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**A Palestinian Sadat? Another false claim of Netanyahu's**

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At an event marking the 40th anniversary of Anwar Sadat's visit to the Knesset last week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu referred to the possibility of negotiations with the Palestinians. He said: "I have not yet encountered a Palestinian Sadat, who will declare his desire for an end to the conflict, recognize the State of Israel with any borders and support our right to live in security and peace." As usual, this is not only a rewriting of history by Netanyahu but a collection of lies that one need not make an effort to unravel.

As early as September 9, 1993, the exchange of letters between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat on the eve of the signing of the Oslo Accords stated: "The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security … accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 …. commits itself … to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations", and in the light of " a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability … renounces the use of terrorism." Arafat continued to define the clauses of the Palestinian Covenant that negate Israel's existence as "invalid and impracticable." In exchange for all of this, Israel was asked to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people.

On September 13, 1993, the Declaration of Principles - which Netanyahu, according to his own testimony, did everything in his power to sabotage - stated right at the beginning that the parties "agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process."

And if that is not enough, on September 28, 1995, the Interim Agreement stated that the sides "[reaffirm] their determination to put an end to decades of confrontation and to live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights."

Of course, Netanyahu did not remain committed to these clear and formal commitments, and according to expediency, released his own declarations of "support" for his "peace" doctrine. He began in 1993 by saying that "a PLO state planted 15 kilometers from the shores of Tel Aviv would be an immediate mortal danger to the Jewish state" or that "PLO policy is the doctrine of stages and its goal is to destroy the State of Israel and not reach an agreement with it. The decisions made by the PLO in 1988 were intended only to please the United States," and the Palestinians' move to negotiations for the establishment of a Palestinian state "was intended only to bring Israel back to the narrow pre-1967 borders and renew the attack on the Jewish state. "

Netanyahu was careful to express his "willingness" for a twostate solution even in his later terms: "under their current conditions, a Palestinian state is out of the question" (2015). And on the eve of the elections he promised that "if I'm elected, there will not be a Palestinian state in my term" (March 2015). As far as Netanyahu is concerned, one can only go so far as to reach the next solution: "The autonomy plan under Israeli control is the only alternative to preventing these dangers, which are hidden in the 'peace' plan of the Oslo agreement."

Netanyahu continues to ignore Abbas's repeated statements regarding the end of the conflict in various events, such as his speech in Gaza: "The Nakba must be destroyed through a permanent solution based on the principle of two states for two peoples." The establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel will lead to historic reconciliation between the two peoples." And later: "historic reconciliation on the basis of two states for two peoples" (Gaza, September 13, 2005). "They say that even after the peace agreement we will demand Haifa, Acre and Safed; that's not true, and the agreement will be the end of the conflict," he said. "If there is no permanent agreement that talks about the end of the conflict, it will give various elements the possibility of sabotaging and stopping everything" (Ramallah, 2013).

If Netanyahu had asked, Abbas would have showed him the pamphlet called "The Position," which in recent years has been distributed in three languages to anyone who visits the Muqata or anyone who asks. There he would have found right at the outset the appeal that appeared at the initiative of the Arab League, which was unanimously approved and reiterated each year, regarding the "two-state solution and the end of the conflict." On the same page he would find that "in Algeria in 1988, the Palestinian leadership announced the acceptance of the principle of a two-state solution on the lines of June 4, 1967, as a basis for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict … and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the 1967 lines with small and agreed on border adjustments on both sides."

Even with regard to the issue of the refugees, it was written: "In previous meetings between the Palestinians and Israel, it was proven that there are practical and feasible ideas for solving the Palestinian refugee problem, and this is when there are sincere intentions to reach a two-state solution and end the conflict." And to remove any doubt regarding the realization of the right of return, it was immediately stated that this was a "just and agreed solution ... This means that no solutions will be imposed on any side."

The end of the conflict is the product of the final status agreement, in which all the claims are resolved. In order to sign such an agreement, Israel must return to the negotiating table based on the known parameters from which Netanyahu withdrew in 2009. The end of the conflict as an agreement clause cannot survive for long if both sides do not commit to an honest and prolonged process of reconciliation. This is possible only if the two sides sign an agreement in which they make painful concessions, while preserving their core interests: Israel, the democratic state of the Jewish people enjoying security and recognized borders, and the Palestinians an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

To this end, it turns out, Sadat is not missing a Palestinian, but more an Israeli, and no less an American Carter.