik'a
<b>Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council</b>				
Kalia	20.8		35.9	Dragot
Mitspe Shalem	7.8		9.5	Dragot
Almog	20.6		24.0	Dragot
Beit Ha-Arava	18.7		24.7	Dragot
Vered Yerikho	21.0		25.0	Dragot
Ovnat	20.8		23.5	Dragot

Settlement	Aerial Distance from Green Line	Need to Cross Palestinian Locale	Driving Distance from Green Line	Crossings to Reach Israel
<b>Mate Binyamin Regional Council</b>				
Mevo Khoron	0.2		3.7	
Ofra	15.1		18.9	Akhim
Kokhav Ha-Shakhar	20.5		25.0	Akhim
Rimonim	18.2		20.4	Akhim
Beit Khoron	4.7		5.2	Ofer, Maccabim
Khalamish	10.7		18.7	Akhim, Khashmona'im
Mitspe Yerikho	22.5		14.9	A-Za'im
Kfar Adumim	15.3		12.6	A-Za'im
Shilo	10.6		33.0	Akhim, Shomron
Giv'on Ha-Khadasha	27.1		10.8	
Ma'ale Mikhmesh	4.0		15.3	Akhim
Matityahu	10.9		4.8	
Nili	0.0		4.4	Khashmona'im
Ateret	3.8		24.4	Khashmona'im
Pesagot	16.0		14.4	Akhim
Almon	9.6		7.5	Khashmona'im
Dolev	6.9		16.9	Khashmona'im
Ma'ale Levona	8.6		33.4	Akhim
Eli	21.8		36.7	Akhim
Geva Binyamin (Adam)	23.7		5.9	Akhim
Nakhli'el	6.6		18.0	Khashmona'im
Kokhav Ya'akov	11.6		10.2	Akhim
Ganei Modi'in	7.7		1.4	
Khashmona'im	0.0		1.4	
Na'ale	0.0		7.2	Khashmona'im
Talmon	4.9		16.1	Khashmona'im
Kfar Ha-Oranim	10.5		0.0	
Amikhai	0.0		36.6	Akhim
<b>Shomron Regional Council</b>				
Sal'it	1.8		2.9	
Shavei Shomron	13.3		16.5	Te'enim
Reikhan	1.5		6.2	
Mevo Dotan	8.1		14.8	Reikhan
Kfar Tapuakh	24.0		28.9	Shomron
Elon Moreh	22.0		48.0	Shomron
Khinanit	2.3		7.5	
Shaked	2.9		6.2	
Barkan (Beit Aba)	10.5		15.3	Shomron
Yakir	11.2		20.2	Shomron
Einav	8.8		10.8	Te'enim
Khermesh	5.0		11.4	Reikhan
Alei Zahav	5.0	A-Luban	12.3	Rantis
Brakha	23.2		37.2	Shomron / Te'enim
Yits'har	20.5		35.5	Shomron / Te'enim
Migdalim	32.7		37.7	Shomron / Te'enim
Sha'rei Tikva	2.7		4.3	

Settlement	Aerial Distance from Green Line	Need to Cross Palestinian Locale	Driving Distance from Green Line	Crossings to Reach Israel
Kiryat Netafim	10.7		17.1	Shomron
Itamar	28.0		36.6	Shomron / Te'enim
Pedu'el	4.5	A-Luban	19.1	Rantis
Ets Efra'im	4.9		8.9	
Nofim	10.5		22.2	Shomron
Tsufim	1.8		5.4	
Avnei Khefets	4.2		5.3	Te'enim
Rekhelim	24.0		28.9	Shomron
Revava	12.3		18.2	Shomron
Brukhin	9.3		12.2	Rantis
<b>Har Khevron Regional Council</b>				
Carmel	6.4		11.3	Meitar
Ma'on	4.7		8.9	Meitar
Shani	0.0		0.0	
Adora	6.4		8.2	Tarqumiya
Eshkolot	1.8		2.4	
Penei Khever	12.5		24.3	Meitar
Telem	7.4		9.7	Tarqumiya
Tene	2.3		6.7	Meitar
Metsadot Yehuda	0.2		1.8	
Susya	3.2		3.6	Meitar / Metsadot Yehuda
Otni'el	8.3		18.8	Meitar
Khagai	12.3		26.9	Meitar / Metsadot Yehuda
Shim'a	2.9		10.5	Meitar
Negohot	2.6		5.1	
Sansana	0.0		0.0	
<b>Local Councils</b>				
Ma'ale Efra'im	34.7		46.1	Shomron / Akhim
Kiryat Arba	15.2		28.4	Meitar / The Tunnels
Elkana	3.1		6.7	
Beit El	13.5		19.3	Akhim
Kedumim	12.5	Al-Funduq	23.4	Te'enim / Eliyahu
Karnei Shomron	9.0		10.8	Eliyahu
Efrat	6.5		9.8	The Tunnels / Lamed-Hei
Beit Arye	3.8	A-Luban	6.1	Rantis
Giv'at Ze'ev	4.9		11.6	
Alfei Menashe	2.8		8.5	
Imanuel	13.2		19.5	Eliyahu/Shomron
Oranit	0.0		1.8	
Har Adar	0.0		1.6	
<b>Cities</b>				
Ma'ale Adumim	4.5		7.6	A-Za'im
Ariel	16.1		19.9	Shomron
Beitar Illit	0.4		3.0	Beit Elite / The Tunnels
Modi'in Illit	0.6		3.7	





Map 42: The Separation Barrier and Crossings in Judea and Samaria, 2020



**Table 51: Distance between the Settlements in Judea and Samaria  
and the Green Line**

Settlement	Distance from Green Line	Number of Residents (2020)
Oranit	Up to 1 km.	8,965
Ganei Modi'in	Up to 1 km.	2,716
Har Adar	Up to 1 km.	4,084
Khashmona'im	Up to 1 km.	2,712
Kfar Ha-Oranim	Up to 1 km.	2,614
Mevo Khoron	Up to 1 km.	2,686
Metsadot Yehuda	Up to 1 km.	602
Matityahu	Up to 1 km.	898
Sansana	Up to 1 km.	577
Shani	Up to 1 km.	547
<b>Total</b>	<b>Up to 1 km.</b>	<b>26,401 (5.85%)</b>
Eshkolot	1-3 km.	588
Beitar Illit	1-3 km.	61,125
Har Gilo	1-3 km.	1,627
Khinanit	1-3 km.	1,477
Tene	1-3 km.	925
Modi'in Illit	1-3 km.	77,967
Sal'it	1-3 km.	1,409
Tsufim	1-3 km.	2,433
Reikhan	1-3 km.	352
<b>Total</b>	<b>1-3 km.</b>	<b>147,903 (32.8 %)</b>
Avnei Khefetz	3-5 km.	2,080
Alfei Menashe	3-5 km.	7,997
Elkana	3-5 km.	3,911
Beit Arye	3-5 km.	5,351
Bat Ayin	3-5 km.	1,605
Giv'on Ha-Khadasha	3-5 km.	1,044
Mekhola	3-5 km.	629
Negohot	3-5 km.	376
Neve Daniel	3-5 km.	2,340
Nili	3-5 km.	1,848
Susya	3-5 km.	1,237
Rosh Tsurim	3-5 km.	947
Shadmot Mekhola	3-5 km.	665
Shim'a	3-5 km.	812
Sha'arei Tikva	3-5 km.	6,057
Shaked	3-5 km.	1,017
<b>Total</b>	<b>3-5 km.</b>	<b>37,916 (8.4 %)</b>
Adora	5-10 km.	447
Allon Shvut	5-10 km.	3,071
El'azar	5-10 km.	2,487
Efrat	5-10 km.	11,405
Beit Khoron	5-10 km.	1,454
Brukhin	5-10 km.	1,478
Geva Binyamin	5-10 km.	5,761

Settlement	Distance from Green Line	Number of Residents (2020)
Giv'at Ze'ev	5-10 km.	19,225
Dolev	5-10 km.	1,513
Khermesh	5-10 km.	229
Talmon	5-10 km.	4,882
Kokhav Ya'acov	5-10 km.	9,116
Kfar Etsyon	5-10 km.	1,203
Karmeit Tsur	5-10 km.	995
Carmel	5-10 km.	447
Mevo Dotan	5-10 km.	478
Migdal Oz	5-10 km.	576
Ma'on	5-10 km.	594
Ma'ale Adumim	5-10 km.	37,846
Mitspe Shalem	5-10 km.	244
Maskiyot	5-10 km.	333
Na'ale	5-10 km.	2,343
Einav	5-10 km.	925
Alei Zahav	5-10 km.	3,828
Almon	5-10 km.	1,440
Ets Efra'im	5-10 km.	2,460
Otni'el	5-10 km.	980
Pedu'el	5-10 km.	2,044
Keidar	5-10 km.	1,619
Karnei Shomron	5-10 km.	9,417
Rotem	5-10 km.	242
Telem	5-10 km.	478
Teko'a	5-10 km.	4,168
Total	5-10 km.	133,728 (29.6%)
Asfar	10-20 km.	986
Ariel	10-20 km.	19,582
Beit El	10-20 km.	5,684
Beka'ot	10-20 km.	192
Barkan	10-20 km.	1,933
Vered Yerikho	10-20 km.	360
Khagai	10-20 km.	676
Khemdat	10-20 km.	310
Yakir	10-20 km.	2,368
Kfar Adumim	10-20 km.	4,785
Ma'ale Mikhmash	10-20 km.	1,635
Ma'ale Amos	10-20 km.	720
Mitspe Yerikho	10-20 km.	2,577
Neve Tsuf	10-20 km.	1,494
Nofim	10-20 km.	949
Nokdim	10-20 km.	2,591
Nakhl'i'el	10-20 km.	735
Ateret	10-20 km.	943
Imanuel	10-20 km.	4,129
Ofra	10-20 km.	3,013
Penei Khever	10-20 km.	678



Settlement	Distance from Green Line	Number of Residents (2020)
Pesagot	10-20 km.	2,037
Kedumim	10-20 km.	4,586
Kiryat Arba	10-20 km.	7,338
Kiryat Netafim	10-20 km.	964
Revava	10-20 km.	2,786
Ro'i	10-20 km.	170
Rimonim	10-20 km.	698
Shavei Shomron	10-20 km.	1,031
Total	10-20 km.	75,950 (16.85 %)
Ovant	More than 20 km.	255
Itamar	More than 20 km.	1,285
Elon Moreh	More than 20 km.	2,010
Almog	More than 20 km.	246
Argaman	More than 20 km.	133
Beit Ha-Arava	More than 20 km.	398
Brakha	More than 20 km.	2,926
Gitit	More than 20 km.	497
Gilgal	More than 20 km.	217
Khamra	More than 20 km.	259
Yitav	More than 20 km.	322
Yafit	More than 20 km.	218
Yits'har	More than 20 km.	1,838
Kokhav Ha-Shakhar	More than 20 km.	2,450
Kfar Tapu'akh	More than 20 km.	1,437
Migdalim	More than 20 km.	505
Mekhora	More than 20 km.	178
Ma'ale Efra'im	More than 20 km.	1,255
Ma'ale Levona	More than 20 km.	946
Masu'a	More than 20 km.	180
Niran	More than 20 km.	105
Na'ama	More than 20 km.	169
Netiv Ha-Gedud	More than 20 km.	222
Eli	More than 20 km.	4,601
Amikhai	More than 20 km.	208
Petsa'el	More than 20 km.	322
Kalia	More than 20 km.	465
Rekhelim	More than 20 km.	906
Shilo	More than 20 km.	4,483
Tomer	More than 20 km.	287
Total	More than 20 km.	29,359 (6.5 %)



Residents of Arvot Ha-Yarden will travel an average of 32.63 km. The closest settlement is Mekhola, south of Beit She'an (5 km), and the most distant Gilgal north of Jericho (52.8 km).

Residents of Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh will travel an average of 23.76 km. The nearest settlement is Mitspe Shalem (9.5 km) and the most distant Kalia, south of Jericho (35.9 km).

Residents of the 13 local councils will on average travel around 15 km to a crossing on the Green Line. The most distant settlement is Ma'ale Efra'im—46 km, and the closest Har Adar—1.6 km.

Residents of the four cities will on average travel 8.5 km to the Green Line. Residents of Modi'in Illit make this journey within the "Seam Zone," which is relatively well protected. Residents of Beitar Illit will travel just 3 km to Tzur Hadassah, but must then travel three times as far to reach Jerusalem. Residents of Ariel will travel 17 km to Shomron Crossing before entering the Seam Zone.

## **Need to Pass the Crossings into Israel**

The need to pass a crossing adds time to journeys. The length of time added depends on the time of day and the security situation, which dictates the intensity of the security inspections. In any scenario, however, the crossings lengthens journey times to various destinations. The vast majority of the settlements are situated on the "Palestinian" side of the Separation Barrier and the crossings along its course, and accordingly residents must pass these crossings in order to reach Israel (see Table 50 and Map 42).

Residents of Gush Etsyon Regional Council must pass the Lamed-Hei Crossing to reach the coastal plain; Beitar Illit Crossing to reach central Israel; and the Tunnels Crossing to enter Jerusalem. An exception is Har Gilo, on the "Israeli" side of the Separation Barrier, who nevertheless must cross Walaja / Ein Ya'el Crossing. Another exception is Keidar, close to Ma'ale Adumim, whose residents must pass A-Za'im Crossing in order to enter Jerusalem.

Residents of Arvot Ha-Yarden Regional Council will face delays at Ha-Bik'a Crossing on Route 90 when they head north, at Shomron Crossing on Route 5 when heading west, and at A-Za'im or Akhim Crossings when entering Jerusalem. Residents of Megilot Yam Ha-Melakh Regional Council will need to pass Dragot Crossing when heading south or A-Za'im Crossing to enter Jerusalem. Residents of Mate Binyamin Regional Council will be required to pass A-Za'im or Metsudot

Adumim Crossing in order to reach Jerusalem, and Khashmona'im and Maccabim Crossings in order to reach the Modi'in area.

Residents of Shomron Regional Council will pass the following crossings, from north to south: Reikhan, Te'enim, Eliyahu, Shomron, and Rantis. Residents of Har Khevron Regional Council will face delays at Meitar or Metsadot Yehuda Crossings when heading south, and at the Tunnels Crossing when entering Jerusalem.

The residents of the five local councils situated west of the Security Barrier—Har Adar, Oranit, Giv'at Ze'ev, Alfei Menashe, and Elkana—can enter Israel without any inspection, while residents of other local councils will face delays at the crossings. Similarly, regarding the cities, only Modi'in Illit is situated west of the Separation Barrier. Residents of Beitar Illit pass Beit Illit Crossing when heading west, and the Tunnels Crossing when heading toward Jerusalem. Residents of Ariel pass Shomron Crossing, and residents of Ma'ale Adumim pass A-Za'im Crossing.

In summary, 55.5 percent of Israelis living in Judea and Samaria must pass at least one crossing in order to enter Israel.

## **Crossing Palestinian Communities**

The massive project to construct roads bypassing Palestinian communities, which began in the 1980s, accelerated dramatically after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, due to the prohibition imposed on Israelis against entering Area A and some parts of Area B. Israelis were only permitted to cross a small number of Palestinian communities in order to reach their destinations. This reality has to a degree reduced the risk associated with travel on routes where most of the attacks occur in routine times and during escalations. Watchtowers have been established at exposed points along some of the roads used by Israelis, and these are staffed according to the security situation.

Residents traveling south of Gush Etsyon will pass close by Beit Umar and Al-Arub Refugee Camp (a bypass road around Al-Arub is currently under construction). Drivers using the Jordan Valley road south toward Jericho will cross the Palestinian community of Al-Uja, which is generally calm. Those wishing to head east from Modi'in Illit and Beit Arye toward Pedu'el and Ariel, or to reach the Rosh Ha-Ayin / Petakh Tikva area, will cross the small village of A-Luban. Residents traveling to the settlements to the east and south of Nablus cross the village of Khawara; a bypass road around the village has just been completed.

To sum up: although most of the Israeli residents live within an aerial distance of 10 km from the Green Line, the figures show that the driving distances and times

are longer than the average inside Israel. The construction of bypass roads certainly contributes to security on the roads, but it also lengthens driving times. Moreover, the lack of Jewish territorial contiguity in most parts of Judea and Samaria turns the roads into a serious security flashpoint, requiring the IDF to deploy numerous watchtowers along the roads to isolated settlements and to undertake patrols in vehicles and on foot. During periods of escalation, this reality deters Israeli visitors and obliges the IDF to provide accompanying forces for various service providers and suppliers, as well as for residents traveling to Israel. This situation hampers employment, settlement consolidation, and quality of life, and imposes a serious burden on the IDF forces and the police.



# Chapter Eight

## Summary and Conclusions

The construction of the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria was undertaken by all the Israeli governments since 1967, each according to its political perception and the way in which it saw the future of the region. In the first decade after the Six-Day War, the Ma'arakh governments generally acted in accordance with the security approach embodied in the Allon Plan, and concentrated on building settlements in the Jordan Valley and the greater Jerusalem area. The settlements were primarily agricultural in character—kibbutzim and moshavim—and most of the immigrants from Israel were secular. At the end of the period their number did not exceed 5,000 persons. The settlement picture at the end of this period was incapable of influencing or achieving the political goal defined at the time: the containment of a future Arab political entity (Palestinian or Jordanian) and the neutralization of its territory through Israeli control of its external borders.

Most of the Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria were built in the period 1977–1984, under the Likud governments. These governments shifted the focus from agricultural settlements to community and urban settlements. In accordance with the Sharon Plan, they also expanded the settlement zones to the central mountain ridge and western Samaria. At the end of this period, the Jewish settlement system had a population of 35,300. However, it was also unable to secure the two additional political goals it was intended to address: preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state enjoying territorial contiguity, or alternatively annexing all or most of the area to the State of Israel without damaging the Zionist vision of a democratic state with a Jewish majority.

All the governments over the 35 years that have followed have built a relatively very small number of new settlements. Since the Rabin government decided in 1992 not to construct new settlements, efforts have concentrated on increasing the number of Israelis living in the existing settlements, particularly since the signing of the Oslo Accords. The number of residents has risen from 95,000 in 1993 to 451,000 in 2020. Another effort, led by the Settlement Division of the WZO, together with the Yesha Council, was launched in response to the transfer of powers in Areas A and B to the Palestinian Authority. Known as the Super Zones plan (1997), this initiative, inspired by the political echelon, led to the construction of illegal settlements intended to densify and expand the existing settlement blocs and to increase the Jewish presence



along Route 60, which defines Palestinian territorial contiguity along the central mountain ridge. Moreover, in recent years, as part of the “war for Area C,” extensive areas have been allocated for individual farms across the West Bank.

## **Key Features of the Jewish Settlement System in Judea and Samaria**

- The number of Israelis living in the settlements is 451,257.
- The settlements include four cities (43.5 percent of the Jewish residents), 13 local councils (20.7 percent), and six regional councils including 110 settlements (35.8 percent).
- 75 percent of the settlements have a community and urban character; these are home to 95.3 percent of the residents.
- Over one-third of the Israelis in Judea and Samaria are Haredim, over one-third are Religious Zionists, and the remainder are secular.
- Two-thirds of the settlers moved to Judea and Samaria mainly in order to improve their quality of life; one-third moved mainly for faith-based and religious reasons.
- In the 2021 elections, 91 percent of voters chose parties from the right-wing camp, while the remainder voted for the center-left camp.

Examination of the settlement system according to Criterion #1: *Has the number of Jewish settlers in the West Bank reached a critical demographic mass?* Our study reveals the following findings:

- The proportion of Jews out of the total population of Judea and Samaria rose gradually over the years, and in recent years has stabilized at 14 percent—a level that does not threaten the firm and decisive Palestinian majority in the area.
- The demographic balance between Jews and Palestinians in the various settlement areas, according to the different plans, shows that the three political goals have not been secured. It should be noted, however, that in the Jerusalem area, which is home to most of the Israelis who live beyond the Green Line, a Jewish critical mass is currently being consolidated.

Regarding long-term trends, it emerged that:

1. The nominal growth of the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria over recent years has stabilized at an average of 13,000. The annual growth rate, which reached a peak of 16 percent in 1991, has shown an ongoing and gradual decline, reaching 2.24 percent in 2020. This growth rate is still higher than that inside the

State of Israel (1.8 percent).

2. Regarding the sources of annual growth—the total migration balance and domestic migration balance have both been falling constantly since 2000, and in 2020 a negative balance was recorded. The decline is concentrated mainly in the four cities and some of the local councils that are home to most of the Jewish population in the area. By contrast, the international migration balance is positive, and is constituting an increasingly important component in the total migration balance (as high as one-third). Natural growth is rising gradually, and in recent years has accounted for almost the entire annual growth. However, almost half of the natural growth is contributed by the two Haredi cities—Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit.
3. The population of Judea and Samaria is particularly young, even by comparison to the State of Israel, which has a very young population compared to the developed countries. This creates potential for future growth, albeit mainly in the Haredi sector.

*According to the current trends, the weight of the Jewish population within the total population of Judea and Samaria can be expected to fall. Growth will rely on natural growth, substantially increasing the proportion of Haredim relative to secular Jews. These processes will not contribute to securing the political goals outlined above, although the dense Haredi population around Jerusalem will strengthen the existing trend toward the emergence of a significant Jewish critical mass in this area. This will require more complex solutions as part of the two-state solution.*

Examination of the settlement system according to Criterion #2: *Has a high level of density been created among the Jewish population, potentially enabling contiguous contact and cohesion between its different parts?* The examination of all the selected indices reveals a lack of the density required in for settlement cohesion (with the exception of the Jerusalem area), and accordingly an inability to secure the three political goals:

- Judea and Samaria is an extremely congested area, even more so than Israel, which is itself considered a very congested country. However, the reason for this is very clearly the high density of the Palestinian population (472 persons per sq.km.), and not the Jewish population, which has a density of 78 persons per sq.km.—a level typically found in peripheral and desert areas. Moreover, the deployment of the Jewish population in parts of Judea and Samaria is linear, following the main roads and Green Line. This is regarded as a poor quality of deployment, as within Israel itself.

- The high average distance between settlements, the absence of similar identity-based, cultural, and economic characteristics between all the settlements in the regional councils, and the differences between the population of the large Haredi cities and the surrounding Jewish settlements are all factors that prevent the maintenance of interactions in the social and economic spheres at the level of intensity required for settlement cohesion.
- Moreover, the high average distance between the settlements and the regional council offices, the need to circumvent Areas A and B (which account for 40 percent of the area of the West Bank), and the need to pass crossings in some instances, together with the high average distance from service cities within the Green Line, all also prevent settlement cohesion.

Examination of the settlement system according to Criterion #3: *Has a hierarchy of settlements been created in terms of size and location?* This examination shows that unlike the system inside Israel and the Palestinian system, the hierarchy of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria does not have a normal urban character and is underdeveloped in urban terms. The principal problem is that the two relatively large cities—Modi'in Illit and Beitar Illit—are poor Haredi cities that do not constitute points of reference for the national-religious or secular population in almost any field. Both are situated on the Green Line, at a great distance from most of the settlements in Judea and Samaria, and both themselves receive the services they require from the main cities inside Israel. The third-largest city, Ma'ale Adumim, is situated on the edge of the desert and its surrounding settlement system is extremely thin. The fourth city, Ariel, is situated in an excellent location in the center of Samaria, and is home to a university. However, it is relatively small, with some 20,000 residents. The density of the built-up area in all the Jewish cities in Judea and Samaria also reflects an inability to create the potential for extensive urban services (despite the fact that the two Haredi cities are extremely congested, like the Haredi cities inside Israel).

The absence of a settlement hierarchy in terms of location and size hampers the ability of the Jewish settlement system in Judea and Samaria to maintain an independent fabric of life. In broad terms, the Jewish system throughout the area features a large number of small settlements, many of them very small. These settlements do not maintain significant economic and social interactions with the Palestinian settlement system (urban and rural), but rely on Israeli cities within the Green Line, particularly the capital Jerusalem.

Examination of the settlement system according to Criterion #4: *Does the settlement structure entail a presence on the ground and are the settlements based on local agriculture and industry?* The examination of the settlement system from this aspect, based on numerous parameters, revealed a very limited presence of the Jewish settlements on the ground:

- The level of private Jewish land ownership is negligible (0.28 percent) and requires the allocation of “state land” for Jewish construction; however, this land is located almost entirely in the Judean Desert and the Jordan Valley.
- Within the area of the Jewish settlements there is a relatively high proportion of privately-owned Palestinian land.
- Israeli agriculture in Judea and Samaria is marginal and concentrated almost entirely in the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area. Only one-fourth of the settlements, four percent of the residents, and 0.6 percent of the Israeli workforce in Judea and Samaria work in agriculture, farming an area of just 143,000 dunams (mainly in the Jordan Valley). These rates are lower than those inside Israel and in Palestinian agriculture (approx. 1.2-2 million dunams). Moreover, the regional councils in the area are not agricultural in character, in contrast to the situation inside Israel, with the exception of the two smallest councils—Arvot Ha-Yarden and Megillot Yam Ha-Melakh.
- The situation regarding Israeli agriculture is similar: only 5.3 percent of the workforce is employed in industry—a significantly lower rate than inside Israel. There are only three significant industrial zones, and 63 percent of the workers in these zones are Palestinians.
- The workforce participation rate is particularly high in Judea and Samaria, and is particularly remarkable given the high proportion of Haredi residents. However, the proportion of part-time jobs is higher than inside Israel, and more importantly—the proportion of those employed in state-funded sectors, particularly the education system, is significantly higher than in Israel.
- The proportion of Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria in the lowest socioeconomic rank (cluster 1) is much higher than the average inside Israel, due to the high proportion of Haredim (3.5 times their weight inside Israel).
- The proportion of residents entitled to a matriculation certificate among Israeli residents of Judea and Samaria is higher than the average in Israel. However, the proportion of graduates is lower, particularly among residents who live in the cities. These findings reflect a poor exploitation of educational potential and/or a shift of graduates to Israel. For all the categories, the proportions among the Haredim are negligible, and significantly lower even than the figures for Haredim inside Israel.

- Lastly, a significant proportion of the budget of the local authorities relies on government grants (balancing, special, and earmarked grants), which are provided with unusual generosity to the non-Haredi authorities in this area.

These economic statistics highlight the fragile nature of the Jewish settlement system in Judea and Samaria. In the absence of massive and ongoing governmental support, the local authorities will find it difficult to maintaining their existing standard of living, and most of them are liable to be left unable to cope.

Examination of the settlement system according to Criterion #5: *Is the deployment of the population and settlements based on exclusive, or at least safe, principal traffic arteries?* An examination of the settlement system from this aspect reveals the following findings:

Half the Jewish residents indeed live within 5 km (as the crow flies) of the Green Line, and three-fourths live within 10 km (one-sixth of the width of the West Bank). The traffic arteries to the Jewish settlements very rarely cross Palestinian communities. However, driving distances within Judea and Samaria are relatively large, and journey times to places of work and service cities inside Israel are relatively long. The duration of exposure while traveling through the heart of the Palestinian population is long and liable to entail danger. The IDF makes substantial investments in securing the roads to isolated settlements, but historical experience shows that most of the attacks take place along the roads.

Israeli governments over the decades built the Jewish settlements without any overall master plan adapted to the conditions in the area. They adopted disparate and non-complementary patterns of settlement that emerged in Israel's early years according to the availability of land. In the early years, the governments still believed in the first strategy outlined above—the aspiration to create demographic and spatial dominance over the Palestinian settlement system through expansive Jewish settlement. This constituted an attempt to replicate Israel's successful actions within the Green Line after 1948. Yigal Allon mentioned an objective of two million Israelis in the Jordan Valley, and Ariel Sharon claimed one million Jews were needed to secure this goal. Later, in the late 1970s, Ariel Sharon adopted a different approach. An anecdote relates that when he drank tea with his friends, he would stir the drink vigorously and declare: "I'll build so many settlements in the territories that it will be impossible to separate them from the Palestinians, just as you can't separate the sugar and the tea in my cup." In practical terms, most of the Jewish settlements (including those later evacuated in 2005) were build during this period. However, Sharon—like his



predecessors (with the exception of Moshe Dayan)—did not encourage integration and mutual dependency between the two populations. Instead, he focused on the second goal: preventing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state by dissecting the Palestinian settlement system. The Jewish settlements were built with a wedge-like shape into the Palestinian system, rather than as an integrated and complementary system. Subsequent Israeli governments worked both to reinforce this wedge and to secure Jewish demographic and spatial dominance in various areas. Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak commented: “Sharon’s plan was to deploy so many settlements at so many points in Judea and Samaria that a Palestinian state could never be established. But this plan was foolish. Sharon’s isolated settlements weakened rather than strengthened the settlement blocs. Sharon’s isolated settlements were a classic case of aiming too high and ending up in a worse position than before.”

*This study shows that the Jewish settlement system has failed to secure the three strategies intended to achieve its three political goals. It has not integrated with or complemented the existing Palestinian system; it has not created a demographic majority; and it has not secured spatial control of Judea and Samaria or of one of the settlement areas defined in the various plans. It does not threaten Palestinian territorial integrity along the mountain ridge. Thus the Jewish settlement system does not negate the feasibility of the two-state solution in the spatial and physical dimension. Removing the Jewish wedge system (comprising isolated settlements along the mountain ridge) from within the local Palestinian system will only serve to reinforce the existing Palestinian system; it will alleviate rather than impede its fabric of life.*

The impact of the Jewish system on the demographic balance and on Palestinian spatial dominance—north of Jerusalem and south of Gush Etsyon—is negligible at best. In the Jerusalem area, however, where the majority of the Israeli population beyond the Green Line is concentrated (including in East Jerusalem), a Jewish urban and demographic mass is emerging that is liable to impede the maintenance of Palestinian contiguity along the mountain ridge. This will demand more extensive functional solutions and arrangements in this area. Israel’s future plans in this area, including new neighborhoods and roads, are liable to intensify this trend and to exacerbate the negative impact on the feasibility of the two-state solution.

This study shows that the Jewish settlement system has suffered in recent years from negative trends in such aspects as demographic growth, sources of growth, socioeconomic ranking, and various economic parameters. If these trends continue, the Jewish population of Judea and Samaria will in the future comprise a Haredi

majority, a religious-national minority, and a very small secular population. This population will become a security and economic burden on the back of the State of Israel—a poor population, lacking independent employment sources, and dependent on Israel within the Green Line in all areas—employment, services, governmental support, and so forth.

Prof. Vered Noam, who received the Israel Prize for Talmud, summed up the situation: “This reality has been obvious for years, even to those who support the settlements,” she wrote. “For a very long time, most of the political right-wing has realized that it is no longer possible to speak of annexation and imposing Israeli law [on the territories]. In the existing state of affairs, such an aspiration is not within the realms of the possible. When the Likud found its back to the wall and was forced to formulate its political objective and define an overall strategy, it proposed autonomy, which is an intermediate step in the opposite direction—the path of concession of ownership. But this was only by way of lip service. From this point on, the right-wing government and the settlers—those who had actualized its own approach—adopted a total and impossible distinction between settlement and its ultimate objective. Between action and its political manifestation. Between the achievement of the settlements and their inevitable price: granting clear civilian status to almost two million Arabs.”<sup>39</sup>

Accordingly, if Israel seeks to preserve the feasibility of the two-state solution, it must refrain from its planned actions in the greater Jerusalem area and seek to concentrate Israelis in settlements and settlement blocs adjacent to the Green Line. It must prepare a plan facilitating employment, traffic, and services in the new system, including its future connection to Israel.

The appendices to this study include an examination of the components of the two-state solution, confirming the feasibility of this solution from a spatial and physical dimension. Another study attached examines the attitudes of Israelis likely to face evacuation in the event of a permanent agreement. The three surveys included in this second study, undertaken in different periods and using different methodologies among representative samples of ideological and quality-of-life settlers, *effectively disprove the assertion that it is no longer possible to realize the two-state solution, including the evacuation of settlements*. The surveys, conducted among the population slated for evacuation in a future agreement (i.e. those living outside the “zone of probable agreement,”) show that the majority of settlers are pragmatic. Even if they do not support the evacuation of settlements, they will be willing to accept the decision, provided that the withdrawal is approved in a government decision and/or

<sup>39</sup> “The End of the Yellow Time,” *Nekuda* 61, 1992 (Hebrew).

referendum. Most settlers disapprove of violence and of protests beyond the scope of the law, and prefer to express their protest in a lawful and legitimate manner. It also emerged that opposition to a withdrawal is motivated not only by ideological factors, but also by more practical considerations, such as the distance from the place of work, the desire to remain in an existing community, and resistance to change at an advanced age. Effective attention to these aspects could reduce the level of opposition to evacuation. The decision to evacuate settlements will ultimately be taken on the basis of various considerations. The current analysis of the attitudes and desires of settlers in Judea and Samaria suggests that they will not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to a diplomatic solution.

Accordingly, the greatest challenge facing the two sides is not in the spatial and physical dimension—since it is still possible to reach a two-state solution based on the guiding parameters of the negotiations at Annapolis in 2008, but rather in the political dimension. In this respect, the requisite conditions include a willingness on the part of the Israeli government to readopt the two-state solution, and the ability of the Palestinians to present a single legitimate and authoritative body to pursue negotiations and sign a permanent agreement.



# Appendix 1

## The Two-State Solution: Key Principles

*The study showed that in physical, demographic, and spatial terms, a two-state solution based on the parameters that guided the negotiations at Annapolis in 2008, and based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 is still viable. What is lacking today is the *political viability* of this solution. The Israeli government is refusing to resume negotiations, with the possible establishment of a Palestinian state this may entail. The PLO faces opposition from Hamas (which controls the Gaza Strip and is gaining an increasing strong presence in the West Bank), internal divisions in Fatah, the failure to hold general elections for many years, and other problems. The social and attitudinal feasibility of the solution among the Israeli public is also complex and conditional. Most Israelis reject proposals to annex the territories and support various solutions based on separation. However, they tend to be pessimistic regarding the feasibility of the two-state solution. In Palestinian society, disillusionment with the diplomatic process has led to growing support for the one-state solution.*

Despite this, if political conditions allow—following changes in the Israeli position and joint Palestinian alignments, or as the result of an international initiative—I will add here the principles for a permanent agreement based on the two-state solution. My goal is to provide a positive demonstration of the practical feasibility of this solution in physical terms, and to allow readers to become familiar with this proposed solution and evaluate its feasibility.

### Background

The *legal status* of the West Bank has not changed since it was occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War. The West Bank is regarded as occupied territory by the international community, contrary to Israel's position. Immediately after the war, Israel annexed 70 sq.km. of the West Bank to Jerusalem, including six sq.km. of East Jerusalem ("Al-Quds"), a move not recognized by the international community and condemned in a series of resolutions. As part of the Oslo process between Israel and the PLO, which began with the signing of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 1993, 40% of the West Bank (Areas A and B), where approximately 90% of the Palestinian population (2.85 million) live, came under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority (PA), established in 1994. By the end of 2018, the population of the remainder of



the area (Area C) comprised 429,759 Israelis in 130 Jewish settlements and some 300,000 Palestinians. In the summer of 2005, as part of the unilateral Disengagement Plan, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip. In 2020, about 2.1 million Palestinians live in this area. At the same time, Israel evacuated the 17 Jewish settlements (8,000 people) in the Gaza Strip, along with four Jewish settlements in northern Samaria.

After 1999, Israel and the PLO engaged in rounds of negotiations toward a permanent agreement, mainly under American mediation, and based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338. However, all the rounds of negotiations all failed to reach a final agreement. Following the Second Intifada, which erupted in the fall of 2000, Israel resumed operations in the PA areas (beginning with Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002). Between 2002 and 2007 it constructed most of the “Security Barrier;” the sections of the barrier that are located inside the West Bank were disqualified in an opinion granted by the International Court of Justice in July 2004. On November 29, 2012, 138 UN states admitted Palestine within the 1967 lines as a non-member state in the organization.

The *relations between Israel and the PA* are broadly based on the Interim Agreement (1995). Under this agreement, extensive and effective security cooperation is maintained between the security forces of the two sides, while economic aspects are governed by the Paris Agreement (1994). Each side refrains from implementing certain sections of the agreement, but neither has proposed that it be cancelled.

The *Gaza Strip* has been under the control of Hamas since the organization seized power in the area in 2007. Israel has imposed a partial closure on the area. Since the implementation of Israel’s Disengagement Plan, four rounds of military escalation have taken place (Operations Summer Rains, Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, and Protective Edge). Attempts to advance a reconciliation processes between Hamas and the PLO, which would require the PA to resume responsibility for Gaza and entail joint work by both organizations, have proved unsuccessful and there has been no change in the underlying reality in the area.

On the *broader regional level*, Israel has maintained security cooperation with Jordan and Egypt, as well as covert cooperation with other Arab countries based on the shared interests against the background of the growing strength and influence of Iran and Turkey and the struggle against the jihadist Islamic organizations. Significant changes have also become apparent in Saudi Arabia’s attitude toward the diplomatic process between Israel and the Palestinians, including statements expressing willingness to make progress toward normalization with Israel, provided that Israel maintains a clear commitment to the two-state solution. At the same time, the Arab League’s Peace Initiative of 2002, which includes the parameters that served

as the basis for the Annapolis 2008 negotiations, still serves as the foundation for the Arab Quartet's requirements concerning negotiations and the signing of a permanent agreement between Israel and the PLO.

Concerning the *international system*, several key features should be noted. The US stands by Israel and is not urging Israel to resume negotiations, though the Biden Administration seeks to preserve conditions ensuring the feasibility of the two-state solution. However, a process of withdrawal by the US from involvement in the Middle East can also be seen, and in the long term the US-Israeli relationship is being eroded in all three of its key pillars—shared values, strategic interests, and bipartisan support. It has been these three areas that have guaranteed stability in the relationship over the past few decades. Meanwhile, Russia is consistently upgrading its involvement in the region and consolidating its ties with Iran and Syria.

Within these systems, *Israel* is working to achieve a number of *key goals*: continued control of the West Bank, at least until the Palestinians accept Israel's positions regarding a permanent agreement; strengthening ties with the Sunni Arab states on the basis of common interests; ensuring US support for the Israeli position in order to neutralize resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council and in order to modify the nuclear agreement with Iran; and efforts to avoid an escalation in the West Bank or a further round of escalation in the Gaza Strip, which could damage its relations with Jordan and Egypt, respectively.

The *PLO* refuses to resume negotiations with Israel unless Israel agrees to *principles and parameters for the discussions* based on the international resolutions and the previous rounds of negotiations, most notably the Annapolis process of 2008. It has avoided implementing the reconciliation agreement with Hamas due to its reluctance to assume responsibility for Gaza, and it is also refraining from allowing the Hamas to join the PLO due to concern that this would allow Hamas to seize the lead role in representing the Palestinians. Within the PA areas, a pattern of economic consolidation can be observed, particularly by comparison to Gaza; however, this process also heightens the PA's dependence on Israel for its exports, imports, and employment.

Turning to *internal trends in Israeli society* and the Jewish world, the Second Intifada led to the creation of post-territorial nationalism, while the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians sometimes serves as a tool in the internal confrontation within Israeli society concerning the definition of its collective identity. Several trends can be observed today that threaten Israeli society: an increasing tendency to religiosity among both Jews and Arabs; the reinforcement of a “frontier culture” that is destabilizing the current system of government; a widening culture of illegality;

protracted damage to democracy and the democratic institutions; a deepening between politicians and professional civil servants; widening differences of opinion between the various streams in American Jewry and the Israeli government; the lack of a national consensus on the future of the West Bank, which in turn intensifies the damage to the legitimacy of the political system; the erosion, through the “Arrangement Law,” of the position that was accepted for many years that Israeli legislation cannot be applied to the Territories; the equalization of the status of Israelis in the West Bank to that of citizens living inside the “Green Line”; and a tension among Israeli Arabs between a tendency to “Israelification” and their position on the Palestinian position.

## **General Framework for an Agreement**

The following is a suggested set of principles enabling both parties to resume negotiations, sign a permanent agreement, and resolve the conflict.<sup>40</sup>

### **The State of Israel and the PLO:**

1. Reaffirm their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security based on a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace and achieving historic reconciliation.
2. Recognize that peace requires the transition from the logic of war and confrontation to the logic of peace and cooperation, and that acts and words characteristic of the state of war are neither appropriate nor acceptable in the era of peace.
3. Affirm their deep belief that the logic of peace requires compromise, and that the only viable solution is a two-state solution based on UNSC Resolution 242 and 338.
4. Affirm that this agreement marks the recognition of the right of the Jewish people to statehood and the recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to statehood, without prejudice to the equal rights of the Parties’ respective citizens.
5. Recognize that after years of living in mutual fear and insecurity, both peoples need to enter an era of peace, security and stability, entailing all necessary actions by the parties to guarantee the realization of this era.
6. Recognize each other’s right to peaceful and secure existence within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.
7. Determine to establish relations based on cooperation and the commitment to live side by side as good neighbors aiming both separately and jointly to contribute to the well-being of their peoples.

<sup>40</sup> Based on the Geneva Initiative, 2003.

8. Reaffirm their obligation to conduct themselves in conformity with the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
9. Confirm that that this Agreement is concluded within the framework of the Middle East peace process initiated in Madrid in October 1991, the Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993, the subsequent agreements including the Interim Agreement of September 1995, the Wye River Memorandum of October 1998 and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999, and the permanent status negotiations including the Camp David Summit of July 2000, the Clinton Ideas of December 2000, the Taba Negotiations of January 2001, the 2002 Arab League Peace Initiative, the Bush Vision of June 2004, the 2005 Quartet Roadmap, and the Annapolis Process in 2008.
10. Reiterate their commitment to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338 and 1397 and confirm their understanding that this Agreement is based on, will lead to, and—by its fulfillment—will constitute the full implementation of these resolutions and the settlement of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict in all its aspects.
11. Declare that this Agreement marks the historic reconciliation between the Palestinians and Israelis, and paves the way to reconciliation between the Arab World and Israel and the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between the Arab states and Israel in accordance with the relevant clauses of the Beirut Arab League Resolution of March 28, 2002.
12. Resolve to pursue the goal of attaining a comprehensive regional peace, thus contributing to stability, security, development and prosperity throughout the region.
13. The purpose of the Permanent Agreement is to end the era of conflict and usher in a new era based on peace, cooperation, and good neighborly relations between the parties.
14. Implementation of the Agreement will settle all the parties' claims arising from events occurring prior to its signature.
15. This effort shall continue at all times, and shall be insulated from any possible crises and other aspects of the parties' relations.
16. Israel and Palestine shall work together and separately with other parties in the region to enhance and promote regional cooperation and coordination in spheres of common interest.

## Borders and Territory

The inherent tension in this sphere is created by the Palestinian demand that Palestine should be established on 22 percent of the area of Mandatory Palestine (6,205 sq.km.) and by the difficulty Israel faces in evacuating all the Israelis living over the Green Line. The answer to this tension is the idea of a land swap allowing most of the Israelis living over the Green Line to remain in their homes and come under Israeli sovereignty, while at the same time enabling the Palestinians to establish a state with an area of 6,205 sq.km.

In keeping with this basic principle, therefore, the central dilemma to be addressed is the question of the cost of a permanent agreement. Land swaps in the context of a permanent agreement entail three main costs, all of which are interdependent:

1. The evacuation of Jewish communities from the West Bank and the absorption of their residents in Israel.
2. Damage to the fabric of Palestinian life and to Palestinian contiguity as a result of the annexation by Israel of “blocs” and “fingers” of Jewish settlements that penetrate deep into the heart of Palestinian territory.
3. Damage to Israeli localities situated within the State of Israel but close to the border, due to the use of their land for land swaps and their proximity to the new border.

Any attempt to reduce the cost of the first component increases the costs of the latter two. Greater annexation of Jewish settlements avoids the need for the forced evacuation of settlements, while raising the cost in terms of damage to the fabric of Palestinian life and to adjacent Israeli locales close to the border. Conversely, reducing the damage to Palestinians and Israelis means the more extensive evacuation of Jewish settlers from the West Bank and a reduction in the scope of land swaps.

Accordingly, when delineating a border it is important to strive for a cost-benefit optimization between these three components. This implies a profound recognition, understanding, and evaluation of the various costs and the presentation of optimal solutions in which the cost-benefit components will allow a reasonable existence for both countries, side by side, on the basis of a structurally-stable border.<sup>41</sup>

A study commissioned by the movement Commanders for Israel's Security, based on the parameter of “the 1967 borders as a base, with land swaps at a ratio of 1:1,” delineated an optimal border between Israel and Palestine. The plan focuses on the annexation to Israel of settlements close to the Green Line (see Map 44).

<sup>41</sup> For further details, see Commanders for Israel's Security, *A Stable Border: A Border Separating Israel and Palestine*, April 2017 (Hebrew).



This proposed border requires land swaps totaling 242 sq.km., equivalent to 3.9% of the territory of the Palestinian state (6,205 sq.km.). The length of the proposed border will be 741 km. The number of Jewish settlements to be annexed is 50 (including the 12 neighborhoods in East Jerusalem), and the number of Israelis to be annexed will be approximately 521,000 (77.7% of all Israelis living east of the Green Line). On the other side of the border, 20 Israeli communities (within the Green Line) will lose 20% or more of their land, and 24 Israeli communities (within the Green Line) will fall within a distance of 1,000m or less from the proposed border. Similarly, 69 Palestinian communities will lose an average of 15.2% of their land, but Palestinian territorial and transportation contiguity will not be impaired.

## **Security**

The tension in this sphere is created by the Palestinian demand for Israel to return to the 1967 borders, and the Israeli interests accruing from regional and bilateral threats.

### **Basic Assumptions**

1. The guiding principle of the permanent agreement is that any agreement will secure arrangements ensuring that Israel's ability to defend itself on its own will not be impaired, whatever the circumstances.
2. Israel must ensure that its security situation improves as a result of the diplomatic agreement.
3. The agreement will include security arrangements ensuring that, in the event of its collapse, Israel's security situation will not be less favorable than it is now.
4. The Middle East suffers from ongoing instability and is in the midst of turmoil. The region is fraught with threats, but also offers opportunities for a change in the balance of forces in Israel's favor.
5. Arab countries on the moderate Sunni axis share a zone of common interests with Israel due to the perception of common threats and the need to combine forces in order to address these threats—this in addition to the interest in resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
6. A sustainable and permanent agreement will allow Israel's integration into a set of regional arrangements, thereby enhancing its ability to confront diverse threats.
7. The United States and European countries share common interests with Israel, as well as an interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict. This explains their willingness to assist in the implementation of a final settlement, including the financing and deployment of a multinational force.



Map 44: Proposal for a Stable and Permanent Border with Land Swaps, 2020

8. In any permanent solution, the State of Palestine will include the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The application of the agreement to the Gaza Strip is conditional on its return, in both civilian and military terms, to the authority of a single Palestinian government.
9. The current Palestinian leadership, the PLO, is struggling to impose its control over all the organizations and regions in the West Bank, and it has no authority whatsoever over the Gaza Strip, which is controlled by Hamas.
10. As long as the detachment between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip continues, the parties will agree to condition the implementation of the agreement on issues pertaining to the Gaza Strip and on Israel's policy toward Hamas and other Islamist organizations.
11. The Palestinians will generally reject security arrangements that violate their sovereignty, except those anchored in international decisions and those used in the peace agreements between Israel and Egypt and Jordan (demilitarization, international forces, gradual implementation, etc.).
12. Due to the distrust between the parties, international, Arab, and other involvement will be required in all future arrangements between Israel and the Palestinians, as part of the security arrangements in the Palestinian state.
13. Preventing the passage of weapons and unauthorized persons across the border between Jordan and the Palestinian state is key to maintaining the Palestinian state as a demilitarized entity. This will require a special arrangement in the Jordan Valley, including the permanent presence of a strong US force on the west side of the Jordan River, and even in the Rafah area.
14. The main opponents of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement are Iran and the non-state organizations (the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others). These groups will work to prevent the agreement and impair its stability. In addition, there are terrorist, extremist and interested parties within Israel determined to prevent an agreement and to sabotage its implementation and stability.
15. Israel's eastern security border: An arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians, together with arrangements between Israel and the moderate Arab states, will expand still further Israel's strategic depth with regard to the military threat from the East.

## **Guiding Principles for an Arrangement**

1. Once the agreement is fully implemented, the border between Israel and Palestine will be considered permanent and final.
2. The parties acknowledge that mutual understanding and cooperation in security matters will form a significant part of their bilateral relations, and will strengthen regional security.
3. Palestine and Israel will base their security relations on cooperation, mutual trust, good neighborly relations, and the protection of their common interests.
4. The border regime will be defined as “open” or “breathing,” and will permit the controlled passage of goods, vehicles, workers, and tourists between the two sides.
5. Palestine and Israel:
  - Will recognize and respect the right of the other party to live in peace within safe and recognized boundaries, free from threats of war, terror, and violence.
  - Will avoid the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other party, and will settle all disputes between them peacefully.
  - Will refrain from joining, assisting, promoting, or collaborating with any coalition, organization, military alliance or security treaty whose objectives or operations include an attack or other hostile activities against the other party.
  - Will refrain from organizing, encouraging or allowing the establishment of irregular force or armed gangs, including mercenaries and militias, within their territory and will prevent their establishment. In this sense, any existing irregular force or armed gang will be dismantled, and will be prevented from regrouping at any time in the future.
  - Will refrain from organizing, assisting, allowing or participating in acts of violence in or against the other party, and will refrain from consenting to activity intended to activate others in such acts.
6. The border between Israel and Palestine will be based on the 1967 lines, with arrangements and adjustments required due to the demographic needs of the State of Israel, including the main settlement blocs, Israeli communities close to the Green Line, and the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, as well as changes required as a result of the transfer of territories from Israel to Palestine.
7. In order to promote security cooperation, the parties will establish a Joint Supreme Security Committee. The committee will meet on a monthly basis. It will maintain a permanent joint office and be able to establish subcommittees as it deems appropriate, including subcommittees for the immediate resolution of local tensions.

8. Jordan and Egypt will take part in the security arrangements on the basis of their support for the peace agreement and out of concern for its stability and its impact on their interests.
9. The agreement will include functional arrangements:
10. Both sides will establish joint industrial zones along the borders, including special security arrangements.
11. Each party will ensure the integrity and functionality of infrastructure located in its territory but used by the other party.
12. Agreed functional arrangements between the two parties will be established to ensure uninterrupted travel to the holy places.
13. Functional arrangements to be agreed upon between the two parties will be established to enable the passage of rescue, fire, and medical teams as required by each party.
14. Israel's security considerations will be a priority, and will ensure that:
  - Even in the scenario of the collapse of the agreement or its breach by the Palestinians, the security of the State of Israel will be preserved and its ability to defend itself, by itself, will not be harmed.
  - The security of the State of Israel will rely on its national strength and will be based on the willingness or ability of the Palestinians and/or of multinational forces to meet their commitments.
15. Implementation of the permanent agreement in the Gaza Strip is conditioned on:
  - Maintaining a central Palestinian government that exercises effective control over the Gaza Strip.
  - The dismantling of terrorist organizations and their infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, and ensuring that the principle of a demilitarized Palestinian state also applies in Gaza.

## **Demilitarization of the Palestinian State**

1. The Palestinian State will be demilitarized. Palestine will not be permitted:
  - To make military alliances with states, organizations or entities hostile to Israel.
  - To invite or permit a foreign army or organization to station, pass through, or otherwise make use of its territory.
  - To maintain military forces or weapons outside its territory.
2. The Palestine-Jordan border will be a security line ensuring the demilitarization of Palestine and preventing the entry of hostile elements into its territory.
3. A strip on either side of the Jordan River will be designated as a "special security



zone” and will be subject to special arrangements that combine (for agreed periods of time and with agreed procedures) the capabilities of Jordan, the Palestinian state, Israel, and the multinational force.

4. Israel will control (for an agreed period) the entry of people and cargo at international border crossings on land, air, and sea.
5. “Conditional strategic depth.” Subject to rules of conduct to be formulated between the parties, the territory of the Palestinian state will constitute “conditional strategic depth” of the State of Israel (as in the agreement with Jordan, and similar to the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula in the agreement with Egypt).
6. A multinational force will be deployed in the Palestinian state; the force will be under US command and dominated by elite American forces, along with the participation of other military units with the agreement of the parties.

### **Palestinian Security Forces**

The task of the Palestinian security forces includes preventing the destabilization of the political regime and supporting the integrity and dignity of the State of Palestine. This includes: combating and countering terrorism; strict enforcement of the principle of demilitarization; preventing weapons smuggling; border control; enforcing law and order; intelligence gathering; rescue and recovery; community services.

With the establishment of the Palestinian state, any illegal weapons will be collected by the Palestinian security forces and transferred to the multinational force for destruction.

### **Israel-Palestine Border**

The borders between Israel and Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza will be based on a multi-component defense system: preventative intelligence, tactical intelligence gathering, the barrier system, the definition of sensitive security areas, and the gradual and conditional transfer of security responsibilities.

### **Palestine-Jordan Border**

This will constitute another vital security line for ensuring the demilitarization of the Palestinian state, preventing smuggling and the entry of hostile elements from Jordan’s territory into Palestine and Israel, with all this implies.

### **Palestine-Egypt Border**

This will constitute another vital security line for ensuring the demilitarization of the Palestinian state, preventing smuggling and the entry of hostile elements from

Egypt's territory to the Palestinian state and Israel, with all this implies.

### **International Crossings**

International crossings must effectively ensure the safe and dignified passage of people and goods between Palestine and Jordan, while preventing abuse of the crossings in order to smuggle weapons and other illegal substances, as well as people posing a security risk to one or more of the three parties. In addition, the transitional facilities must be properly secured and protected.

### **A Corridor between Gaza and the West Bank**

The corridor will be under Israeli sovereignty and Palestinian administration.

### **Airspace**

The Israeli-Palestinian civilian airspace will be part of Israel—the Flight Information Region (FIR). It will be managed by the Israel Air Force with transparency to the Palestinian side regarding civilian traffic in their territory. An “air coordination cell” will be established between Israel and Palestine.

### **Maritime Space**

Like the airspace, Palestinians will control their territorial waters in Gaza, but with certain restrictions enabling Israel to maintain overall security, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

### **Early Warning Stations**

Israel will be able to maintain two warning stations: Baal Hatzor (Jabal al-‘Asur) and Mount Ebal (Jabal ‘Ibal), for operating electronic and optical monitoring equipment, both active and passive.

### **Multinational Force**

1. The multinational force (Multilateral Force for the Implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement) will be established within the framework of the agreement between the parties and will constitute an integral part thereof.
2. The multinational force will have the capacity to carry out its missions and respond to Israel's demands for reliable security arrangements, while minimizing the violation of Palestinian sovereignty.
3. The force will monitor, verify, and assist in the implementation of the parties' commitment to the agreement and prevention of its violation.

4. The multinational force will be under U.S. command, with a dominant component of elite U.S. military forces and with the participation of other militaries as agreed by the parties.
5. The multinational will be built and operated in accordance with a mandate to be agreed between the parties.
6. In the Jordan Valley, the force will be American only and will work in coordination with the Jordanian security system in all aspects of border security operations along the River Jordan and at the border crossings; it will work in coordination with the Egyptian security system on the Gaza border.

### **Electromagnetic Spectrum**

Use of electromagnetic space by either party will not interfere with use by the other side. Israel will maintain control of the spectrum's security elements, while reaching understandings with Palestinians concerning the civilian use of frequencies.

## **Regional Diplomatic and Security Arrangements**

Participation in the planned regional security framework should be open to all countries in the region that accept its terms. These should include a commitment to regional stability, support for the Arab Peace Initiative, support for the two-state Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the basis of negotiations, and once such an agreement is reached—willingness to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel. Countries outside the region that share these goals and contribute to them, such as the United States and Russia, as well as relevant organizations (EU, NATO, and the Arab League), will be invited to participate in the framework, but not in the decision-making process.

## **Principles and Stages for the Implementation Plan**

### **Stage 1: Up to 5 Years**

1. Israel will maintain full security responsibility for Area C.
2. The Palestinian government will exercise full civilian and security in the Gaza Strip.
3. Disarmament of the Gaza Strip in accordance with the agreement.
4. Evacuation and relocation of IDF bases.
5. Construction of the Barrier and border crossings along the course of the Jordan-Palestine border.

6. Construction of obstacles and border crossings along the borders between Israel and Palestine.
7. Application of a border arrangement along the Palestine-Egypt border.
8. Evacuation of communities east of the agreed border and resettlement of their residents.
9. Completion of training of the Palestinian security forces.
10. The building of the multinational power.
11. Gradual transfer of Area C to the State of Palestine.
12. Building the corridor / temporary “safe passage.”

### **Stage 2: Up to 8 Years**

1. Gradual transfer of civil and security responsibilities to the Palestinian government and to the multinational force, including the Special Security Area in the Jordan Valley.
2. Consolidation and preparation of the multinational force with its various components.
3. Transfer of responsibility for the Jordan-Palestine border crossings to the Palestinian government.

### **Stage 3: Full Sovereignty of the Palestinian Government**

1. A continuous campaign against terrorism; maintenance of the border arrangement; operational activities of the multinational force.
2. Overall security arrangements, including the Special Security Area, will be assessed 10 years after the implementation of Stage 2.

## **Security: Summary**

1. An agreement that will be fair and approved by the majority of the Palestinian population will give the majority of supporters an interest in denouncing and isolating the minority that opposes the agreement.
2. An arrangement with the Palestinians will allow for a regional security-political alliance between Israel and several key Arab states based on common interests, such as:
  - Fighting terrorist organizations, Salafites, jihadists, and others.
  - Addressing the Iranian threat both nuclear and sub-nuclear.
  - Stopping the spread of the “Shiite Crescent.”
  - Strengthening moderate Sunni regimes.
  - Streamlining the fight against weapons smuggling across the region

3. Improving Israel's international standing and curbing hostile trends such as BDS.
4. An increase in US security aid to Israel.
5. Releasing the IDF from responsibility for policing and for tasks entailing friction with a civilian population, thereby allowing it to focus on core security tasks and to invest its resources in enhancing its strength and in ensuring preparedness.
6. Reducing security tension with Israeli Arabs.
7. Allocating budgetary resources to social and welfare issues.

### **A Word about the Jordan Valley**

The idea of maintaining a security zone on the eastern slopes of Samaria and in the Jordan Valley emerged after the 1967 Six Day War due to Israeli concern at a possible land invasion by a "potential eastern front" comprising the armies of Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. This front has since disappeared: from the destruction of ground-to-air missile batteries in the Lebanon Valley and the downing of 86 Syrian planes during the First Lebanon War in 1982; through the cessation of free arms shipments from Russia to Syria due to the collapse of the USSR in 1988; the peace agreement with Jordan signed in 1994; the occupation of Iraq by the US in 2003 and the civil war in the country; and lastly the civil war in Syria since March 2011.

Any junior intelligence officer can understand that Iran is neither interested in nor capable of sending armed troops toward Israel, crossing 1,500 km of the Arabian Desert, while exposed to the Israeli Air Force, and while crossing through a domain inhabited mainly by Sunnis.

What is Israel's true strategic depth?

The Israel-Jordan peace agreement has for 26 years included two clauses whose security importance is equal to that of the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula in Israel's peace agreement with Egypt. Both clauses appear in Article Four of the agreement and both are mutual. The first, section 4, prohibits Jordan and Israel from signing military alliances with hostile states or organizations, and from "allowing the entry, stationing and operating on their territory, or through it ... in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security of the other Party." In other words, based on the working assumption that the Jordanian military is neither capable of nor interested in threatening Israel, the true security border of Israel is not the Jordan River, but Jordan's borders with Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, which lie over 300 kilometers from the Israeli population centers. This section in the agreement thus gives Israel greater strategic depth than any territorial demands ever raised by the Zionist movement since the 1919 peace conference at Versailles.

The threat to Israel is today defined as the "seepage" of terror from Jordan through



the Jordan Valley to the Palestinian state, and from there on to Israel. This threat also received an extremely effective security response. Firstly, section 5 of the security article in the peace agreement with Jordan states that “the Parties undertake to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism, subversion or violence from being carried out from their territory or through it and to take necessary and effective measures to combat such activities and all their perpetrators.” Commanders from Israel’s Jordan Valley Brigade and operational commanders of the IDF’s Central Command will confirm that the Jordanian army, deployed along the River Jordan, performs its task faithfully, and indeed more than that. This success has allowed Israel to enjoy a stable and calm border, and accordingly to reduce significantly the number of forces it stations in the area.

## **Jerusalem**

There are two possible alternatives: firstly, dividing East Jerusalem according to the demographic principle—Jewish neighborhoods to Israel and Arab neighborhoods to Palestine, with a special regime for the “Historic Basin” (see below). Secondly, maintaining Jerusalem as an open city with two municipalities, while separating the city from both Palestine and Israel by means of a physical obstacle.

### **First Alternative**

1. Status of residents: The municipal boundaries in the Jerusalem Law will be amended. Palestinians residents of East Jerusalem will receive Palestinian residency and citizenship in exchange for the retraction of Israeli residency.
2. Obstacle and crossings: An obstacle will be constructed, on both sides of which the security forces of both sides will act to prevent unauthorized passage or any other terrorist or criminal activity. A network of controlled crossings will be established between the two cities for the movement of goods, vehicles, pedestrians, and tourists.
3. Security arrangements in the “Historic Basin.”
  - The “Historic Basin” will include the Old City, the City of David, Mount Zion, the Kidron Basin, the Mount of Olives, and the Mount of Anointment (2 sq.km., 70,000 inhabitants, 90% of whom are Arabs).
  - Obstacle: The “Historic Basin” will be separated from Israeli Jerusalem and Palestinian Al-Quds by means of a soft obstacle (a decorative alert fence similar to that installed at Ben Gurion Airport). The obstacle will include crossing points for pedestrians, tourists, vehicles, and service providers.
  - Freedom of access to all the holy places and freedom of worship thereat will be guaranteed in accordance with the status quo.

- Israelis and Palestinians will enjoy free access to the “Historic Basin” through a system of crossings monitored by the relevant body (multinational force / joint forces), and will only be required to present their ID card. There will be no passage from one state to the other through the “Historic Basin.”
- An Israeli-Palestinian multinational joint committee will be set up for arbitration on matters concerning the “Historic Basin.”
- Administrative management of the area: Israel and Palestine will appoint by mandate a multinational force (from Arab countries, Europe, and the US) to manage all aspects of life in the “Historic Basin” (from security to tourism), assisted by the Municipality of Jerusalem and the Municipality of Al-Quds.
- The multinational force will be deployed in the “Historic Basin” area and at sensitive points in the city and will oversee the implementation of the agreement by both sides.
- Israelis will continue to hold Israeli citizenship while Palestinians will hold Palestinian citizenship.
- The sides will review the existing mandate every ten years and may cancel it by mutual agreement.


## **Second Alternative**

Two separate municipalities within an open city, separated by an obstacle from Israel and Palestine (see Map 45).

## **Refugees<sup>42</sup>**

1. Significance of the Refugee Problem: The Parties recognize that, in the context of two independent states, Palestine and Israel, living side by side in peace, an agreed resolution of the refugee problem is necessary for achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace between them. Such a resolution will also be central to stability building and development in the region.
2. The Parties recognize that UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242, and the Arab Peace Initiative (Article 2.ii.) concerning the rights of the Palestinian refugees represent the basis for resolving the refugee issue, and agree that these rights are fulfilled according to Article 7 of this Agreement.
3. Compensation: Refugees shall be entitled to compensation for their refugeehood and for loss of property. This shall not prejudice or be prejudiced by the refugee’s

<sup>42</sup> This section is based on the Geneva Initiative, 2003.



Map 45: Jerusalem, Two Capitals (Proposal)

permanent place of residence. The Parties recognize the right of states that have hosted Palestinian refugees to remuneration

4. Choice of permanent place of residence: The solution regarding the permanent place of residence aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in this agreement. Options for the permanent place of residence from which the refugees may choose shall be as follows: i) the State of Palestine; ii) areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap<sup>43</sup> after the application of Palestinian sovereignty; iii) third countries;<sup>44</sup> iv) the State of Israel;<sup>45</sup> v) the present host countries.<sup>46</sup>
5. Free and informed choice: The process by which Palestinian refugees shall express their PPR choice shall be on the basis of a free and informed decision. The Parties themselves are committed and will encourage third parties to facilitate the refugees' free choice in expressing their preferences, and to countering any attempts at interference or organized pressure on the process of choice. This will not prejudice the recognition of Palestine as the realization of Palestinian self-determination and statehood.
6. End of refugee status: Palestinian refugee status shall be terminated upon the realization of an individual refugee's permanent place of residence as determined by the International Commission.
7. End of claims: This agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem. No claims may be raised except for those related to the implementation of this agreement.
8. International role: The Parties call upon the international community to participate fully in the comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem in accordance with this Agreement, including, inter alia, the establishment of an International Commission and an International Fund.

<sup>43</sup> Options i and ii shall be the right of all Palestinian refugees and shall be in accordance with the laws of the State of Palestine.

<sup>44</sup> Option iii shall be at the sovereign discretion of third countries and shall be in accordance with numbers that each third country will submit to the International Commission. These numbers shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that each third country shall accept.

<sup>45</sup> Option iv shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel and will be in accordance with a number that Israel will submit to the International Commission. This number shall represent the total number of Palestinian refugees that Israel shall accept. As a basis, Israel will consider the average of the total numbers submitted by the different third countries to the International Commission.

<sup>46</sup> Option v shall be in accordance with the sovereign discretion of present host countries. Where exercised this shall be in the context of prompt and extensive development and rehabilitation programs for the refugee communities.



9. Property compensation: Refugees shall be compensated for the loss of property resulting from their displacement. The aggregate sum of property compensation shall be calculated as follows: The Parties shall request the International Commission to appoint a Panel of Experts to estimate the value of Palestinians' property at the time of displacement. The aggregate value agreed to by the Parties shall constitute the Israeli contribution to the International Fund. No other financial claims arising from the Palestinian refugee problem may be raised against Israel. The value of fixed assets remaining intact in the former settlements to be transferred to the State of Palestine shall be offset from Israel's contribution to the International Fund. The evaluation of this sum shall be undertaken by the International Commission, taking into account an estimate of the damage caused by the settlements.
10. Compensation for Refugeehood: A "Refugeehood Fund" shall be established in recognition of each individual's refugeehood. The Fund, to which Israel shall be a contributing party, shall be overseen by the International Commission.
11. Funds will be disbursed to refugee communities in the former areas of UNRWA operation, and will be at their disposal for communal development and commemoration of the refugee experience. Appropriate mechanisms will be devised by the International Commission whereby the beneficiary refugee communities are empowered to determine and administer the use of this Fund.
12. The International Commission: An International Commission shall be established and shall have full and exclusive responsibility for implementing all aspects of this Agreement pertaining to refugees.
13. An International Fund shall be established to receive contributions outlined in this section and additional contributions from the international community. The Fund shall disburse monies to the Commission to enable it to carry out its functions.
14. UNRWA should be phased out in each country in which it operates, based on the end of refugee status in that country. UNRWA should cease to exist five years after the start of the Commission's operations. The Commission shall draw up a plan for the phasing out of UNRWA and shall facilitate the transfer of UNRWA functions to host states.
15. Reconciliation programs: The Parties will encourage and promote the development of cooperation between their relevant institutions and civil societies in creating forums for exchanging historical narratives and enhancing mutual understanding regarding the past. The Parties shall encourage and facilitate exchanges in order to disseminate a richer appreciation of these respective narratives, in the fields



of formal and informal education, by providing conditions for direct contacts between schools, educational institutions and civil society. The Parties may consider cross-community cultural programs in order to promote the goals of conciliation in relation to their respective histories.

16. These programs may include developing appropriate ways of commemorating the villages and communities that existed prior to 1949.

# Appendix 2

## Profile of the Needs and Desires of Settlers in Judea and Samaria

**Prof. Gilad Hirschberger and Prof. Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler**

There has recently been a resurgence of discussion of the feasibility of the two-state solution as a way of resolving the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. The legal experts Mautner and Singer (21 Oct. 2021), one of whom was involved in drafting the Oslo Accords, reached the following conclusion: “Immediately after the signing of the Oslo Accords it was possible to establish a separate Palestinian state, including the evacuation of all the settlers living deep inside the West Bank and the redrawing of Israel’s eastern border in order to leave all the other settlers—the majority at the time—in Israeli territory. This possibility no longer exists today. In other words, it is no longer politically or practically possible to evacuate a sufficient number of settlers in order to enable the establishment of a Palestinian state with territorial contiguity.”

The goal of this report is to examine the decisive claim that it is no longer possible to evacuate settlers and to establish a contiguous Palestinian state alongside Israel. Our analysis is based on empirical data we gathered concerning the settler population in Judea and Samaria for the years 2014, 2016, and 2018. All the surveys show that it is not possible to regard the settler population in Judea and Samaria as a monolithic entity. Different settlers have differing needs and motivations regarding their ongoing residence in the area. Moreover, the three surveys show that the level of willingness among settlers—including ideological settlers—to discuss the future of their settlement in the territories and to cope with the possible evacuation of settlements is greater than is usually assumed. The first survey, conducted in 2014, was an experimental poll among a representative sample of settlers living outside the “zone of probable agreement” (an area comprising around 3.5 percent of the total area of Judea and Samaria that is likely to be annexed to Israel in any future agreement). The survey was conducted on a sample of 590 participants, based on layer sampling (settlers motivated by quality of life versus ideological settlers) and cluster sampling (sampling for all the municipal entities). Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the settlers’ homes. The second survey, conducted by telephone, was undertaken in 2016 on a sample of 1,504 settlers representing four distinct groups outside the “zone

of probable agreement.” statist ideological settlers (loyal to the State of Israel and its laws), non-statist ideological settlers (for whom settler ideology takes precedence over the state’s laws), quality of life settlers, and settlers in the city of Ariel. The third survey, also conducted by telephone, was carried out on a sample of 2,376 settlers according to the following categories: (1) The settlers’ political and religious attitudes; (2) attitudes concerning the two-state solution; (3) willingness to accept the evacuation of settlements; (4) conditions for the evacuation of settlements; (5) attitudes toward annexation; (6) where the settlers see their future; (7) how they evaluate their quality of life; (8) personal and national security; (9) attitudes toward democracy and the rule of law. We will then examine the attitudes of settlers in Judea and Samaria over the course of time. Lastly, we will offer a research-based answer to the question: is it still possible to evacuate a sufficient number of Jewish settlers from Judea and Samaria in order to implement a solution based on two-states for two peoples?

## **1. Political and Religious Attitudes**


Various commentators and writers share the basic assumption that the settlers in Judea and Samaria constitute a homogenous, religious, and nationalist population. The findings of our surveys reveal a high level of divergence between the different groups of settlers. As Figure 1 shows, ideological settlers typically hold extremely right-wing views (particularly in the non-statist sub-group), while quality of life settlers and those in Ariel tend to hold more moderate center-right positions. It is also worth noting that the residents of Ariel defined themselves as more right wing than those of other quality of life settlements.

The distinction between the different groups of settlers is further clarified when religious differences are taken into account. While a large majority of ideological settlers are religious, most of the quality of life settlers (including in Ariel) are secular.

The differences between the groups of settlers are also apparent in terms of the motivation behind their decision to live in Judea and Samaria. As Figure 3 shows, ideological settlers live in the territories for ideological and religious reasons, while quality of life settlers (including in Ariel) live there for economic reasons and factors relating to their quality of life.


## Figure 1: Political Attitudes among Settlers in Judea and Samaria

The terms right and left are used to refer to political orientation. Please indicate your political orientation on the following scale from "very left" to "very right".




## Figure 2: Level of Religiosity of Settlers in Judea and Samaria

Are you secular, traditional, religious, religious Zionist, ultra-orthodox Zionist, ultra-orthodox?



**Figure 3: Motivations for Settlement in Judea and Samaria**



## 2. Attitudes toward the Two-State Solution


Many commentators and writers adopt an almost axiomatic point of departure when discussing the future of the territories that argues that the settlers in Judea and Samaria oppose the two-state solution. They argue that settlers reject this solution both for ideological reasons and because it is liable to lead to the evacuation of the settlement in which they live. However, our surveys show that almost half of the quality of life settlers and Ariel settlers agree to a two-state solution that is supported by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Among ideological settlers, 10-15 percent will support such an agreement (Figure 4). It should be clarified that support for an agreement is not confined to a willingness to accept the decision, but implies that the agreement is regarded as positive.

We also asked about the settlers' attitudes toward an agreement led by former US President Donald Trump, including a withdrawal from most of the Territories but including concessions to Israel on other issues, such as Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees. It should be noted that this question was asked in 2018 before Trump launched his "Deal of the Century." Again, significant differences can be seen (Figure 5) between ideology settlers and quality of life settlers, although the level of support overall was low in this instance (presumably because of the full withdrawal from the Territories).




**Figure 4: Support for the Two-State Solution among Settlers in Judea and Samaria**

the basis of two states for two people, and Prime Minister Netanyahu supports this agreement. In such a scenario, would you support the agreement that the government has reached and that is endorsed by Netanyahu?



**Figure 5: Support among Settlers in Judea and Samaria for a Diplomatic Initiative by Trump**

What is your attitude towards a possible policy initiative by American President Donald Trump whereby Israel will withdraw from most of Judea and Samaria, but this initiative will be biased in favor of Israel in other respects (Jerusalem, refugees)?




### 3. Willingness to Accept the Evacuation of Settlements

While support for the two-state solution among settlers in Judea and Samaria is higher than many imagine, another question must also be examined: how will settlers react to a solution that includes a withdrawal from the Territories, even if they do not agree with the solution?

Over half the respondents in quality of life settlements and in Ariel believe that settlers should be evacuated from the Territories in return for due compensation; even among ideological settlers, 30 to 40 percent agree with this position (Figure 6). In this context the non-statist ideological settlers are particularly strong in their opposition, supporting resistance to the evacuation of the settlements. They are also the only group that prefers resistance to other courses of action. In other words, if the Israeli government decides to evacuate settlements in Judea and Samaria, a clear majority of settlers will accept the decision as legitimate. Only non-statist ideological settlers—a small group within the total settler population—will prevaricate between resistance and acceptance.

**Figure 6: Willingness to Accept Evacuation if the Government Decides to Evacuate Their Settlement**


If the Israeli government reaches a decision to evacuate your settlement, and this decision is approved in a referendum, what do you think should be done?



If the decision to evacuate settlements is taken through a government decision and is also approved in a referendum, most quality of life settlers and half of the ideological settlers believe that it should be accepted and their settlement should be evacuated (Figure 7).


**Figure 7: Willingness to Accept Evacuation approved by the Government and by a Referendum**

If the government decides to evacuate Jewish settlements, and this decision is approved in a referendum, do you think settlements should be evacuated: under any circumstance, for financial compensation, or not under any circumstance?




We also asked the settlers about their willingness to evacuate if the Israeli government enacts in the near future an “evacuation for compensation” law allowing settlers to receive immediate compensation for their home in the event of evacuation. In contrast to the previous question, which refers to a government decision independent of the settlers’ desires, in this case the intention is not to obligatory evacuation but to a decision by settlers to leave now. When the decision is left to them, most of the ideological settlers refuse to evacuate, while most of the quality of life settlers and those in Ariel do not reject out of hand the possibility of receiving compensation (Figure 8).

**Figure 8: Willingness to Evacuate Immediately in Return for Compensation**



**Figure 9: Correlation between Level of Compensation and Willingness to Evacuate the Settlement**

To what extent would you be willing to evacuate from your home if you were offered compensation that is equivalent to your income and assets today; that is 25% greater than your income and assets today; that is 50% greater than your income and assets today; that is 75% greater than your income and assets today?




The figure reflects significant differences between quality of life settlers and ideological settlers regarding the possibility of “evacuation for compensation” in the immediate future, before an agreement has been signed with the Palestinians or a government decision has been taken to withdraw from the Territories. Approximately 50 percent of non-ideological settlers (the quality of life and Ariel groups) are willing to consider such a possibility, compared to less than one-fourth of ideological settlers. Almost 70 percent of ideological settlers absolutely reject this idea, compared to less than 30 percent of non-ideological settlers.

In the 2014 survey, we compared ideological settlers to quality of life settlers in terms of their willingness to evacuate their settlement as function of the level of financial compensation offered: compensation equal to the value of their property compared to compensation 25, 50 or 75 percent higher than its value. Unsurprisingly, quality of life settlers were more willing to evacuate in return for compensation, but the level of compensation did not have a significant impact on their willingness to do so. Conversely, among ideological settlers the greater the compensation the *lower* the level of willingness to evacuate (Figure 9). For these settlers, high financial compensation creates a dissonance between their ideology and values and the financial temptation, and as a result intensifies their refusal to “sell” values they hold sacred in return for money.

**Figure 10: Changes in Willingness to Evacuate among Non-Statist Ideological Settlers**

If the government decides to evacuate Jewish settlements, and this decision is approved in a referendum, do you think settlements should be evacuated: under any circumstance, for financial compensation, or not under any circumstance?






We also examined whether any change occurred between 2016 and 2018 in the level of willingness to evacuate the settlement. As Figures 10 and 11 show, among ideological settlers (statist and non-statist), positions hardened somewhat, with a clear fall in the level of willingness to evacuate in return for compensation and a rise in refusal to do so. Indeed, by 2018 the differences between statist and non-statist ideological settlers were essentially blurred. Despite this trend, almost half of all ideological settlers still take the position that they should evacuate their settlement if a government decision is taken.

**Figure 11: Changes in Willingness to Evacuate  
among Statist Ideological Settlers**


If the government decides to evacuate Jewish settlements, and this decision is approved in a referendum, do you think settlements should be evacuated: under any circumstance, for financial compensation, or not under any circumstance?



The flip side of the coin of willingness to evacuate is willingness to protest against evacuation. We examined two types of protest: normative protest within the confines of the law (Figure 12) and non-normative protest entailing the breaking of the law (Figure 13). The ideological settlers clearly show a greater desire to struggle against the evacuation of settlements by comparison to the quality of life and Ariel groups. However, their willingness is confined to lawful actions (signing petitions, attending demonstrations). Only a small minority report that they will be willing to take the law into their own hands. Since it is possible that respondents might be reluctant to report an intention to engage in unlawful activities, we also asked about their level of support for others who act unlawfully (Figure 14). The level of support for others who engage in unlawful protests is much higher than the settlers' willingness to state that they themselves will act in this manner (by a factor of 5-6). Predictably, ideological settlers express greater support for others who choose to act unlawfully than do quality of life settlers.


**Figure 12: Support for Normative (Legal) Protest against the Evacuation of Settlements**

To what extent would you participate in legal protest such as demonstrations, signing petitions, writing letters to public officials?




**Figure 13: Support for Non-Normative (Unlawful) Protest against the Evacuation of Settlements**

To what extent would you participate in illegal protest such as physically assaulting the evacuation forces, physically assaulting people who support the evacuation?



**Figure 14: Support for Others Who Engage in Non-Normative Protest against the Evacuation of Settlements**

To what extent would you support other people who engage in illegal protest against the evacuation of Jewish settlements?



## 4. Conditions for Evacuation


Acceptance of the evacuation of settlements is not only a function of ideology and faith. Settlers in Judea and Samaria have lived in their home settlement for decades, and a network of non-ideological considerations also influence their willingness to evacuate—from distance and driving time to their place of work to their bonds to the community in their settlement and their desire to maintain the communal structure.

As the following table shows, the place of work is a factor in determining where to relocate to, particularly among the quality of life and Ariel groups (see also figure 16). For ideological settlers, and particularly the non-statist sub-group, it is important to relocate together with their community. Distance from the place of work is an equally important factor for all the settlers.

Among respondents from the statist ideological settlements who stated that their place of work is an important consideration, over one-third reported that in the event of annexation they would prefer to move to the Jerusalem area (34 percent), followed by the annexed settlement blocs (19 percent) or the north of Israel (18 percent).

		Mean	S.D.	Statistical test	Degrees of freedom	Significance
To what extent will your place of work be a consideration in choosing where to relocate to?	Ultra-nationalist ideological	3.04	1.52	4.36	3, 1076	.005
	Nationalist ideological	2.92	1.39			
	Quality of life	3.28	1.47			
	Ariel	3.30	1.51			
To what extent will it be important to you to relocate together with your community?	Ultra-nationalist ideological	3.24	1.31	31.86	3, 1234	.000
	Nationalist ideological	3.17	1.30			
	Quality of life	2.52	1.35			
	Ariel	2.41	1.34			
To what extent will it be important to you to live close to your place of work – i.e. within half an hour's driving distance?	Ultra-nationalist ideological	3.72	1.29	1.47	3, 1158	.222
	Nationalist ideological	3.71	1.19			
	Quality of life	3.74	1.33			
	Ariel	3.91	1.22			


**Figure 15: Importance of Relocating Together with the Community**



Among quality of life settlers who stated that their place of work is an important consideration, approximately one-half will prefer to move to the Gush Dan region (51 percent), and one-fifth (18 percent) to the north of Israel.

As Figure 15 shows, relocating together with the community is not an important factor for settlers in the quality of life and Ariel groups. It is a more important consideration for ideological settlers, but even in these groups only one-fifth regard it as a very important factor.

**Figure 16: Importance of Proximity to the Place of Work**






## 5. Attitudes toward the Annexation of Settlements

The annexation of the Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria to the State of Israel is one of the declared goals of the settlement movement. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that a large majority of ideological settlers support the annexation of all the Jewish settlements to Israel, even if this means a single state between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean, with all this implies (Figure 17). By contrast, only around half of quality of life settlers support the annexation of the settlement in Judea and Samaria to the State of Israel.

**Figure 17: Support for the Annexation of the Jewish Settlement in Judea and Samaria to the State of Israel**


What is your opinion about annexing all Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, even if this results in a one-state reality?



However, once the question emphasizes the practical ramification of annexing all the Territories—granting status to the Palestinians (even if not Israeli citizenship)—the level of support for annexation falls (Figure 18). Thus it would seem that settlers wish to “have their cake” (annex all the Jewish settlements) and “eat it” (avoid the need to annex Palestinian residents).

**Figure 18: Support for the Annexation of All the West Bank, including Granting Residency Status to the Palestinians**

What is your opinion about annexing the entire West Bank and providing the Palestinians with Israeli residency but not citizenship?



## 6. Where Do the Settlers See Their Future?

We examined how and where settlers see their future in two scenarios: the annexation of the settlements in Judea and Samaria and the evacuation of their settlement.

### A. Annexation of Judea and Samaria

	Non-statist ideological	Statist ideological	Ariel	Quality of life
Stay in the same settlement	76%	76%	75%	72%
Jerusalem area	6%	8%	1%	9%
Tel Aviv / Gush Dan region	1%	2%	11%	6%
Northern Israel	2%	3%	2%	4%
Another settlement in Judea and Samaria that will be annexed to Israel	2%	2%	3%	1%
Southern Israel	1%	2%	0	2%
Don't know	6%	3%	3%	4%
Missing responses	6%	4%	4%	4%

If Israel annexes their settlement, most settlers want to remain in the settlement where they live now; fewer quality of life settlers prefer this option relative to the other groups. Settlers in Ariel show a preference for moving to Tel Aviv / the Gush Dan region over other areas in this scenario, whereas respondents from quality of life settlements and from the ideological settlements show a stronger preference for Jerusalem over other areas. One-fourth (25 percent) of settlers in Ariel would be willing to leave the settlement even if it is annexed to Israel. A higher proportion of respondents in the 18-25 age group are interested in leaving their settlement than in other age groups, regardless of the type of settlement.

It was found that young respondents (18-25) from ideological settlements are interested in relocating even in the annexation scenario. Among young respondents interested in relocating in this scenario, the preferred area is southern Israel. By contrast, around one-fifth of young settlers in Ariel prefer the central / Gush Dan region. It was also found that the older the respondents, the more interested they are in remaining in their settlement in the annexation scenario.

## B. Evacuation of Settlements

We also examined the following question: another possible scenario regarding the future of your settlement is that a decision might be made to evacuate it. If this happens, which area of Israel would you prefer to move to?

	Non-statist ideological	Statist ideological	Ariel	Quality of life
Tel Aviv / Gush Dan	6/0%	6.6%	25.8%	36.8%
Jerusalem	22.2%	23.1%	18.3%	4.5%
Another settlement in Judea and Samaria that will be annexed to Israel	19.6%	18.3%	10.5%	9.2%
Northern Israel	8.8%	11.7%	14.8%	14.2%
Southern Israel	3.4%	3.1%	4.8%	2.5%
Central Israel	0	0.3%	1.5%	1.0%
Sharon region	0.3%	0.6%	1.0%	0.2%
Modi'in / Shoham	0	0	1.0%	0
Leave Israel	1.4%	1.4%	3.0%	6.7%
Willing to move, no particular area	0.9%	1.7%	2.3%	2.2%
Depends on work	0	0.3%	0.3%	0
Refuse to move	8.5%	7.4%	2.5%	8.5%
Do not want to move	0.6%	0.6%	0	0.5%
No reply / don't know	2.3%	2.3%	1.0%	3.2%
Missing responses	26.1%	22.6%	13.5%	10.4%


If their settlement is evacuated, quality of life settlers show the lowest level of refusal to leave; most of them will prefer to move to Tel Aviv or Jerusalem. Residents of Ariel show a clear preference for Tel Aviv, whereas a relatively small proportion of ideological settlers would choose to relocate to Tel Aviv. Most of the ideological group prefer to move to Jerusalem, to another settlement in the Territories, or to northern Israel.

An analysis by age yields two particularly interesting findings:

1. Most of the settlers in all groups and ages are willing to leave their settlement if it is evacuated.
2. Contrary to the expectation that younger respondents would show a greater level of resistance to relocation, due to a higher tendency to protest and militant positions in this age group, the research findings revealed the opposite tendency. The older the settlers, the greater their opposition to relocation. It is probable that the more established people are in their place of residence, the harder it is for them to move. In general terms older people find it harder to cope with changes than the young.

## 7. The Quality of Life of the Settlers


**Figure 19: Satisfaction among Settlers in Various Spheres of Life**



The quality of life and Ariel settlers state that they live in the Territories mainly due to the financial considerations and factors concerning quality of life. By contrast, settlers in the ideological settlements, and particularly those in the non-statist sub-group, declare that they came to the Territories for ideological and religious reasons. Somewhat ironically, however, quality of life settlers actually report a lower level of satisfaction with various aspects relating to the quality of life in their settlement. Their level of satisfaction is particularly low, relative to the ideological and Ariel groups, in the spheres of education, culture, employment, and community life (see figure 19).

**Figure 20: The Socioeconomic Condition of Settlers in Judea and Samaria**

The average family income in Israel is 14000 NIS a month. Is the income of your family:



The respondents from Ariel report a lower socioeconomic status than those in other settlements. Within the ideological group, the statist sub-group reports higher socioeconomic status than the non-statist group. Settlers in Ariel have smaller homes (fewer rooms), presumably due to their socioeconomic status, their relatively older age, and their smaller number of children (see figure 20).

Most of the settlers are salaried employees. A small minority work in agriculture,



and a small proportion are employed in industry. Among the non-statist settlers the proportion of salaried employees is slightly lower and a higher proportion are employed in teaching relative to the other groups. Among quality of life settlers and the statist ideological group, half of the respondents work in Judea and Samaria while the other half is divided mainly between the Tel Aviv area and the Jerusalem area. Among non-statist ideological settlers, the proportion who work in Judea and Samaria is higher—70 percent. Accordingly, some 50-60 percent of non-statist settlers have short journeys to and from work.

A comparison between the 2016 and 2018 surveys reveals an interesting phenomenon. Ideological settlers appear to be discovering the aspect of quality of life in Judea and Samaria (i.e. they are more inclined than in the past to mention quality of life considerations as part of their decision to live in the area). Conversely, quality of life settlers are discovering ideology (i.e. they mention the ideological motivation more than in the past). This suggests that despite the differences between the four groups, as time passes all the settlers seem to be developing a common and collective identity.


## **8. Personal and National Security**

We defined the aspect of national security on the basis of two key threats that face Israel and are related to the future of Judea and Samaria. The first is the physical threat of missiles and terror that could be launched from the territory following a withdrawal. The second is the symbolic threat and the threat to identity, relating to the possibility that continued control of the Territories and the de facto creation of a single state will not allow Israel to survive as a Jewish and democratic state.

As Figure 21 shows, all the groups of settlers regard terror as an existential threat to Israel, although the figure is slightly lower in the case of the quality of life settlers. Ideological settlers are particularly concerned that a withdrawal from the Territories will paralyze the center of Israel due to missile attacks. Quality of life settlers are significantly less concerned by this threat than the other groups, while the settlers in Ariel fall between the ideological and quality of life groups.

Regarding the symbolic threat and threat to identity, significant differences emerge between the groups of settlers. Most of the quality of life and Ariel groups believe that continued control of the Territories endangers Israel's identity as a Jewish and democratic state, while most ideological settlers do not perceive such a threat (Figure 22). Nevertheless, it is important to note that around 40 percent of ideological settlers do recognize the threat to Israel's identity posed by continued control of Judea and Samaria.

**Figure 21: Sense of Physical Threat among Settlers in Judea and Samaria**




Despite the relatively high recognition of the symbolic threat, most settlers are not concerned that Israel will lose its Jewish majority. Among the ideological settlers a small minority is concerned about this possibility, while among the quality of life and Ariel groups around 20 percent fear the loss of a Jewish majority.

Clear differences can be seen between the groups of settlers concerning their perception of threats. The settlers as a whole tend to be more concerned about the existential and physical threat than by the symbolic threat or the threat to identity. Most of the ideological settlers, and particularly those in the non-statist sub-group, have a stronger sense of a physical threat than the quality of life and Ariel groups. Conversely, these two groups have a stronger sense of a symbolic threat than the ideological settlers.

**Figure 22: Sense of a Symbolic Threat among Settlers in Judea and Samaria**

To what extent do you agree with the following statements:




## 9. Attitude to Democracy and the Rule of Law

Most of the settlers in all the groups accept the rules of the democratic game and acknowledge the importance of the rule of law. However, as Figure 23 shows, support for democracy and the rule of law is significantly lower among the non-statist settlers. This group also includes the highest proportion of those who declare that the Land of Israel is more important than democracy. The quality of life settlers are the least likely to adopt this position.

**Figure 23: Attitude to Democracy and the Rule of Law**

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?:




How should decisions about Israel's borders be made?	Non-statist ideological	Statist ideological	Ariel	Quality of life
Only by a referendum	44.0%	50.3%	48.3%	47.8%
By the government and Knesset	12.2%	20.3%	37.0%	42.3%
By the Halakhah and the rabbis' rulings	29.0%	19.1%	9.3%	4.0%
Government + referendum	0.9%	1.4%	1.5%	1.0%
Knesset and Halakhah	1.1%	0	0	0
Referendum and Halakhah	2.0%	1.7%	0	0
Combination of all three	2.6%	2.0%	0.3%	0.7%
Refuse to answer	0.9%	0.6%	0	0.2%
Other	0.3%	0.6%	0	0
Don't know	0	0	0.5%	0.5%
Missing responses	7.1%	4.0%	3.3%	3.5%

Around half the respondents in all the groups support holding a referendum in order to reach decisions on Israel's borders. However, support for a referendum is lower among the non-statist ideological sub-group than in the other groups. Quality of life settlers, and even more so residents of Ariel, are inclined to trust the government to take such decisions; the difference between these groups and the ideological settlers is statistically significant. The non-statist settlers show the lowest level of confidence in the decisions of the government and Knesset. Ideological settlers, and particularly the non-statist sub-group, are more likely than quality of life settlers to argue that Jewish religious law (Halakhah) and rabbinical decisions should be applied on issues concerning Israel's borders. Settlers in Ariel show the lowest level of support for this position.

As on other issues, positions hardened somewhat between 2016 and 2018, particularly among non-statist ideological settlers. As Figure 24 shows, there has been a fall in the level of support for a referendum among the non-statist ideological settlers and a rise in their tendency to prefer Halakhah and rabbinical rulings on issues concerning the future of the Territories.

**Figure 24: Change over Time in the Attitude toward Democracy among Non-Statist Ideological Settlers**

Do you think that decisions pertaining to Israel's final borders should be determined by the government and the Knesset; by referendum; or by Jewish law (Halakha) and rabbinic opinion?




These findings are consistent with our earlier findings from 2014, which also showed that a majority of ideological settlers believe that the Whole Land of Israel



is more important than Israel’s democratic character (Figure 25). A majority also believes that the Torah commandments take precedence over decisions of the Knesset (Figure 26).


**Figure 25: The Whole Land of Israel or Democracy?**

The greater land of Israel is more important than the Democratic character of the state?



**Figure 26: Torah Commandments or Knesset Decisions?**

To what extent do you agree with the following statement:  
The biblical directive takes precedence over the rule of the Knesset?



## Analysis and Conclusions

In a series of three surveys conducted in 2014, 2016, and 2018, we undertook for the first time an evaluation of attitudes among settlers in Judea and Samaria (see also the English-language publications at the end of this review). The three surveys relate to settlers living outside the “zone of probable agreement.” The surveys do not include Haredi settlements (most of which fall within the “zone of probable agreement.”) The surveys show that the settler population includes distinct groups with different characters, beliefs, and patterns of behavior. The findings of this survey provide empirical support for a division into four groups: statist ideological settlers, non-statist ideological settlers, quality of life settlers, and Ariel. The findings highlight the different characteristics and needs of each group. The ideological settlers differ from the quality of life and Ariel groups in numerous key parameters. Moreover, the four groups respond differently to various scenarios for the evacuation of settlements—a finding that has important ramifications in predicting the future political positions and behavior of this population. For example, all the groups of settlers express a strong sense of affinity to the State of Israel. However, some groups (the quality of life and Ariel settlers) seek to act within the rules of the democratic game in the context of future political decisions, while others (the ideological settlers) attach considerable importance to Halakhah and rabbinical rulings. These differences underscore the tension between democracy and acceptance of the rule of law, on the one hand, and ideological loyalty to the settlement enterprise, on the other. Decision makers would be wise to take these differences into account and ensure an appropriate response to the needs of each group.

The survey provides important evidence confirming that most settlers in Judea and Samaria recognize the possibility that settlements may be evacuated. Moreover, they are willing to discuss the practical ramifications of evacuation. One of the most interesting findings in this context concerns the response among the ideological settlers. A large majority of these settlers are pragmatic and are not categorically opposed to the evacuation of settlements. Evidence of this includes the non-absolute character of their opposition to evacuation and even a level of support for evacuation carried out in accordance with a government decision.

The evacuation of settlements in Judea and Samaria constitutes an extremely significant crisis of faith, ideology, and identity for the settler population, and particularly for the ideological settlers. However, there is a high level of willingness among the settler population as a whole to accept a government decision, even if they oppose it. Opposition to evacuation will be manifested primarily in lawful and

legitimate ways. A majority of settlers effectively confirm that their struggle against evacuation will be conducted within the confines of the law; only a minority are considering taking the law into their own hands or acting violently. However, the comparison between 2016 and 2018 is interesting and reveals a trend to growing extremism. It is clear that over time the level of trust in state institutions is falling, as is the willingness to evacuate. The main significance of this trend is that time may be working against those who support the idea of a separation from the Palestinians.

The research findings expose a significant gap between the rhetoric of the settler leaders in Judea and Samaria and attitudes among the settlers themselves. Firstly, the quality of life settlers—around one-third of the settler population—express a high level of support for the two-state solution; will support the evacuation of settlements if this is undertaken on the basis of a government decision; and show a fairly high level of support for an “evacuation for compensation” law allowing them to evacuate and receive compensation even now, before an agreement. Ideological settlers express more hawkish positions than the quality of life group, but even in this group a large proportion are willing to leave the Territories in the event of an agreement. Ideological settlers show a low level of support for the two-state solution, but almost half of them state that settlers should leave their settlement if a government decision is taken on the subject.

One of the clearest signs of the pragmatic tendency among the settlers is that a majority of respondents in all the groups agreed that settlers should evacuate in return for fair compensation. Non-statist ideological settlers are the least likely to agree with this position and the most likely to refuse to evacuate on any condition. We also asked the respondents to what extent they would consider the immediate implementation of an “evacuation for compensation” law. The idea of such a law is that even before political decisions are made concerning the future of Judea and Samaria, any settler will be able to leave their home in the Territories in return for fair compensation. The law allows for non-coercive evacuation as and when the settler so wishes. Quality of life and Ariel settlers show a willingness to consider this possibility positively, while the two groups of ideological settlers are more likely to reject this idea.

The findings suggest that decision makers should be very cautious when offering material incentives to an ideological population group. We found that when compensation is consistent with these settlers’ current assets, it does not arouse opposition, since they are not profiting from evacuation but merely maintaining the current financial situation. However, offering a higher level of compensation not only fails to tempt the ideological population to agree to evacuation, but actually creates dissonance between their ideology and the material temptation. As a result,

the ideological settlers become more entrenched in their positions and more opposed to evacuation. This population will not sell its values in return for money, and decision makers must take this into account.

The survey findings show that settlers of all types are more concerned by the physical threat than by the symbolic threat. Ideological settlers are more concerned about the physical threat than quality of life settlers, and conversely—quality of life settlers are more concerned about the symbolic threat than their ideological peers. Thus it is clear that the differences between ideological settlers and quality of life settlers in terms of their responses to evacuation reflect a different perception of threats. Quality of life settlers are more concerned about maintaining Israel's Jewish and democratic character, and accordingly more open to a possible withdrawal from Judea and Samaria. Ideological settlers focus on a tangible and physical threat to Israel's security, reinforcing their stronger opposition to a withdrawal.

In contrast to the image of the settler population among the Israeli public, all the groups of settlers expressed a strong level of support for democracy and the rule of law. The level of support was weakest among the non-statist ideological settlers, again corroborating their character as a more extreme group with a more ambivalent attitude toward the system of government and law in Israel. The non-statist ideological group also expressed the strongest support for the position that the Land of Israel is more important than democracy. Similarly, members of this group are the most likely to argue that important decisions regarding the Territories should be left to Halakhah and rabbinical rulings. Nevertheless, it is important to note that a majority in all the groups prefer a referendum over any other possible mechanism for taking such decisions. The way in which a withdrawal is undertaken is important to all the settlers. The ideological settlers will be willing to accept (reluctantly) a decision taken by a majority in the Knesset or in a referendum that offers clear benefits for Israel. In the absence of such clear returns, their level of opposition rises.

While opposition to evacuation is usually perceived as reflecting ideological opposition to an Israeli withdrawal from territory, our survey shows that other factors are also involved. For example, the distance from the place of work is an important variable for settlers in Judea and Samaria. The most extreme group of settlers—the non-statist ideological group—is already characterized by the shortest distances from the place of work. It is important to bear this in mind, since this aspect could moderate their opposition to evacuation. Another surprising finding was that opposition to relocation increased with increasing age. This finding contradicts the prevalent assumption that young settlers are more militant and more likely to oppose evacuation. Again, this suggests that opposition to evacuation is not due solely to

ideological factors, but also to personal considerations of convenience and an ability to cope with significant changes. For the older population, relocation presents a significant physical challenge and causes greater disruption to their social and work life. Older settlers are more likely to face difficulties in acclimatizing to a new place of residence, and accordingly are more strongly opposed to evacuation.

Three surveys conducted during various periods and using different methodologies among representative samples of ideological and quality-of-life settlers do not support the conclusion that it is impossible to implement a two-state solution requiring the evacuation of settlements. The surveys, held among the population liable to face eviction in a future agreement (i.e. those living outside the “zone of probable agreement”) show that most settlers are pragmatic. Even if they do not support the evacuation of settlements, they will be willing to accept the decision, provided that the withdrawal is approved in a government decision and/or referendum. Most settlers disapprove of violence and of protests beyond the scope of the law, and prefer to express their protest in a lawful and legitimate manner. It also emerged that opposition to a withdrawal is motivated not only by ideological factors, but also by more practical considerations, such as the distance from the place of work, the desire to remain in an existing community, and resistance to change at an advanced age. Effective attention to these aspects could reduce the level of opposition to evacuation. The decision to evacuate settlements will ultimately be taken on the basis of various considerations. The current analysis of the attitudes and desires of settlers in Judea and Samaria suggests that they will not constitute an insurmountable obstacle to a diplomatic solution.

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